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INTRODUCTION
The year 2002 brought some significant changes to the Federal
1
Circuit: the addition of a new judge, Sharon Prost, and the issuance
of two decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court reversing the Federal
Circuit’s decisions. These decisions have had an impact on the
Federal Circuit—Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems,
2
Inc. limited the Federal Circuit’s patent jurisdiction and Festo Corp. v.
3
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushki Co. criticized the Federal Circuit in its
application of the controversial doctrine of equivalents. The Federal
Circuit’s docket continues to grow with the increased importance
placed on intellectual property, as evidenced by the breadth and
number of patent law decisions published by the Federal Circuit in
2002. The 2002 opinions are summarized here by subject matter.
I.

PROCEDURAL ASPECTS

The Federal Circuit addressed numerous procedural issues in its
decisions, including the subject matter jurisdiction of the district
courts, personal jurisdiction in patent cases, standing, collateral
estoppel, various trial procedures, and the procedures of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). The most notable
decision on a procedural issue did not come from the Federal
Circuit, but concerned the Supreme Court’s view of the Federal
Circuit’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction in patent cases.
A. Appellate Jurisdiction
In general, the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over any case where the subject matter jurisdiction of the district
court is based, in whole or in part, on a dispute arising under the
4
patent laws of the United States. However, in 2002, the Supreme
Court determined that the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the
Federal Circuit did not extend to every case in which a patent dispute
5
arises.
6
In Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., the
Supreme Court held that the Federal Circuit does not have
1. Nominated to be Circuit Judge by President George W. Bush on May 22,
2001, confirmed by the U.S. Senate September 21, 2001, and assumed duties of the
office on October 3, 2001. Judge Prost sat on a panel for the first time in January
2002.
2. 535 U.S. 826, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (2002).
3. 535 U.S. 722, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (2002).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2000).
5. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 834, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805.
6. Id. at 826, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1801.
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jurisdiction based on a patent infringement counterclaim; rather, the
Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is fixed with reference to that of the
7
district court. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1338, a district court has subject
8
matter jurisdiction of cases “arising under” the patent laws. In
Holmes, the Supreme Court determined that the well-pleaded
complaint rule governs resolution of whether the district court has
jurisdiction under § 1338, and that the rule does not allow for a
counterclaim to serve as the basis for the district court’s “arising
9
under” jurisdiction. The Justices did not accept that the phrase
“arising under” should be interpreted differently in assessing the
Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction in order to effectuate the congressional
10
goal of ensuring patent-law uniformity. As a result, the Supreme
Court stated that the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Federal
Circuit is limited to cases in which the patent dispute is apparent on
11
the face of the complaint alone.
Consistent with the decision in Holmes, the Federal Circuit held in
12
Telcomm Technical Services, Inc. v. Sieman’s Rolm Communications, Inc.
that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal solely
13
predicated on the existence of a patent infringement counterclaim.
In this case, the plaintiff appealed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment on plaintiff’s allegations of monopolization and
14
attempted monopolization under the Sherman Antitrust Act. The
complaint did not allege a cause of action arising under the patent
15
laws; rather, only the defendant raised a patent issue in the case. As
a result, the Federal Circuit transferred the case to the U.S. Court of
16
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
17
In Golan v. Pingel Enterprise, Inc., the Federal Circuit again
explored the boundaries of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction and
addressed whether it had jurisdiction over an appeal based on the
18
Declaratory Judgment Act for non-infringement of a patent.
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Holmes, the Federal
Circuit looked to whether the declaratory judgment complaint

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 834, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805.
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000).
Holmes, 535 U.S. at 831, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803-04.
Id. at 833-34, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804.
Id. at 834, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805.
295 F.3d 1249, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1606 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1252, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1608.
Id. at 1250-51, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607.
Id. at 1251, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607.
Id. at 1252, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1608.
310 F.3d 1360, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1366-67, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914-15.
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19

alleged an action arising under the patent laws. The Federal Circuit
indicated that in the context of declaratory judgments, “the plaintiff’s
complaint arises under federal law if the cause of action that the
declaratory defendant threatens to assert arises (or would arise)
20
under federal law.” The Federal Circuit explained that in the case
of a complaint seeking a declaration of non-infringement, the action
threatened by the declaratory defendant would be a patent
21
infringement action and would clearly arise under patent law.
Consequently, the Federal Circuit found that Golan’s declaratory
judgment allegations in his complaint for non-infringement of a
patent conferred jurisdiction on the court and noted that Pingel’s
patent infringement counterclaims were irrelevant when determining
22
whether the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction in this case.
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the U.S. District Courts
United States district courts have limited subject matter
23
24
jurisdiction. They may hear cases where there is a federal question,
25
such as a dispute arising under the patent laws, or controversies
26
among parties having a diversity of citizenship.
During the past year, the Federal Circuit addressed several aspects
of district court subject matter jurisdiction, including how a case is
determined to “arise under” the patent laws, whether a case should
be brought in the Court of Federal Claims, and whether a case is
properly brought under the Declaratory Judgments Act.
27
In Pixton v. B&B Plastics, Inc., the Federal Circuit considered
whether a district court had subject matter jurisdiction over Pixton’s
28
patent infringement action. As discussed above, under the relevant
jurisdictional statute, a district court has subject matter jurisdiction of
29
cases arising under the patent laws. In this case, Pixton assigned his
30
patent for plastic fishing lures to the defendant, B&B Plastics.
Subsequently, Pixton alleged that B&B breached the agreement and

19. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914-15.
20. Id. at 1367, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1915 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. of State of
Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 18 (1983)).
21. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1915.
22. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1915.
23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
25. Id. § 1338(a).
26. Id. § 1332(a).
27. 291 F.3d 1324, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1944 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
28. Id. at 1325-26, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1945.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
30. Pixton, 291 F.3d at 1326, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1945.
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31

sued B&B for infringement. The district court concluded that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the underlying action
32
On appeal, the Federal
sounded entirely in contract principles.
Circuit stated that a court must consider “whether the plaintiff has
stated, in a well-pleaded complaint, a claim arising under the patent
33
laws” to determine whether § 1338 jurisdiction attaches.
The
Federal Circuit explained that this must be determined from the
34
plaintiff’s statement of his claim.
The Federal Circuit then
indicated that Pixton’s complaint was well-pleaded and clearly set out
35
an action for patent infringement. The Court explained further
that federal jurisdiction “is not lost simply because the most efficient
36
approach at trial may be to address the license defense first.” As a
result, the Federal Circuit vacated the decision and remanded the
37
case back to the district court for trial.
38
In Toxgon Corp. v. BNFL, Inc., the Federal Circuit considered
whether a district court had subject matter jurisdiction over a case
where the alleged infringement resulted from activities authorized by
39
the United States for its sole benefit. In response to the filing of a
patent infringement suit by the plaintiff, the defendants moved to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
asserting that the infringement occurred “under the authority of and
40
for the sole benefit of the United States.” Defendants argued that
the plaintiff’s claims must be brought in the Court of Federal Claims
under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a), a law that restricts the remedy for
41
infringement by the United States to monetary compensation.
Among other things, the statute also relieves a federal contractor of
liability where the contractor uses or manufactures an infringing
42
invention for the United States.
The Federal Circuit held that
§ 1498(a) provides an affirmative defense in a suit between private
litigants, rather than a jurisdictional bar, and that it would therefore
31. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1945.
32. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1945.
33. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1945 (quoting Jim Arnold v. Hydrotech Sys., Inc.,
F.3d 1567, 1576, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1119, 1127) (citations omitted).
34. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1945 (quoting Jim Arnold v. Hydrotech Sys., Inc.,
F.3d 1567, 1576, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1119, 1127) (citations omitted).
35. Id. at 1327, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1946.
36. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1946 (citations omitted).
37. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1946.
38. 312 F.3d 1379, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
39. Id. at 1380, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147 (citations omitted in original).
40. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147; see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) (allowing a
motion for judgment for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter).
41. Toxgon Corp., 312 F.3d at 1380, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147-48 (Fed. Cir.
2002); 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000).
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be inappropriate to dismiss this action under Rule 12(b)(1).
Instead, the Federal Circuit stated that where appropriate, a defense
arising under § 1498(a) should be resolved by summary judgment
44
under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Federal Circuit faced a similar issue in Madey v. Duke
45
University. The district court dismissed a portion of Madey’s claim
for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that Duke University’s use of
Madey’s patents arose under the authority of a government research
grant and the case should have been brought in the Court of Federal
46
Claims. The Federal Circuit reversed the case, determining that the
district court erred in not applying Federal Circuit law and by
providing no findings or analysis upon which to base a review of the
47
decision.
48
In Vanguard Research, Inc. v. PEAT, Inc., the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court’s determination that there was not a case
or controversy sufficient for jurisdiction under the Declaratory
49
Judgment Act.
In so doing, the Federal Circuit stated that “a
patentee’s present intentions do not control whether a case or
controversy exists,” even though a party may indicate that it never
expressly authorized, nor intended to authorize, a suit for patent
50
infringement. Instead, the proper question is whether the plaintiff
seeking a declaratory judgment “had a reasonable apprehension” that
51
the patentee would sue for patent infringement at some future date.
In this case, by filing an earlier suit in state court over the same
technology and indicating to the plaintiff’s customers that the
plaintiff was using a patented technology without a license, the
52
defendant demonstrated a “‘willingness to protect that technology.’”
Thus, the Federal Circuit explained that the filing of a patent
43. Toxgon, 312 F.3d at 1382, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149.
44. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149; see FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (providing for
summary judgment).
45. 307 F.3d 1351, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
46. Id. at 1353-54, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739-40.
47. Id. at 1359-60, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744-45.
48. 304 F.3d 1249, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
49. Id. at 1250, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370; see 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000)
(allowing a court to declare the rights or legal relations of any interested party,
whether or not further relief is or could be sought, in a case of actual controversy
within its jurisdiction).
50. Vanguard Research, 304 F.3d at 1255, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374 (citing
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Releasomers, Inc., 824 F.2d 953, 956, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1310, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
51. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374.
52. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374 (citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Releasomers, Inc., 824 F.2d 953, 956, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1310, 1312 (Fed. Cir.
1987)).
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infringement claim would be “another logical step in its quest to
53
protect its technology.”
C. Personal Jurisdiction
A district court must have jurisdiction over the parties to a case in
54
order to properly adjudicate their claims. A court may exercise its
power over a defendant if the defendant is present in the forum state
or if the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum
state to the extent that the assertion of power will not “offend
55
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
In assessing the authority of the district courts over the parties to
an action, the Federal Circuit issued opinions concerning the effect
of a forum selection clause in a technology agreement, the effect of
negotiating a license in a state, the effect of a waiver of personal
jurisdiction, and what factors satisfy the minimum contacts test of
personal jurisdiction.
56
In Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, the Federal Circuit had the
opportunity to address the effects of a forum selection clause in a
57
technology agreement on personal jurisdiction. The district court
granted a preliminary injunction to Monsanto prohibiting McFarling
from using plant genes and seed obtained from crops grown from
58
Monsanto’s patented soybean seed. McFarling tried to use plant
genes and seed obtained from crops grown from Monsanto’s
patented herbicide-resistant Roundup Ready® soybean seed the
59
previous year. Monsanto required their seed distributors to have
purchasers sign a technology agreement saying that they will not save
60
any seeds for the next season.
Monsanto brought suit in U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri pursuant to the
61
forum selection clause in that agreement. Based on that clause, the
Federal Circuit determined that jurisdiction in Missouri was proper
62
because of “contractual consent”. The Federal Circuit explained
that McFarling’s voluntary failure to read the back of the contract,
53. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374.
54. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (stating that the
Due Process Clause does not contemplate state power to make a binding judgment
against an individual or corporation with which the state has no contacts, ties, or
relations).
55. Id.
56. 302 F.3d 1291, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
57. Id. at 1294, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163.
58. Id. at 1293, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162.
59. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162.
60. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162.
61. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162.
62. Id. at 1295, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163-64.
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which contained the forum selection clause, did not entitle him to an
63
exemption from the effects of the clause.
In Depreynyl Animal Health, Inc. v. University of Toronto Innovations
64
Foundation, the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded a decision by
the district court not to exercise personal jurisdiction over the
65
defendant. The Federal Circuit explained that its law governs the
issue of personal jurisdiction in patent-related cases, but regional
circuit law governs the determination of whether non-infringement
and invalidity claims fall within the scope of an arbitration clause of a
66
license agreement between the parties. The Federal Circuit stated
that the negotiation of a patent license agreement of a U.S. patent in
Kansas, albeit with a choice of law clause selecting Canadian law,
satisfied the minimum contacts requirement and constituted
sufficient purposeful availment of the U.S. patent law to make
67
jurisdiction in Kansas proper. The Federal Circuit also held that, in
view of international comity, the Kansas district court should stay the
proceedings pending the outcome of the ongoing Canadian
68
arbitration.
69
In Frank’s Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc. v. PMR Technologies, Ltd.,
the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that PMR
waived its personal jurisdiction defense by filing claims against new
70
defendants. The Federal Circuit based its determination on the fact
that, in filing its Answer, Class-Action Counter-Claim, and First
Amended Complaint, PMR asserted infringement claims against six
counter-claim defendants that previously were not involved in any
71
infringement suit related to the patent at issue. The Federal Circuit
reasoned that, because the new claims did not arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence (even though they were based on
infringement of the same patent), and because such action was not
authorized by the joinder rules, the attempted joinder constituted a
waiver of the opportunity to challenge personal jurisdiction relating
63. Id. at 1295-96, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164. In the dissent, Judge Clevenger
noted that the technology agreement (which contained the forum selection clause)
was a contract of adhesion. Id. at 1300, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167 (Clevenger, J.,
dissenting). Judge Clevenger stated that the terms of an adhesion contract should
not be permitted to overcome the constitutional right to due process that underlies
the personal jurisdiction requirement. Id. at 1301-02, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168.
64. 297 F.3d 1343, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
65. Id. at 1346, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706.
66. Id. at 1348-49, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708.
67. Id. at 1354, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712.
68. Id. at 1358, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1715.
69. 292 F.3d 1363, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
70. Id. at 1366, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066.
71. Id. at 1371-72, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
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to the pending claims in the action against the party seeking to add
72
additional claims.
73
In Hildebrand v. Steck Manufacturing Co., the Federal Circuit
reversed and remanded a declaratory judgment of non-infringement,
invalidity, and tortious interference because the trial court erred in
74
concluding that it had personal jurisdiction over Hildebrand. The
Federal Circuit applied Federal Circuit law in analyzing the lower
court exercise of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant
75
in a patent infringement case. The Federal Circuit indicated such
jurisdiction over a non-consenting party outside the forum state I
proper if that party is “amenable to service of process under the
appropriate long-arm statute [and] the culmination of the party’s
activities within the forum state satisfies the minimum contact
76
requirement of the due process clause.”
The Federal Circuit
determined that Hildebrand’s offers to do business and warning
letters, coupled with offers to negotiate with plaintiffs, rose only to
77
the level of soliciting business.
According to Ohio law, mere
solicitation of business by a foreign person does not constitute
78
transacting business in the state.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that Hildebrand did not
79
satisfy the first prong of the personal jurisdiction test. The Federal
Circuit also concluded that the second prong of the personal
jurisdiction test was not satisfied because Hildebrand’s contacts with
80
the forum were minimal.
The Federal Circuit explained that
“[f]airness and reasonableness demand that a patentee be free to
inform a party who happens to be located in a particular forum of
suspected infringement without risk of being subjected to a lawsuit in
81
that forum.”
D. Standing
82

Federal courts may only decide actual cases or controversies.
Accordingly, the courts have imposed standing requirements in order
72. Id. at 1372, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
73. 279 F.3d 1351, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1696 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
74. Id. at 1353, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1697.
75. Id. at 1354, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698.
76. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698.
77. Id. at 1355, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698.
78. Id. at 1354, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698.
79. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698.
80. Id. at 1355-56, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699-1700.
81. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699 (citing Red Wing Shoe Co. v. HockersonHalberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1361, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1192, 1197 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
82. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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to ensure that only actual cases or controversies are litigated. In its
only case addressing standing during this past year, the Federal
Circuit determined that the plaintiff’s lack of standing to sue did not
affect the defendant’s right to bring counterclaims related to unfair
competition, tortuous interference, and attorney fees.
84
In H.R. Technologies, Inc. v. Astechnologies, Inc., the district court
determined that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue for patent
infringement because it did not own the relevant patent, and
therefore granted the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the entire case
85
without prejudice, including the defendant’s counterclaims. After
determining that the district court’s decision was an appealable final
order, the Federal Circuit held that the district court properly
dismissed the plaintiff’s infringement action without prejudice
because the plaintiff could simply execute a valid assignment to show
86
The Federal Circuit also
ownership of the patent in question.
affirmed the dismissal of the defendant’s counterclaim for non87
infringement because it also turned on the question of ownership.
However, the Federal Circuit determined that the district court
improperly dismissed the defendant’s counterclaims that were not
affected by the standing defect because those claims did not depend
88
upon ownership of the patent.
As a result, the Federal Circuit
affirmed-in-part, vacated-in-part, and remanded the district court’s
89
decision.
E. Collateral Estoppel
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents parties from
90
litigating an issue of fact or law that was decided in a prior suit.

83. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“[T]he
core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-orcontroversy requirement of Article III.”).
84. 275 F.3d 1378, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
85. Id. at 1381, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1272-73.
86. Id. at 1383-84, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1275.
87. Id. at 1386, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1276.
88. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1276.
89. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277.
90. See Adair v. Sherman, 230 F.3d 890, 893 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that “under
the doctrine of issue preclusion, an issue may not be litigated if . . . : (1) the issue is
the same as that involved in a prior action; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the
determination of the issue was essential to the final judgment; and (4) the party
against whom estoppel is invoked was represented in the prior action.”); Grosz v. City
of Miami Beach, 82 F.3d 1005, 1006 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that collateral estoppel
can foreclose relitigation of an issue of fact or law where that issue was fully litigated
and decided in a prior suit).
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Issue preclusion is not intended to “create vested rights in decisions
91
that have become obsolete or erroneous over time”.
92
In Vardon Golf Co. v. Karsten Manufacturing Corp., the Federal
Circuit held that a non-final judgment could not be given preclusive
effect even when Vardon had not exhausted its appellate remedies,
including moving for certification of interlocutory appeal under Rule
54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, substituting the reissue
patent at an appropriate time, or suspending the reissue proceedings
93
before the USPTO.
Earlier, the district court granted partial
summary judgment on the grounds that Karsten did not infringe
94
certain claims of Vardon’s ‘941 patent. Two months after the court
granted partial summary judgment in Karsten’s favor, the ‘950 reissue
patent was issued. Vardon surrendered the ‘941 patent in order to
obtain the ‘950 reissue patent, thereby mooting the summary
judgment on the ‘941 patent and extinguishing Vardon’s right to
95
appeal.
Subsequently, the district court held that Vardon was
collaterally estopped from asserting the reissue patent ‘950 against
Karsten because Vardon failed to preserve its right to appeal the
96
partial summary judgment. The Federal Circuit explained that the
decision with respect to the ‘941 patent claim was not final because it
97
Consequently, the
was not immune to reversal or modification.
Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Vardon’s
98
complaint.
99
Similarly, in Bayer AG v. Biovail Corp., the Federal Circuit held that
100
Bayer was not collaterally estopped from suing Biovail. In the prior
action, the district court construed the claim in light of an
Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”), whereas in the later
action, information regarding actual products manufactured in
101
accordance with the ANDA was submitted.
The Federal Circuit
determined that the district court was required to construe the claim
with respect to measurement of manufactured products as opposed
to the specification contained in the ANDA that was the subject of the

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Comm’r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599 (1948).
294 F.3d 1330, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1468 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1334, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471.
Id. at 1332, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1469.
Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1469.
Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1470.
Id. at 1334, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471.
Id. at 1335, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472.
279 F.3d 1340, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1675 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1342, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676.
Id. at 1343, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677-78.
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102

prior action. Further, with respect to manufactured products made
in accordance with the ANDA specification of the prior action, the
Federal Circuit held that “infringement under 35 U.S.C.
103
§ 271(e)(2)(A) by submission of an ANDA is not synonymous with
104
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) by a commercial product
[and, therefore, the patentee should] have a full and fair opportunity
to litigate the issue of infringement by the commercial product”
105
despite a finding of non-infringement under § 271(e)(2)(A).
Specifically, the Federal Circuit determined that the district court’s
prior construction of the claims of the patent at issue did not address
106
the issues presented in the later case.
As a result, the Federal
107
Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
The Federal Circuit addressed a related issue in Ecolab Inc. v.
108
Paraclipse, Inc. In that case, the Federal Circuit stated that a consent
judgment between parties as to a certain product did not preclude
the defendant from challenging the validity of the patent in a
subsequent action alleging infringement by a new and different
109
product.
The Federal Circuit indicated that the provisions of a
consent judgment are to be construed narrowly and a party does not
waive its right to challenge the validity of a patent as to future accused
110
products absent clear intent to do so. In that case, the language of
the consent judgment was not clear because the defendant merely
111
agreed that the patent in suit was valid. Further, the record in the
case showed that the accused devices at issue were not “‘essentially
112
the same’” in the prior case and the later suit.
As a result, the
Federal Circuit remanded the case for a new trial where the
113
defendant was entitled to challenge the validity of the patent.

102. Id. at 1349, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.
103. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2000) (stating that it is an act of infringement to
submit an application for a patent for a drug already claimed or the use of which is
already claimed in a patent).
104. Id. § 271(a) (stating that whoever without the proper authority makes, uses,
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention is infringing that patent).
105. Bayer AG, 279 F.3d at 1350, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683.
106. Id. at 1349-50, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682-83.
107. Id. at 1350, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683.
108. 285 F.3d 1362, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
109. Id. at 1377, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1359-60.
110. Id. at 1376, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1359 (quoting Diversey Lever, Inc. v.
Ecoloab, Inc., 191 F.3d 1350, 1352, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1062, 1064 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
111. Id. at 1377, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1359.
112. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1359 (citation omitted in original).
113. Id. at 1378, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1360.
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Trial Procedures

The Federal Circuit addressed various trial and post-trial
procedural issues during the 2002 calendar year, including the
appropriate timing of a motion for a judgment as a matter of law, the
effect of erroneous jury instructions on claim construction, and the
appropriate timing of a motion for relief from judgment.
In Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics Technology Corp. v. Shell Oil
114
Co., the Federal Circuit ruled that the district court erred in
converting its grant of a new trial to a judgment as matter of law
(“JMOL”) because the plaintiffs did not move for a JMOL before the
115
case was submitted to the jury. Thus, plaintiffs were not entitled to
116
move for JMOL after the jury returned its verdict.
117
In Ecolab, Inc. v. Paraclipse, Inc., the Federal Circuit held that the
district court erred by erroneously instructing the jury in a patent
118
infringement trial regarding issues of claim construction.
Particularly, the Federal Circuit noted that the claim for a lighted
insect trap requires only that a housing “contain” a surface that
reflects light, and because the ordinary meaning of “contain” is “to
have within,” it was error to instruct the jury that the reflecting
surfaces required by the claim were limited to surfaces located on the
119
inside wall of the trap’s housing cover. The Federal Circuit stated
that because there was sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict of
infringement under a correct interpretation of the claim, the plaintiff
suffered prejudice from the district court’s error, and thus was
120
entitled to a new trial.
121
In Fiskars Inc. v. Hunt Manufacturing Co., the Federal Circuit
concluded that a request for relief from judgment twenty-one months
122
after entry of that judgment should be denied. There, Hunt filed a
motion for relief of judgment pursuant to Rules 60(b)(5) or (6) of
123
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to vacate the damages
awarded based on new evidence allegedly showing that Fiskars was

114. 308 F.3d 1167, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
115. Id. at 1187, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559.
116. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559.
117. 285 F.3d 1362, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
118. Id. at 1365, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1350.
119. Id. at 1374, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1357.
120. Id. at 1376, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1358.
121. 279 F.3d 1378, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1851 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
122. Id. at 1379, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1852.
123. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5) (providing relief when “it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application”); id. 60(b)(6) (providing relief
from a final judgment “for any other reason justifying relief from the operation of
the judgment”).

FINALPATENTSUMMARY.DOC

2003]

8/15/2003 1:41 PM

2002 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

905

124

not entitled to lost profits.
The Federal Circuit held that Rule
60(b)(6) was available only in extraordinary circumstances, which
125
The Federal Circuit also
were not present in the immediate case.
rejected Hunt’s argument that the damages for lost profits should be
reassessed after the trial “if market data probative of acceptability
becomes available once a non-infringing alternative replaces the
126
infringing product in the marketplace.”
As a result, the Federal
Circuit agreed with the district court that evidence arising nearly two
years after trial does not create the level of extraordinary
127
circumstance necessary to invoke Rule 60(b)(6).
The Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion
to reopen the case and vacate a damages judgment nearly two years
128
after entry of that judgment.
G. USPTO Procedures
The Federal Circuit had occasion to address certain USPTO
129
procedures in Blacklight Power, Inc. v. Rogan.
In that case, the
Federal Circuit affirmed a decision by the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia, finding that the Director of the USPTO had the
authority to withdraw Blacklight’s patent application from issue,
following Notice of Allowance, payment of the issue fee, and
130
The USPTO withdrew Blacklight’s
notification of the issue date.
application because there was concern that the patent application set
forth a proposition contrary to the known laws of physics and
131
chemistry, thus raising serious patentability problems.
On appeal, Blacklight argued that 35 U.S.C. § 151 compelled
issuance of the patent because it states that a patent should be issued
132
when the fee is paid. Moreover, Blacklight argued that 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.313, the regulation that the USPTO relied on to withdraw the
133
application, contravenes the language of § 151.
The USPTO
responded that its actions were proper because § 151 begins with the
124. Fiskars, 279 F.3d at 1380, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1852-53.
125. Id. at 1382, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854.
126. Id. at 1383, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855.
127. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855.
128. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855.
129. 295 F.3d 1269, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1534 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
130. Id. at 1270-71, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1535.
131. Id. at 1272, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1536.
132. Id. at 1273, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1537; 35 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
133. Blacklight Power, 295 F.3d at 1272, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1536; see Rules of
Practice in Patent Cases, 37 C.F.R. § 1.313(b) (2002) (explaining that once the issue
fee is paid, the USPTO will not withdraw an application from issue for any reason
unless: (1) there is a mistake by the USPTO; (2) there is an illegality in the application;
(3) one or more claims are not patentable; or (4) there is interference).
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conditional clause: “If it appears that applicant is entitled to a patent
under the law”; however, here, Blacklight was not entitled to a patent
134
under the law. The Federal Circuit agreed with the USPTO, holding
that, while the words “shall issue” impose a duty, the preface of § 151
135
makes that duty conditional.
Section 151 does not bar the USPTO
from interrupting the sequence of action if it reasonably believes that
this condition in the opening clause is not met, and thus, § 151 does
not prohibit the USPTO from withdrawing a patent application after
136
the issue fee is paid.
Blacklight argued that the USPTO did not
make a final determination of unpatentability when it withdrew the
137
application. The USPTO stated that, although it could not make a
final determination because the application was in Pennsylvania being
prepared for patent printing, a related patent was reviewed and found
138
to be unpatentable.
The district court found that at the time the
patent was withdrawn regulation § 1.313(b)(3) did not require a final
139
pronouncement.
The Federal Circuit agreed, holding that when
there is a time restraint, the USPTO does not have to conclusively
determine the outcome of a patent application because of the
complexity of the examination process and the potential for human
140
error.
H. Deference Owed to the USPTO
In denying a petition for rehearing en banc in Dethmers
141
Manufacturing Co. v. Automatic Equipment Manufacturing Co., the
dissenting judges remarked upon the deference owed to the USPTO
in its administration of its own procedural rules and the impact of
142
that deference on the presumption that a patent is valid.
In the
underlying case, the panel decision invalidated certain reissue claims
based on a USPTO procedural rule that specified the content of a
143
reissue oath or declaration.
One dissenting opinion argued that
“once a patent issues, non-compliance with a procedural rule
134. 35 U.S.C. § 151; Blacklight Power, 295 F.3d at 1273, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1537.
135. Blacklight Power, 295 F.3d at 1273, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1537.
136. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1537.
137. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1537.
138. Id. at 1271-72, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1536.
139. Id. at 1273, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1537.
140. Id. at 1273, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1537.
141. 293 F.3d 1364, 1365, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1317-18 (Fed. Cir. 2002). There
was a six-six split amongst the judges. Judges Newman, Lourie, Gajarsa, Dyk, Prost,
and Linn chose to hear the case en banc. Judges Mayer, Michel, Rader, Clevenger,
Schall, and Bryson declined to hear the case en banc. Id.
142. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318 (Linn, J., dissenting).
143. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318.
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administered by [the USPTO] within the agency’s statutory authority
and found, by virtue of the grant of the patent, to have been satisfied
144
The dissent further indicated
during prosecution,” is irrelevant.
that, as the result of the holding in the case, an examiner’s
misapplication of a USPTO procedural rule may invalidated a patent,
contrary to the proposition of deference toward patent issues and
supported by “a ground of invalidity not included in the exclusive list
145
of grounds set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 282.”
Accordingly, the dissent
concluded that the holding failed to recognize the statutory
146
presumption of validity to which every issued U.S. patent is entitled.
A second dissent argued that the USPTO should be afforded more
deference in this particular area because a reviewing court is “illequipped to determine whether the USPTO received the information
147
that it deems necessary for an examination.”
I.

Miscellaneous Procedural Issues
148

In Genetech, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., the Federal Circuit reversed the
district court’s grant of summary judgment for non-infringement
149
However, the Federal
based on an erroneous claim construction.
Circuit affirmed the district court’s order barring Genetech from
proceeding on a theory of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents because Genetech failed to allege such theories in its
claim charts as required under the Local Rules for the Northern
150
District of California.
Specifically, the Federal Circuit noted that
the philosophy behind amending claim charts is decidedly
conservative and designed to prevent the “‘shifting sands’” approach
151
to claim construction.
Thus, despite Genetech’s argument that it
interpreted the local rule as requiring a claim chart listing whether
the claimed infringement is literal or under the doctrine of
equivalents, and that Amgen had prior notice of equivalence
arguments and therefore was not prejudiced, the Federal Circuit

144. Id. at 1366, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318.
145. Id. at 1366, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318; 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) (establishing
four defenses for an action involving the validity or infringement of a patent).
146. Dethmers Mfg., 293 F.3d at 1366, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318 (Linn, J.,
dissenting).
147. Id. at 1367, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1319 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
148. 289 F.3d 761, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1640 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
149. Id. at 764, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1642.
150. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642.
151. Id. at 774, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649 (quoting Amtel Corp. v. Info Storage
Devices, Inc., 1998 WL 775115 at 2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 1998)) (quotation omitted).
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upheld the order because there were no allegations of legal or factual
152
error, and the district court’s ruling was not clearly erroneous.
153
In TechSearch L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., the Federal Circuit found that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in its appointment and
154
use of a technical advisor.
Predicting how the regional circuit
would decide this issue of first impression, the Federal Circuit
155
outlined the parameters for the use of a technical advisor.
The
Federal Circuit explained that the district court must: “[1] use a fair
and open procedure for appointing a technical advisor and address
any allegations of bias, partiality, or lack of qualifications in the
candidates; [2] clearly define and limit the technical advisor’s duties,
presumably in a writing made known to all parties; [3] guard against
extra-record information; and [4] make explicit []the nature and
content of the technical advisor’s tutelage concerning the
156
technology.”
In reaching its decision, the Federal Circuit noted
that the district court established sufficient protective measures to
ensure that the advisor did not improperly influence the district
157
court’s consideration of the evidence. The district court’s failure to
subject the technical advisor to cross-examination by the parties did
not constitute reversible error because the advisor, unlike an expert
witness for the parties, may not be relied upon as source of
158
evidence. Furthermore, the record did not suggest that the advisor
conducted independent experiments or research that could have
159
been used to resolve disputed issues of fact.
II. PATENTABILITY AND VALIDITY
In 2002, the Federal Circuit continued to address several important
issues relating to patentability and validity. For example, on a few
occasions the Federal Circuit confirmed the existence of “prosecution
history laches,” holding that unreasonable and unexplained delay in
160
prosecution may be applied to bar enforcement of patent claims.
The Federal Circuit also rejected attempts to expand the applicability
152. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649.
153. 286 F.3d 1360, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
154. Id. at 1379, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462.
155. Id. at 1378, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461.
156. Id. at 1379, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461-62 (quoting Ass’n of Mexican Am.
Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 611 (9th Cir. 2000).
157. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462-63.
158. Id. at 1380, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463.
159. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463.
160. See, e.g., In re Bogese II, 303 F.3d 1362, 1367, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1448, 1452
(Fed. Cir. 2002); Symbol Tech., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found.,
277 F.3d 1361, 1364-68, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1515, 1517-20 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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of inherent anticipation, noting that inherent anticipation is not a
161
The following
substitute for a well-reasoned obviousness analysis.
section presents a general overview of some of the more important
cases from 2002 addressing issues relating to patentability and validity.
A. 35 U.S.C. § 102

162

1.

Anticipation
“Invalidity based on ‘anticipation’ requires that the invention is not
163
in fact new.” Anticipation may be supported by a single reference
describing the claimed invention with enough detailed precision to
164
establish the subject matter as existing in the prior art.
In Verve L.L.C. v. Crane Cams, Inc., the patent in suit related to
165
The Federal
improved push rods for internal combustion engines.
Circuit held that the district court erred in refusing to consider
extrinsic evidence in construing the phrase “substantially constant wall
166
thickness” and in determining that the phrase was indefinite.
The
Federal Circuit also reversed the district court’s holding on summary
judgment that the patent in suit was invalid based on anticipation,
holding that the plaintiff’s Japanese patents on their face did not show
167
the push rods of the patent in suit. In particular, unlike the patent in
suit, the Japanese push rods were not wider at the mid-portion but
168
Accordingly, on these
were of a uniform lengthwise diameter.
undisputed facts, the Federal Circuit held that “no reasonable trier of
fact could find that [the patent was] anticipated by the Japanese
169
references.”

161. See, e.g., Trintec Indus., Inc. v. Top-U.S.A. Corp., 295 F.3d 1292, 1297, 63
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1597, 1600-01 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
162. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (describing the conditions for patentability). A
person is entitled to a patent unless: (a) the invention is used or patented already;
(b) the invention was in public use or for sale more than one year prior to the date
of application; (c) the invention is abandoned; (d) the invention was patented in
another country prior to the date of application in the United States; (e) the
invention was described in another patent application; (f) the subject matter was not
in fact invented by the applicant; or (g) the invention was first the work product of
another person. Id.
163. Verve L.L.C. v. Crane Cams, Inc., 311 F.3d 1116, 1120, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1051, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Hoover Group, Inc. v. Custom Metalcraft, Inc.,
66 F.3d 299, 302, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1101, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
164. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054.
165. Id. at 1117, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1052.
166. Id. at 1120, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054.
167. Id. at 1120-21, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054-55.
168. Id. at 1121, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054-55.
169. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055.
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The Federal Circuit addressed the issue of inherent anticipation on
several occasions in 2002. Under the doctrine of inherency, even
though an element is not expressly disclosed in a prior art reference,
the reference is still “deemed to anticipate a subsequent claim if the
missing element ‘is necessarily present in the thing described in the
reference, and if it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary
170
skill.’”
Inherent anticipation requires that the missing descriptive
material is “necessarily present” in the prior art, not merely probably
171
or possibly present.
172
In Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., the two parties were competitors in
the school bus mirror market. Each owned a patent and each claimed
that the other infringed its patent. In particular, Rosco’s design patent
related to an oval, highly convex, cross-view mirror with a black, flat
metal backing. Mirror Lite’s utility patent related to an oval cross-view
mirror with a varying radius of curvature along the major axis of the
convex ellipsoid mirror lens. In a bench trial, the district court found,
inter alia, Rosco’s design patent was invalid as functional and obvious,
and Mirror Lite’s utility patent was invalid as anticipated under 35
173
U.S.C. §§ 102(e) and 102(g).
With respect to Mirror Lite’s utility
patent, the district court found the claims invalid under § 102(e) based
on anticipation by an earlier-filed U.S. application and under § 102(g)
174
based on prior invention “‘by another.’”
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that when determining the
175
invalidity of patent claims, each claim must be considered separately.
In particular, each claim of a patent shall be presumed valid
176
independently of the validity of the other claims.
Here, the Federal
Circuit held that the lower court erred by failing to explicitly address
177
and analyze each claim.
The district court also found that the design patent inherently
disclosed the invention of the utility patent under § 102(e), allowing
one skilled in the art to read the design patent as disclosing a mirror
with a varying radius of curvature based on the inherent nature of
178
those characteristics. The district court concluded that “‘one skilled
170. Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., 304 F.3d 1373, 1380, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1676,
1680 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Cont’l Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268,
20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1746, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
171. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680.
172. 304 F.3d 1373, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1676 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
173. Id. at 1376, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677.
174. Id. at 1381, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681 (quoting U.S.C. § 102 (g)(2)(2000).
175. Id. at 1379, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680.
176. Id. at 1380, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680 (quoting U.S.C. § 102 (g)(2)(2000).
177. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680.
178. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680 (quoting Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., 139 F.
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in the art could produce the results claimed in the [utility patent]
simply by practicing the [design patent], i.e., the result flows naturally
from the express disclosure of the design patent whether or not others
179
are aware of it.’”
The Federal Circuit held that the district court
erred because no evidence was presented suggesting that the design
patent inherently discloses to one of ordinary skill a mirror with a
180
varying radius of curvature along the major axis.
The district court also found certain claims of the utility patent were
181
invalid under § 102(g) in view of Rosco’s pre-1992 products, thus
concluding that Rosco made the invention of the utility patent before
182
the critical date. In reversing the district court, the Federal Circuit
held that uncorroborated testimony of prior inventorship is
insufficient to constitute clear and convincing evidence of conception
183
of the invention prior to the critical data.
184
In Trintec Industries, Inc. v. Top-U.S.A. Corp., the Federal Circuit
vacated and remanded the district court’s grant of summary judgment
185
that the patent at issue was invalid as inherently anticipated.
The
Federal Circuit determined that a prior art catalogue that taught the
use of a color printer did not inherently anticipate a claim that recited
186
a color photocopier.
Although the Federal Circuit conceded that
the difference may be “minimal and obvious,” it noted that
187
“obviousness is not inherent anticipation.” With respect to another
asserted claim, the Federal Circuit determined that the prior art
catalog did not inherently teach the required claim element of
188
creating artwork on a computer. The Federal Circuit remanded the
case noting that because obviousness seemed to be the actual question
at issue, it could only be properly addressed with a fully developed
189
record.

Supp. 2d 287, 301 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
179. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680 (quoting Rosco, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 300).
180. Id. at 1381, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680-81.
181. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681. A patent is invalid if “before [the
applicant’s] invention thereof, the invention was made in this country by another
who had not abandoned, suppressed or concealed it.” 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2) (2000).
182. Rosco, 304 F.3d at 1381, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
183. Id. at 1382, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
184. 295 F.3d 1292, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1597 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
185. Id. at 1297, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1601.
186. Id. at 1296, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1600.
187. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1600 (citing Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 1529,
220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1021, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
188. Id. at 1297, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1600-01.
189. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1601.
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2.

On-sale bar and public use
An inventor is entitled to a patent unless the invention was in
public use or on sale in this country more than one year prior to the
190
date of application for the patent in the United States.
191
In Allen Engineering Corp. v. Bartell Industries, Inc., Allen Engineering
and Bartell both produced concrete riding trowels used to smooth the
192
The Federal Circuit held in this case that
surface of new concrete.
the district court failed to properly construe claim limitations and
193
failed to make adequate findings on infringement. In addition, the
Federal Circuit held that the district court failed to apply the proper
legal test in considering whether Allen’s sales of the Red Rider trowel
more than one year prior to the filing date of the patent in suit
194
constituted an on-sale bar to the patenting of the invention.
Thus,
the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s finding that the patent
195
in suit was not invalid based on an on-sale bar.
With respect to on-sale bar, the Court noted that “to establish an onsale bar, it must be shown that the device that was ‘sold fully
anticipated the claimed invention or would have rendered the claimed
196
invention obvious by its addition to the prior art.’” Allen argued that
the Red Rider was sold only for experimental reasons and that it was
197
not ready for patenting. In determining whether or not Allen’s sales
were experimental or sufficient to constitute an on-sale bar, the
Federal Circuit evaluated the record under the well-established two198
prong test set forth in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics Inc.
Under the “Pfaff test,” to constitute an on-sale bar, it must be shown
that the subject product was both (1) the subject of a commercial offer
for sale not primarily for purposes of experimentation, and (2) ready
199
for patenting. The first prong of this test “involves a determination
of whether a commercial offer for sale occurred, applying traditional
200
contract law principles.” It also involves an assessment of whether the
circumstances surrounding the transaction show that the transaction

190. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
191. 299 F.3d 1336, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1769 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
192. Id. at 1342, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770.
193. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770.
194. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770.
195. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770.
196. Id. at 1352, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778 (quoting Tec Air, Inc. v. Denso Mfg.
Mich. Inc., 192 F.3d 1353, 1358, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294, 1296-97 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (quotation omitted).
197. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778.
198. 525 U.S. 55, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
199. Id. at 67, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646-47.
200. Allen Eng’g, 299 F.3d at 1352, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778.
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201

was not primarily for purposes of experimentation.
This prong is
satisfied “by proof of reduction to practice before the critical date; or
by proof that prior to the critical date the inventor had prepared
drawings or other descriptions of the invention that were sufficiently
specific to enable a person skilled in the art to practice the
202
The on-sale bar is evaluated claim-by-claim, barring
invention.’”
203
some claims but not others.
The Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in concluding
that Red Rider sales did not trigger an on-sale bar solely because the
204
Red Rider was in an experimental stage.
As the Federal Circuit
noted, this conclusion alone is insufficient, stating “What is important
to an assessment of the commercial versus experimental significance of
a sale is not necessarily the posture of the invention’s overall
development, but the nature or purpose of the particular use to which
205
the invention that is the subject of that sale is to be put.” The proper
question posed by the experimental use doctrine, using the first prong
of the Pfaff on-sale bar test, does not ask whether the invention was in a
developmental or experimental stage when the sale allegedly took
place; but whether the purpose of the inventor at the time of that sale,
“as determined from an objective evaluation of the facts surrounding
206
the transaction,” was to further development or experimentation.” If
there is sufficient evidence that a device was sold for experimentation
purposes, the first prong of Pfaff would not be satisfied and there
would be no need to consider “whether the device was an embodiment
of the claimed invention or whether the invention was ready for
207
patenting at the time of the sales.”
In vacating the district court’s
decision, the Federal Circuit instructed the lower court to assess
whether the surrounding circumstances show that the transaction was
208
not primarily for purposes of experimentation.
In so doing, the
district court should consider the principles enumerated in EZ Dock v.
209
Schafer Systems, Inc. and in the present case.
201. Id. at 1352-53, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779.
202. Id. at 1353, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779 (quoting Pfaff, 525 U.S. 55, 48
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641.
203. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779.
204. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779.
205. Id. at 1354, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779.
206. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780 (quoting Scaltech, Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, L.L.C.,
178 F.3d 1378, 1384 n.1, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1055, 1059 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
207. Id. at 1353, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779.
208. Id. at 1354, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780.
209. Id. at 1353, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778-79 (citing EZ Dock, 276 F.3d 1347,
1357, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see infra notes 236-39 and
accompanying text (describing the holding of EZ Dock that evidence of experimental
use operates to negate application of the statutory on-sale bar).
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210

In Netscape Communications Corp. v. Konrad, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the claim
of invalidity of Konrad’s patents under the public use and on-sale bars
211
of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). In so doing, the Federal Circuit determined
that Konrad made no discernable effort to maintain the confidentiality
of his inventions after showing them to others prior to the critical
212
date. The Federal Circuit further found that Konrad presented no
213
objective evidence to support an argument for experimental use.
With respect to the on-sale bar, the Federal Circuit concluded that
Konrad’s purchase order constituted a commercial offer for sale
because the one party to the purchase order did not so control the
214
other party as to keep the invention out of the public’s hands.
215
In In re Kollar, the Federal Circuit reversed the USPTO Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences (Board) determination that Kollar’s
216
Kollar’s
patent application was barred under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
patent application was directed to a process for preparing a dialkyl
peroxide by reacting one or more alcohols and/or an olefin with a
217
monoalkyl hydroperoxide in the presence of an acidic catalyst. The
Board sustained a rejection of the claims under § 102(b) based on a
sale of the technology by Redox Technologies, a company owned by
218
Kollar, to Celanese Corporation.
The Federal Circuit upheld the
Board’s determination that the claimed invention was ready to patent
219
under Pfaff because of Kollar’s reduction to practice.
The Federal Circuit determined that the Board erred in finding that
the invention was the subject of a commercial offer for sale under the
220
first prong of Pfaff. Specifically, the Federal Circuit found that under
the Celanese contract, Redox agreed to share technical information
regarding the claimed process during the “R&D Phase” in exchange
221
for annual royalty payments. The Federal Circuit said that although
the Celanese agreement “specifically contemplates that ‘resultant
products’ manufactured using the claimed process could potentially be
sold,” the agreement does not indicate that a product derived from the

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

295 F.3d 1315, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1580 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1318, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581-82.
Id. at 1321, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1584.
Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1584.
Id. at 1324, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1586.
286 F.3d 1326, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1328, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426.
Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426.
Id. at 1328-29, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426-27.
Id. at 1330, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428 (citation omitted in original).
Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428.
Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428 (citation omitted in original).
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process was in fact offered for sale. Rather, the court reasoned that
the agreement was a license to Celanese under all future patents
concerning Kollar’s invention and that granting a license to an
223
invention does not alone trigger the on-sale bar of § 102(b).
The
Federal Circuit held that “the right to commercialize’ the invention
granted to Celanese in the form of a license pursuant to the agreement
was insufficient” to bar Kollar’s patent application claims under
224
§ 102(b).
Additionally, the Federal Circuit noted the Board’s failure to
distinguish between a claim to a tangible item—a product, device, or
apparatus—and a claim to a process—a series of acts or steps, and held
that the Board erred in failing to recognize that a process is not sold in
225
the same sense as a tangible item.
The Federal Circuit found that
the know-how describing the process may be sold, i.e., giving a buyer
the freedom to carry out the process pursuant to the terms of an
agreement. However, this does not constitute a sale of the invention
under § 102(b) because the process has not used as a result of the
226
Thus, the Federal Circuit reversed the Board
transaction.
conclusion that the license to a process under a future patent, along
with a description of the process, constitutes a sale of the subject
227
matter of the patents.
228
In Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., the Federal Circuit reversed
and remanded a district court ruling in favor of the defendants that
the patent at issue was invalid on the basis of prior use and
229
unenforceablity.
The Federal Circuit found that there was no
substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict that the claims at issue
were invalid because of prior use, as the record was devoid of evidence
proving that the apparatus satisfied every limitation of the claimed
230
invention. The Federal Circuit also held that uncorroborated oral
testimony presented to show prior public use did not rise to the level of
“clear and convincing evidence necessary to invalidate the patent for
231
prior public knowledge.”

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428 (citation omitted in original).
Id. at 1330-31, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428.
Id. at 1331, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428 (citation omitted in original).
Id. at 1332, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1429.
Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1429.
Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1429.
292 F.3d 728, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 731, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252.
Id. at 738, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1257-58.
Id. at 743, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
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In Dana Corp. v. American Axle & Manufacturing, Inc., the Federal
Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the
233
claim of patent invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). In vacating the
grant of summary judgment, the Federal Circuit stressed that the trial
court “should determine ‘whether the subject of the barring activity
met each of the limitations of the claim, and thus was an embodiment
234
of the claimed invention’” as required by § 102(b).
Further, the
Federal Circuit reiterated that dependant claims “cannot be
invalidated in a wholesale fashion,” but must be individually presumed
valid and independently evaluated, because “dependent claims
necessarily add limitations to claims from which they depend and may
235
therefore not be subject to the same asserted grounds of invalidity.”
As previously noted, the Federal Circuit in EZ Dock, Inc. v. Schafer
236
Systems Inc., also addressed the on-sale bar rule. In this case, the
district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment
declaring EZ Dock’s patent relating to a floating dock invalid because
the dock in question was on sale in this country more than one year
237
before the filing date.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated and
remanded the case, holding that a reasonable jury could find that the
on-sale bar was inapplicable insofar as the sale was for an experimental
238
use. In finding that the sale could have been for experimental and
not commercial use, the court noted that the single sale at issue was
made without advertisement, the buyer paid less than full price, and
239
the inventors visited the site location where the device was installed.
240
In New Railhead Manufacturing Co. v. Vermeer Manufacturing Co., the
Federal Circuit affirmed a decision by the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Texas that invalidated New Railhead’s patents on
a drill bit and a method of horizontal drilling under 35 U.S.C.
241
§ 102(b). With regard to the patent for a horizontal drilling method,
the district court found that a third party, Mr. Freeman, was permitted
242
to use the method more than a year prior to patent application.
Though New Railhead argued that Mr. Freeman’s use was
232. 279 F.3d 1372, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
233. Id. at 1374, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1609.
234. Id. at 1375-76, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611 (quoting Scaltech, Inc. v.
Retec/Tetra, L.L.C., 178 F.3d 1378, 1383, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1055, 1058 (Fed. Cir.
1999)).
235. Id. at 1376, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611-12.
236. 276 F.3d 1347, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
237. Id. at 1350, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291.
238. Id. at 1353-54, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293.
239. Id. at 1352-53, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292-93.
240. 298 F.3d 1290, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1843 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
241. Id. at 1292, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844.
242. Id. at 1297-98, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1848-49.

FINALPATENTSUMMARY.DOC

2003]

8/15/2003 1:41 PM

2002 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

917

experimental, the Federal Circuit found that his use of the patented
method was public because the drilling was at a commercial jobsite on
243
public land next to an interstate highway. Despite the fact that the
inventor continued to modify the drill bit itself, Mr. Freeman’s use of
the patented method met every claim limitation of the method
244
patent. Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that the drilling method
245
was in public use and the patent was invalid under section 102(b).
Judge Dyk, dissenting-in-part, stated that the drill bit was inextricably
intertwined with the method of drilling so that experimental use of the
246
bit constituted experimental use of the method. He went on to say
247
that the use of the method was not public because it was confidential.
The test for secret public use is whether the inventor (as opposed to a
third party) makes a profit from the use, and in this case there was no
248
such profit.
B. 35 U.S.C. § 103—Obviousness

249

Obviousness is a legal conclusion based on underlying facts of four
general types, all of which must be considered by the trier of fact:
(1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the level of ordinary
skill in the art; (3) the differences between the claimed invention and
250
the prior art; and (4) any objective indicia of non-obviousness.
“Determination of obviousness cannot be based on the hindsight
combination of components selectively culled from the prior art to fit
251
the parameters of the patented invention.”
In addition, the
motivation to follow particular sources and select and combine
particular elements must be taught or suggested by the prior art, the
nature of the problem to be solved, or the general knowledge one
252
ordinarily skilled in the field.
243. Id. at 1298, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1849.
244. Id. at 1299, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1850.
245. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1850.
246. Id. at 1301, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1852 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
247. Id. at 1300, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1850-51.
248. Id. at 1301, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1851.
249. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000) (establishing conditions on patentability for nonobvious subject matter). A patent cannot be obtained if the differences between the
subject matter to be patented and the prior art are so minimal that the subject
matter, as a whole, would have been obvious to a person of normal skill in the art.
Id.
250. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459,
467 (1966).
251. Crown Operations Int’l, Ltd. v. Solutia, Inc., 289 F.3d 1367, 1376, 62
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1917, 1922 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc.,
159 F.3d 534, 546, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
252. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922
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In Novo Nordisk A/S v. Becton Dickinson & Co., the Federal Circuit
affirmed a Southern District of New York jury verdict that Novo
Nordisk’s patents for a pen-shaped insulin delivery system for diabetics
254
were invalid as obvious.
The diameter of the needle used in the
system was central to the case. The claims-at-issue were directed to an
insulin-delivery pen with a needle that was thinner than twenty-nine
255
gauge (the higher gauge, the thinner the needle).
The prior art
included pen systems with lower gauge needles and systems not
256
involving pens but with higher gauge needles. The Federal Circuit
found that there was a motivation to combine technologies and create
257
a pen with a thinner needle to reduce pain. The Federal Circuit also
stated that Becton’s arguments about patent monopolies and
overworked, inexperienced, and error-prone patent examiners did not
warrant a new trial, because Novo Nordisk failed to object at trial or
258
raise these issues by post-trial motion.
259
In In re Sastry,
the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s
260
The
determination that Sastry’s claimed invention was obvious.
invention was a method for treating and preventing the Human
261
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV).
The invention required two
peptides, the first being a cytotoxic T lymphocyte (“CTL”)-inducing
peptide and the second being selected from a group of peptides that
assist the immune response elicited by the first peptide by ensuring
that the body maintains a large population of uninfected T helper
262
cells.
The Board sustained a rejection of all of Sastry’s claims as being
obvious over Arlinghaus (which teaches the first peptide) in
263
conjunction with references that teach the second peptide.
On
appeal, Sastry conceded that the first and second peptides were taught
by the prior art, but argued that there was no motivation to combine
264
the references. The Federal Circuit held that Arlinghaus provided a
roadmap for combining the peptides by disclosing two peptide-based
compositions that have CTL-inducing properties and that contain

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

304 F.3d 1216, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1524 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1218, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525.
Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525.
Id. at 1218-19, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525-26.
Id. at 1219, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526.
Id. at 1220, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526-27.
285 F.3d 1378, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1436 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1379, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436.
Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436.
Id. at 1380, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437.
Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437-38.
Id. at 1381, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1438.
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peptides that satisfy the requirements of Sastry’s second peptide,
265
The
including eliciting a low-level antibody-mediated response.
Federal Circuit concluded that Arlinghaus could have been used as an
anticipatory reference but because it disclosed two compositions that
induce CTL activation and included specific peptides within the scope
of the second peptide of Sastry’s claim, Arlinghaus could be viewed as
providing the necessary motivation to combine the peptides of the
266
other references as well.
267
In In re Lee, the USPTO combined two references in a 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 rejection, while discounting the need for “‘any specific hint or
268
suggestion in a particular reference’” to support the combination.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the Board
decision, noting that the “‘common knowledge and common sense’”
that the Board relied on to reject the application is not the type of
“specialized knowledge and expertise contemplated by the
269
Administrative Procedure Act.”
270
In Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa North America Corp., Ficosa appealed the
denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law for noninfringement, the grant of summary judgment for a best mode
violation, and the denial of its JMOL motions on the invalidity of the
271
two patents at issue. With regard to obviousness, the Federal Circuit
determined that Ficosa did not present evidence in support of its belief
that the nature of the problem itself supplied the necessary motivation
272
to combine. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit determined that the
273
evidence was insufficient to support a finding of invalidity.
With
respect to anticipation, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s
decision, explaining that anticipation does not permit an additional
274
reference to supply the missing claim limitation.
C. 35 U.S.C. § 112
The patent laws require that the patent specification contain a
written description of the invention and of the manner and process
265. Id. at 1382, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439.
266. Id. at 1383, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439-40.
267. 277 F.3d 1338, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
268. Id. at 1343-44, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434 (citation omitted in original).
269. Id. at 1344, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435 (citation omitted in original); see
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557 (2000) (outlining the requirements for
initial decisions and agency review).
270. 299 F.3d 1313, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
271. Id. at 1318, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375.
272. Id. at 1334, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387.
273. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387.
274. Id. at 1335, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388.
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of making and using it, in such a manner as to enable any person
skilled in the art to make and use the invention, and must set forth
the best mode contemplated by the inventor for carrying out his
275
invention.
The specification must conclude with one or more
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject
276
If a patent
matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
does not satisfy the written description, enablement, best mode or
definiteness requirements, the patent is invalid under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112.
1.

Written description
277
In New Railhead Manufacturing L.L.C. v. Vermeer Manufacturing Co.,
the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court decision to invalidate New
Railhead’s patents on a drill bit and a method of horizontal drilling
278
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). With regard to the drill bit patent, the
Federal Circuit found that the related provisional application failed to
provide a written description, as required by 35 U.S.C. § 119(e)(1), for
the claimed angled relationship between the drill bit and its
279
housing. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that New Railhead’s
commercial sales constituted a § 102(b) bar because the drill bit patent
is not entitled to claim the priority filing date of the provisional
280
application.
281
In Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., the Federal Circuit granted a
petition for rehearing and reversed its prior decision, which held that a
deposit of biological materials in a public depository will not satisfy the
282
written description requirement.
The Federal Circuit held, as a
matter of first impression, that a reference to a deposit of genetic
material in a patent specification may be sufficient to describe the
283
material in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 112.
In doing so, the Federal Circuit relied on USPTO Guidelines stating
that the written description requirement can be met where disclosed
functional characteristics are coupled “‘with a known or disclosed
275. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2000) (stating the written description, enablement
and best mode requirements).
276. See id. (stating the definiteness requirement).
277. 298 F.3d 1290, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1843 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
278. Id. at 1292, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844.
279. Id. at 1294-95, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846.
280. Id. at 1297, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1848.
281. 296 F.3d 1316, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
282. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 285 F.3d 1013, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1289 (Fed. Cir. 2002), vacated, 296 F.3d 1316, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
283. Enzo Biochem, 296 F.3d at 1330, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617-18; see 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 (2000) (requiring a written description of the invention).
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284

correlation between function and structure.’” The Federal Circuit
remanded the case back to the district court to determine “whether a
person of skill in the art would glean from the written description,
including information obtainable from the deposits of the claimed
sequences, subsequences, mutated variants, and mixtures sufficient to
285
The
demonstrate possession of the generic scope of the claims.”
Federal Circuit also remanded the factual determination of whether
the disclosure provided by the three deposits would sufficiently
286
describe the asserted claims to a person knowledgeable in the art.
287
In Cooper Cameron Corp. v. Kvaerner Oilfield Products, Inc., the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment that
Cameron’s ‘707 patent was not infringed under the doctrine of
288
equivalents and reversed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment that the ‘119 patent was invalid for failing to meet the
289
The
written description requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1.
290
patents in question involved equipment used on sub-sea wellheads.
With regard to the invalidity claim, the district court held that the
‘119 patent lacked sufficient written description to support a particular
aspect of the invention because it was not described in the
291
specification.
The Federal Circuit reversed the lower court,
determining that inventors are entitled to claim their inventions in
292
more than one way.
The ‘119 patent’s drawings disclosed the
disputed embodiment sufficiently to support the written description
requirement, because “drawings constitute an adequate description if
they describe what is claimed and convey to those of skill in the art that
293
the patentee actually invented what is claimed.”
2.

Enablement
294
In Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics Technology Corp. v. Shell Oil Co.,
the Federal Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded a
decision of the District Court of Delaware, finding non-infringement of

284. Enzo Biochem, 296 F.3d at 1324, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613 (quoting
Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the U.S.C. 112, P1, “Written
Description” Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099, 1106 (Jan. 5, 2001)).
285. Id. at 1327, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
286. Id. at 1327-28, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
287. 291 F.3d 1317, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1846 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
288. Id. at 1321, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1849.
289. Id. at 1322, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1850.
290. Id. at 1318, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
291. Id. at 1320, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1848.
292. Id. at 1322-23, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1849.
293. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1850-51.
294. 308 F.3d 1167, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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295

Union Carbide’s patents. With respect to an invalidity claim based
on non-enablement, the Federal Circuit concluded that in view of the
presumption that a patent is valid, Shell’s evidence that Union Carbide
failed to reduce to practice a slightly different catalyst was not relevant
to the question of whether the particular catalyst in the claims was
296
Consequently, the Federal Circuit held that the district
enabled.
court properly overturned the jury’s verdict of non-enablement by
297
granting a new trial.
Chief Judge Mayer, dissenting on the enablement issue, argued that
Union Carbide’s records, which listed hundreds of ineffective catalysts,
showed that to generate an “efficiency enhancing” catalyst as claimed
298
would require “undue experimentation”. In arguing to uphold the
jury’s verdict that the claims were not enabled, Chief Judge Mayer
299
relied on Durel Corp. v. Osram Sylvania, Inc. and Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I.
300
DuPont de Nemours & Co., which indicate that if a significant number
of combinations covered by a claim are inoperative, then the claim
301
might be invalid.
302
In Crown Operations International, Ltd. v. Solutia Inc., the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment that
Solutia’s ‘511 patent was not anticipated and vacated the court’s grant
of summary judgment that Solutia’s ‘258 patent was not invalid for lack
303
of enablement and written description.
In affirming the district
court, the Federal Circuit rejected Crown’s argument that if a prior art
reference disclosed the same structure as claimed by a patent, a
304
property resulting from that structure should be assumed.
The
Federal Circuit reasoned that for a limitation to be inherently
disclosed, “it must necessarily be present and a person of ordinary skill
305
in the art would recognize its presence.” However, the presence of
306
the property cannot be shown by probabilities and possibilities.
The district court held that Solutia’s ‘258 patent was enabled, but
the Federal Circuit found that the district court failed to consider
295. Id. at 1171, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547.
296. Id. at 1186, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558.
297. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558-59.
298. Id. at 1193, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1563 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
299. 256 F.3d 1298, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
300. 750 F.2d 1569, 244 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 409 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
301. Union Carbide, 308 F.3d at 1192-93, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1563 (citing Durel,
256 F.3d at 1306-07, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244; Atlas, 750 F.2d at 1576-77, 24
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 414).
302. 289 F.3d 1367, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1917 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
303. Id. at 1370, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1918.
304. Id. at 1377, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922.
305. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922-23.
306. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923.
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Crown’s evidence that the ‘258 patent contained ambiguities that
raised a genuine issue of material fact about whether the invention
307
Further, the
could be practiced without undue experimentation.
Federal Circuit felt that inoperative embodiments resulting from the
ambiguities were further evidence that there was a genuine issue of
308
material fact with respect to the enablement claim.
3.

Best mode
309
In Bayer AG v. Schein Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Federal Circuit
affirmed a decision by the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Jersey concerning a 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) patent lawsuit based on
Schein Pharmaceutical’s filing an ANDA for generic Ciprofloxacin
310
(“Cipro”).
Bayer AG filed a series of applications also claiming
311
Cipro. As to the patent at issue, Schein argued that Bayer could not
claim priority stemming back to an earlier application because that
312
application failed to meet the best mode requirement.
The Federal Circuit analyzed all seven cases where it held claims
invalid for failure to satisfy the best mode requirement and found the
cases all involved a “failure to disclose a preferred embodiment” or a
“failure to disclose a preference that materially affected making or
313
using the invention.” The Federal Circuit found that the inventor’s
preferred way of making an intermediate compound had no material
effect on the properties of the end product and failure to disclose that
314
method was not a best mode violation.
In doing so, the Federal
Circuit rejected appellants’ argument (based on a misinterpretation of
315
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc. ), that the best mode of
obtaining novel subject matter necessary to practice the invention must
316
be disclosed.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Rader stated that he would simply
affirm the district court decision because “the best mode requirement
317
‘does not compel disclosure of an unclaimed method.’” Judge Rader
would not widen the “best mode net,” as did the majority, to capture

307. Id. at 1379, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924.
308. Id. at 1380-81, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1925-26.
309. 301 F.3d 1306, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
310. Id. at 1308, 1311, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002, 1004.
311. Id. at 1310-11, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003-04.
312. Id. at 1313, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
313. Id. at 1316, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008.
314. Id. at 1321-22, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012.
315. 251 F.3d 955, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1869 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
316. Bayer, 301 F.3d at 1322, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1013.
317. Id. at 1323, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1013 (Rader, J., concurring) (quoting
Bayer AG & Bayer Corp. v Schein Pharm., 129 F. Supp. 2d. 705, 721 (D.N.J. 2001)).
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the properties of the claimed invention and any material effect or
318
He explained that the best mode
impact on those properties.
requirement is self-enforcing; failure to meet its requirements creates
the risk that someone will discover and patent a best mode, thereby
319
obtaining a blocking patent. Judge Rader would limit the best mode
requirement to the “scope of the claimed invention” per the provisions
of 35 U.S.C. § 112, because the current requirement is at best a “trap
320
for the uninformed applicant.”
321
In Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa North America Corp., the Federal Circuit
addressed the best mode requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1. In this
case, Ficosa appealed, inter alia, the district court’s grant of summary
judgment finding there was no best mode violation of a patent
directed to a serviceable clip core coupling used as a component of a
322
two-piece shift cable in certain GM vehicles.
On appeal, Ficosa argued that the inventor knew of a “best way” of
practicing the invention with a particular thickness and hardness of the
323
clip, but failed to disclose it. Teleflex argued that the thickness and
hardness of the materials of the clip are specific to the particular
324
commercial embodiment, e.g., GM requirements.
The Federal
Circuit noted that compliance with the best mode requirement is a
325
question of fact requiring a two-pronged inquiry. The subjective first
prong focuses on the inventor’s state of mind when filing the patent
application, and is directed to whether the inventor considered one
mode of practicing the invention to be superior to all other modes at
326
that time. The objective second prong asks if the inventor adequately
327
disclosed the mode considered to be superior. With respect to this
two-prong test, “‘the best mode inquiry is directed to what the
applicant regards as the invention, which in turn is measured by the
328
claims.’”
The Federal Circuit, noting that the best mode requirement does
not extend to production details or customer requirements,
318. Id. at 1324, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1014.
319. Id. at 1325, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1014-15.
320. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015.
321. 299 F.3d 1313, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374.
322. See supra notes 270-74 and accompanying text (describing the Teleflex
holding).
323. Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1329, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1383 (citation omitted in
original).
324. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1383.
325. Id. at 1330, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384.
326. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384.
327. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384-85.
328. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1383 (quoting Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer
Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1531, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 100, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
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determined that the alleged best mode information relating to
hardness of the clip involved unclaimed subject matter relating to
329
Accordingly,
production details dictated by customer requirements.
the Federal Circuit held that the district court did not err in
concluding that the alleged best mode related to customer
330
requirements and was therefore not a best mode violation.
As a
result, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision to grant
331
summary judgment.
4.

Indefiniteness
332
In Verve L.L.C. v. Crane Cams, Inc., with respect to indefiniteness,
the Federal Circuit determined that the claims on appeal were directed
to push rods for engines with a wall thickness that is substantially
333
constant.
According to the district court, the specification and
prosecution history did not support the term “substantially” and was
334
not adequately defined. The Federal Circuit disagreed, holding that
the lower court erred in ruling that the intrinsic evidence of the
specification and prosecution history are the sole sources of meaning
335
for words when used in a technologic context.
Specifically, the
Federal Circuit held that:
It is well established that when the term “substantially” serves
reasonably to describe the subject matter so that persons in the
field of the invention would understand its scope, and to
distinguish the claimed subject matter from the prior art, it is not
indefinite. Understanding of this scope may be derived from
extrinsic evidence without rendering the claim invalid. The
summary judgment record offered no basis for departing from
336
these general rules.

In All Dental Prodx v. Advantage Dental Products, the Federal Circuit
affirmed in part and reversed in part a summary judgment decision,
finding that Advantage’s patent for a method for making a custom
337
dental impression complied with 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶¶ 1-2. The claim
338
language in dispute was “original unidentified mass.” All Dental sold
tablets that were oval-shaped and flat and could be molded onto a
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384.
Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384.
Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384.
311 F.3d 1116, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1119, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1053.
Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1053.
Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1053.
Id. at 1120, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054.
309 F.3d 774, 776-77 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1945, 1946-47 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 779-80, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948-49.
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339

tooth to take an impression. The Federal Circuit stated that while
the disputed language may not be a “model of clarity,” it is easily
340
The
understood when put in the context of the specification.
Federal Circuit noted that the specification does not need to describe
the subject matter in the exact terms used in the claims, it must simply
indicate to persons skilled in the art that, as of the filing date, the
341
applicant invented what is now being claimed.
With respect to definiteness, the Federal Circuit held that the
prosecution history aided in clarifying the meaning of “original
unidentified mass” because Advantage twice distinguished their
342
invention over the prior art based on that limitation. The Federal
Circuit concluded that the prosecution history made it clear that
“original unidentified mass” meant that the object lacked any specific
343
form and thus the claims were not indefinite. As a result, the Federal
Circuit held that All Dental did not infringe Advantage’s patent
344
because All Dental’s tablets had a specific form and shape.
In Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s holding that Cardiac Pacemaker’s patent
345
was invalid for indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112. The Federal
Circuit agreed with the district court’s finding that the patent did not
disclose the corresponding structure to a recited third means for
performing the dual functions of monitoring the ECG signal and
346
activating the charging means.
In so doing, the Federal Circuit
rejected the argument that the physician could be the corresponding
structure or that the physician connected multiple structures that
performed the claimed functions because, among other things, the
claim language did not permit separate structures to perform the
347
functions with a physician’s input. Indeed, the Federal Circuit noted
that the intrinsic evidence required the undisclosed corresponding
348
structure to perform both dual functions recited.

339. Id. at 777, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1946-47.
340. Id. at 779, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948.
341. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948 (quoting Eiselstein v. Frank, 52 F.3d 1035,
1038, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1467, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citations omitted)).
342. Id. at 780, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1949.
343. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1949.
344. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1949.
345. 296 F.3d 1106, 1107 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1725, 1726 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
346. Id. at 1114, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1730-31.
347. Id. at 1116-18, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1732-34.
348. Id. at 1116, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1732.
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D. Reexamination
349

In In re Bass, the Federal Circuit held that the USPTO was
permitted to consider references identified and discussed in a first
reexamination proceeding in other reexamination proceedings, even
though the patentee received a Notice of Intent to Issue
350
Reexamination Certificate (“Notice”) in the first proceeding. Under
35 U.S.C. § 303(a), the Federal Circuit held that “previously
considered prior art from a prior proceeding could not raise a
351
substantial new question of patentability.”
As such, the patentee
argued that the examiner’s obviousness rejection based on such
352
references in a second reexamination proceeding was improper.
The Federal Circuit, however, held that the USPTO can reconsider an
353
earlier action until a matter is completed.
The Notice did not
preclude the USPTO from further reconsideration and review of the
matter, including basing a rejection on references identified in the first
reexamination proceeding, because a reexamination is complete only
upon the statutorily mandated issuance of a reexamination
354
certificate.
E. Reissue
355

In In re Doyle, the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded a
decision by the Board, finding that the Board erroneously rejected the
pending claims in Doyle’s reissue application by extending the Orita
356
doctrine. In the initial prosecution, Doyle’s application was subject
357
to a nine-way restriction requirement.
After the prosecution and
issuance of the elected claims, but before the two-year statutory limit,
358
During reissue
Doyle applied for a broadening reissue patent.
prosecution, Doyle conceded that the reissue genus claims read on,

349. 314 F.3d 575, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
350. Id. at 576, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1157.
351. Id. at 577, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1157 (citing In re Portola Packaging, 110
F.3d 786, 791, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1295, 1300) (Fed. Cir. 1997); see 35 U.S.C. § 303(a)
(2000) (allowing the Director to determine whether there is a substantial new question
of patentability within three months following the filing of a request for
reexamination).
352. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1157.
353. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1157.
354. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1157.
355. 293 F.3d 1355, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
356. Id. at 1356, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162; see In re Orita, 550 F.2d 1277, 1280
n.7, 193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 145, 148 n.7 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (holding that the applicant did
not demonstrate an error justifying the reissuance of a patent solely because the patent
examiner was authorized to cancel non-existent claims).
357. In re Doyle, 293 F.3d at 1356, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162.
358. Id. at 1356-57, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162.
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but were broader than the non-elected claims of the original
359
The Board affirmed the examiner’s rejection of the
prosecution.
reissue claims based on a failure to specify an error correctable by
360
reissue under the Orita doctrine.
The issue before the Federal Circuit was whether failure to present a
“claim broad enough to read on, or link, two or more groups of claims
subject to a restriction requirement, is an error correctable by
361
reissue.”
The Federal Circuit found that such an error was
362
Orita prevents reissue applicants from
correctable by reissue.
“obtaining substantially identical claims to those of non-elected groups
identified in a restriction requirement” if the claims could not have
363
been prosecuted in the application from which they were restricted.
The Federal Circuit held that Orita was inapplicable to the case at bar
because Doyle’s new claims were not identical or substantially similar
364
to the non-elected claims. As a result, the Federal Circuit concluded
that since Doyle could have prosecuted his claims with the elected
group without conflicting with the restriction requirement–-due to the
fact that they are linking claims–-the Board erred in not allowing him
365
to do so.
F.

Design Patent
366

In Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., both Rosco and Mirror Lite asserted
their patents against each other. Rosco owned a design patent, while
Mirror Lite owned a utility patent. The Federal Circuit reversed the
lower court with respect to the utility patent holding that the design
patent did not inherently anticipate the utility patent. With respect to
the design patent, the district court held that the design patent was
367
functional and obvious, and therefore invalid. The Federal Circuit,
reminding the lower court of its obligations to establish a record with
findings of fact and separate conclusions of law, reversed in part,
vacated in part, and remanded the case to the district court to address
368
various fact-finding issues.
In reversing, the Federal Circuit noted that Mirror Lite did not show
by clear and convincing evidence that there were no designs that had
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.

Id. at 1357, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162.
Id. at 1358, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163.
Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163.
Id. at 1361, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165.
Id. at 1359, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
Id. at 1360, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165.
Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165.
304 F.3d 1373, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1676 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1377, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678.
Id. at 1376, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677.
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369

the same functional capabilities as Rosco’s design. In evaluating a
design patent, the Court applied a stringent standard for invalidating a
design patent on grounds of functionality: the design of a useful
article is deemed functional where “the appearance of the claimed
370
design is ‘dictated by’ the use or purpose of the article.” “When there
are several ways to achieve the function of an article of manufacture,
the design of the article is more likely to serve a primarily ornamental
371
purpose.” In this case, the Federal Circuit determined that the mere
fact that the mirror claimed in the design patent exhibited a superior
field of view over a single predecessor mirror “does not establish that
the design was ‘dictated by’ functional considerations, as required by
372
LA. Gear.” Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that Mirror Lite had
not shown by clear and convincing evidence that there were no
designs, other than the one shown in Rosco’s patent, that have the
373
same functional capabilities as Rosco’s oval mirror.
Thus, it could
not be said that the design patent was dictated by functional
considerations. The Federal Circuit reversed the district court and
held that the patent in suit was not shown to be invalid on functionality
374
grounds.
G. Interference and Priority of Invention
375

In Slip Track Systems, Inc. v. Metal-Lite, Inc., the Federal Circuit
vacated and remanded the district court’s grant of summary judgment
376
of priority. The Federal Circuit also reversed the dismissal of the
cross-complaint and affirmed the denial of leave to amend the
377
complaint. As a preliminary matter, the Federal Circuit noted that,
while the district courts handling interfering patent suits under 35
U.S.C. § 291 do not have to define the interfering subject matter in a
way similar to a count defined by the USPTO under 35 U.S.C. § 135,
the courts are required to define the bounds of the interfering subject
378
matter in a single description.
369. Id. at 1378-79, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679.
370. Id. at 1378, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (quoting L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom
McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1913, 1917 (Fed. Cir.
1993)) (citation and quotation omitted).
371. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (quoting L.A. Gear, Inc., 988 F.2d at 1123, 25
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917 (Fed. Cir. 1993)) (citation omitted in original).
372. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679.
373. Id. at 1378-79, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679.
374. Id. at 1379, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679.
375. 304 F.3d 1256, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1423 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
376. Id. at 1260, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1425.
377. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1425.
378. Id. at 1264, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428; see 35 U.S.C. § 291 (2000) (allowing
an owner of an interfering patent relief against the owner of another patent); id. § 135
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The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s determination of
priority, finding that the lower court erroneously used the clear and
379
Using the correct preponderance of the
convincing standard.
evidence standard, the Federal Circuit reasoned that in a case where
the necessity of testing is more uncertain and where there is other
uncontroverted evidence that the inventor knew that the invention
would work for its intended purpose, it is inappropriate to grant
380
summary judgment based on the lack of testing alone. The Federal
Circuit noted that while testing is not itself a requisite for reduction to
practice, it may be required to show that a prototype demonstrates that
381
an invention suits its intended purpose.
In this case, the specific
question remanded to the district court was whether an “embodiment
made of different materials demonstrates that the invention would
382
work for its intended purpose.”
383
In Manning v. Paradis, the Federal Circuit affirmed the USPTO
Board’s decision awarding judgment to the senior party, Paradis, in an
384
interference. The sole issue considered was whether the junior party,
Manning, reduced to practice the subject matter of the count before
385
the filing date of the senior party. The Federal Circuit noted the
well-settled rule that “‘[i]n order to establish an actual reduction to
practice, the inventor must prove that (1) he constructed an
embodiment or performed a process that met all the limitations of the
interference count; and (2) he determined that the invention would
386
After construing the count to
work for its intended purpose.’”
include a limitation of the intended purpose stated in the preamble,
the Federal Circuit determined that Manning did not know that the
invention would work for its intended purpose at the time of his
387
alleged reduction to practice. The Federal Circuit based its decision
on his counsel’s virtual concession on the issue at oral argument and
the Federal Circuit’s review of a journal article authored by Manning
and relied upon to establish his priority date, which showed that at that

(outlining the procedures for an infringement action).
379. Slip Track Sys., 304 F.3d at 1261, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426.
380. Id. at 1267, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1430-31.
381. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431.
382. Id. at 1268, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431.
383. 296 F.3d 1098, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1681 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
384. Id. at 1099, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.
385. Id. at 1100, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.
386. Id. at 1102, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684 (quoting Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154
F.3d 1321, 1327, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1896, 1901 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
387. Id. at 1103-05, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685-86.

FINALPATENTSUMMARY.DOC

2003]

8/15/2003 1:41 PM

2002 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

931

time he did not know the invention would work for its intended
388
purpose.
389
In Berman v. Housey, the Federal Circuit affirmed the USPTO
Board’s interference decision entering judgment in favor of Housey
390
and dismissing Berman’s unpatentability motion as moot. First, the
Federal Circuit addressed whether the Board properly dismissed
Berman’s unpatentability motion. Berman argued that the Board
improperly decided Housey’s preliminary motion of lack of interfering
391
subject matter before its unpatentability motion. The Federal Circuit
held that 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) is a threshold issue best addressed by the
Board at the preliminary stage of an interference before proceeding
392
on the merits. Accordingly, the Board properly refused to consider
Berman’s unpatentability motion once it determined that § 135(b)
393
barred its proffered interfering claim. The Federal Circuit rejected
Berman’s argument that the Board was required to address the
unpatentability motion because of 35 U.S.C. § 6, which provides in
relevant part that “[t]he [Board] . . . shall determine priority and
394
patentability of invention.”
The Federal Circuit found that the
legislative histories of §§ 6 and 135(a) indicates that those provisions
address only what the Board is empowered to consider, without
395
establishing an affirmative obligation to perform.
With respect to the second issue addressed by the Federal Circuit—
the termination of the interference under § 135(b) due to the failure
to declare such interference within a year of the issuance of the
allegedly interfering patent—the Federal Circuit barred Berman’s
396
claim. The Federal Circuit found that Berman waived its right to
397
At the
contend, on appeal, that claim sixty-four was not barred.
Board level, Berman did not contest the fact that claim sixty-four was
directed to the same or substantially the same subject matter as
Housey’s patents that issued more than a year before claim sixty-four
398
was proffered for interference. Instead, Berman only argued that its
claim twenty-seven (which was filed within the one year time period)

388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.

Id. at 1105, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686.
291 F.3d 1345, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1347, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1024.
Id. at 1350-51, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1026-27.
Id. at 1351, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027.
Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027.
Id. at 1353, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1029, see 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (2000) .
Id. at 1353-54, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1029.
Id. at 1354-55, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030.
Id. at 1354, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030.
Id. at 1354-55, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030.
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399

was the same or substantially the same as its claim sixty-four.
Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that because Berman never argued
at the Board that claim sixty-four is not directed to the same or
substantially the same subject matter as the relevant claims in Housey’s
patents, Berman waived that argument and could not raise it on
400
appeal.
Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected Berman’s contention that
because it filed claim sixty-four within one year of the later Housey
patent (“Housey III”), an interference should be declared with that
401
patent. The Federal Circuit held that Housey’s earlier patent claims
“constitute a proper basis for barring claim sixty-four under § 135(b),
and the subsequent issuance of Housey III cannot revive claim sixtyfour once it lost its right to patentability” with respect to the earlier
402
Housey patents.
403
In Adang v. Fischhoff, the Federal Circuit affirmed-in-part, reversedin-part, and remanded the USPTO Board’s decision against Adang, the
404
senior party in the interference. The Board found the application to
be non-enabling and that actual reduction to practice was not proven
405
before Fischhoff’s priority date.
The invention involved genetically
406
modifying tomato plants to protect against certain types of insects.
The Federal Circuit held that the Board erred in its count
construction, noting that “[i]t is too great a leap to mandate that, in
order to come within the scope of the count, expression of a gene
‘capable of encoding’ a protein must be shown to produce only that
407
protein.” Further, the Board’s construction was too narrow, resulting
in neither Fischhoff nor Adang presenting an example sufficient to
408
satisfy the limitations of the count. However, the Board’s decision of
non-enablement was supported by substantial evidence. The Board
determined that a person skilled in the art would not expect success in
transferring the technique to a different tomato plant without undue
409
experimentation.
Thus, the Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s
410
claim construction, affirmed the decision of non-enablement with

399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.

Id. at 1355, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030.
Id. at 1355, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030.
Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030.
Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030.
286 F.3d 1346, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1504 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1347, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505.
Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505.
Id. at 1347-48, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505-06.
Id. at 1354, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1510 (citation omitted in original).
Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1510.
Id. at 1355-56, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1511.
Id. at 1359, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514.
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regard to one of Adang’s CIP applications, and remanded to
determine whether Adang could establish entitlement to a priority
412
date based on another CIP application at issue.
413
In Griffin v. Bertina, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s
414
The
decision awarding priority to the senior party, Bertina.
invention at issue was a method for diagnosing thrombosis by
obtaining a nucleic acid containing the codon for human Factor V
from a test subject and assaying for the presence of a point mutation
415
that indicates an increased risk for thrombosis. Griffin attempted to
establish an actual reduction to practice prior to Bertina’s accorded
416
date. On appeal, Griffin argued that the count should be construed
417
as limited only to its manipulative steps. Therefore, Griffin asserted
that he completed those manipulative steps, thus reducing the count
418
to practice prior to Bertina’s priority date.
The Federal Circuit
disagreed, stating that the count is limited by the preamble because it
419
gives “meaning and purpose” to the manipulative steps.
For
example, the Federal Circuit pointed out that, while the first step
stated that the test nucleic acid should be obtained from a “test
subject,” without the preamble’s stated objective of diagnose
420
thrombosis, the term “test subject” was meaningless. The Federal
Circuit also found that a party attempting to prove that it need not be
required to establish reduction to practice of every characteristic listed
in the count due to their alleged inherency must prove that such
inherent qualities add nothing to the count beyond the other cited
421
limitations.
Therefore, the Federal Circuit stated that Griffin’s
argument regarding performing the steps inherently diagnosing
422
The Federal Circuit held that the relationship
thrombosis fails.
between the point mutation and an increased risk of thrombosis is
material to the patentability of the count because it indicates the
423
purpose of the method. Thus, because Griffin lacked appreciation
for the utility of the point mutation as actually correlating with an

411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.

Id. at 1360, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514.
Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514.
285 F.3d 1029, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1431 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1030, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432.
Id. at 1030-31, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432.
Id. at 1031, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432.
Id. at 1032, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1433.
Id. at 1032-33, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1433.
Id. at 1033, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434.
Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434 (citation omitted in original).
Id. at 1034, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434.
Id. at 1034-35, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434-35.
Id. at 1034, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434-35.
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heightened risk of thrombosis, it failed to prove a successful reduction
424
to practice.
425
In Scott v. Koyama, the junior party, Scott, sought to establish a
priority date in the United States by proving that he was in possession
of the invention of the count in the United States before Koyama’s
426
Japanese filing date. Scott presented evidence of a conception date,
427
diligence, and actual reduction to practice.
In particular, Scott
offered evidence of daily activity over a period of seventeen days
involving planning construction of a manufacturing facility to practice
428
the process of the count.
As the Federal Circuit noted, an
interference proceeding commences with a determination of the
429
parties’ effective filing dates. The “senior party,” the party with the
earlier effective filing date, will prevail unless the junior party
430
establishes entitlement to an earlier date. The Board found Scott’s
431
evidence insufficient to establish actual reduction to practice. The
Federal Circuit agreed that this evidence did not establish actual
reduction to practice, but, in reversing the Board decision, held that
this evidence should have been considered as evidence of reduction to
432
practice.
433
In Brown v. Barbacid, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the
Board’s decision in this interference case, holding that: (1) the
ultimate burden of proof with respect to priority always remains on the
434
junior party; (2) the Board, with respect to authentication, must
435
weigh evidence from the vantage point of one skilled in the art;
(3) independent evidence must corroborate the inventor’s testimony
of conception or actual reduction to practice and this evidence is
reviewed by the Federal Circuit under “rule of reason” analysis to
436
determine sufficient corroboration;
(4) an inventor does not
establish a conception date if the physical and testimonial evidence
437
relating to that date does not include an element of the count; (5) in
424. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435.
425. 281 F.3d 1243, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1856 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
426. Id. at 1246, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858.
427. Id. at 1246-48, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858-59.
428. Id. at 1247, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858-59.
429. Id. at 1246, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858.
430. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858.
431. Id. at 1247-48, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1859.
432. Id. at 1248-49, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858-59.
433. 276 F.3d 1327, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
434. Id. at 1332-33, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238-39. But see id. at 1340, 61
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243 (“[T]he junior party bears no burden of proof as to the
senior party’s dates of conception and reduction to practice.”).
435. Id. at 1333-34, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1239-40.
436. Id. at 1334-35, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240.
437. Id. at 1335-36, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240-41.
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determining the date of conception, physical evidence containing all
elements of the count requires no further corroboration to
demonstrate the content of the physical evidence itself–-the Board
must then consider evidence relating to reasonable diligence in
438
reduction to practice; and (6) where the senior party’s brief did not
rely on testimonial evidence, the Board is correct in declining to
consider the testimony with respect to the party’s conception and
439
reduction to practice.
H. Patent Term
440

In Bayer AG v. Carlsbad Technology, Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
holding that the patent at issue was valid until December 3, 2003 as a
441
result of the Uruguay Rounds Agreements Act (“URAA”). In April
2001, Carlsbad notified Bayer that it submitted an ANDA on
442
Bayer filed suit against Carlsbad, asserting that the
ciprofloxacin.
443
patent at issue was valid until December 9, 2003.
Carlsbad
counterclaimed that the patent was valid only until October 1, 2002
because of a terminal disclaimer that Bayer filed before passage of the
444
URAA. The Federal Circuit determined that the URAA amendment
automatically changed the expiration date of the earlier patent on
445
which the terminal disclaimer was based. As a result, the patent at
446
issue was entitled to the later date.
I.

Inventorship
447

In Trovan Ltd. v. Sokmat SA., Irori, the Federal Circuit vacated and
remanded a decision by U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California, holding the district court did not properly construe the
claims at issue, thereby necessitating resolution of factual questions
448
regarding inventorship. In this case, Trovan and Sokymat agreed to
449
work together to optimize production of Trovan’s transponders.
The Federal Circuit first reiterated that when a patent either includes
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.

Id. at 1336-37, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1241-42.
Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1242.
298 F.3d 1377, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1045 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1378, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1046.
Id. at 1379, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1047.
Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1047.
Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1047.
Id. at 1382-83, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1049-50.
Id. at 1378, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1049-50.
299 F.3d 1292, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1294, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1865.
Id. at 1298, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867.
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names other than the true inventors or omits names of the true
450
inventors, it is rendered invalid. However, the presumed validity of a
patent creates a presumption that the named inventors are the only
451
inventors. As a result of this presumption, correcting the misjoinder
452
or nonjoinder of inventors requires clear and convincing evidence.
Here, the district court found Gustafson (Sokymat) to be the inventor
of the ‘410 patent because Trovan could not prove by clear and
convincing evidence that Hadden and Zirbes, Trovan employees, were
453
co-inventors. However, the Federal Circuit stated that the fact that
the ‘410 patent contained claims that overlapped those of the ‘855
patent, which issued to Hadden and Zirbes, did not mean that
454
Gustafson was a co-inventor of the ‘855 patent. The Federal Circuit
then interpreted the claims regarding inventorship of the ‘855 patent
455
and determined that the factual record was incomplete.
Consequently, the Federal Circuit remanded the case for the district
court to determine proper inventorship by determining each party’s
456
contributions to the invention. Judge Michel dissented, stating that
although the district court may have erred in its claim construction, it
457
amounted only to harmless error.
458
In University of West Virginia v. VanVoorhies, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the
plaintiff University’s claim that a co-inventor to certain patent
applications breached his duty to assign inventions developed when
459
he was a graduate student at the University.
In its opinion, the
Federal Circuit first acknowledged that while contract law questions
are matters of state law, the problem of whether a patent application
is a continuation-in-part of an earlier-filed patent application (thus
covered by a previously executed assignment) is a matter for federal
460
patent law.
Moreover, the Federal Circuit held that under the
University’s patent policy, the defendant was obligated to assign a
patent application to the University even in the absence of a contract
461
expressly requiring such assignment.
In affirming the district
450. Id. at 1301, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870.
451. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870.
452. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870 (citing Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys.,
Inc., 105 F.3d 976, 979-80, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1782, 1785-86 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
453. Id. at 1303, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871-72.
454. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871-72.
455. Id. at 1304-10, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872-77.
456. Id. at 1310, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877.
457. Id. at 1310, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877 (Michel, J., dissenting).
458. 278 F.3d 1288, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
459. Id. at 1291-92, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1450.
460. Id. at 1296-97, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
461. Id. at 1298, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456.
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court’s rejection of the defendant’s argument that a previously
executed assignment was invalid, the Federal Circuit clarified that
although the doctrine of assignor estoppel precludes challenges to
the validity of a patent itself, it does not bar challenges to the legality
462
of a contract assigning the patent. Finally, the Federal Circuit held
that an inventor’s act of providing technical information to the
University’s patent counsel and executing documents for a patent
application prosecution did not give rise to an attorney-client
relationship. Thus, the Federal Circuit deemed disqualification
unnecessary when the University and the defendant investor’s
463
interest became adverse.
464
In Thompson v. Haynes, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court’s holding denying each party’s claim for correction of
465
inventorship to remove the other party’s employee as a co-inventor.
Thompson entered into an agreement with Fluid Controls to develop
466
a fluid conducting swivel concept.
Fluid Controls was issued a
patent on this concept, and for a period of time, Thompson served as
467
a distributor for the patented fluid conducting swivels.
Subsequently, Thompson ended the distributor relationship and
began manufacturing his own swivels, and upon threat of suit by
Fluid Controls, Thompson filed suit for a declaratory judgment of
468
non-infringement.
Fluid Controls counterclaimed alleging
469
infringement, violation of the Lanham Act, and violation of state
470
unfair competition law. The district court found Thompson guilty
of violating the Lanham Act and state deceptive trade practices act
and awarded Fluid Controls injunctive relief, costs, attorneys’ fees,
and damages consisting of lost sales and Thompson’s profits, both
471
trebled.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit determined that “the
burden on each party was to show facts supported by clear and
convincing evidence that the other person listed as an inventor had
472
not in fact contributed to the conception of the invention.” Thus,
each party’s clear and convincing evidence that its employee

462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.

Id. at 1301, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457.
Id. at 1303-04, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459.
305 F.3d 1369, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1372, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
Id. at 1372-73, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
Id. at 1373, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2000).
Thompson, 305 F.3d at 1373, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
Id. at 1373-74, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652-53.
Id. at 1384, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661.
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473

contributed to the invention misapprehended the burden on it. As
a result, the district court properly found that neither party presented
clear and convincing evidence that the other party’s employee should
be removed as inventor and thus properly refused to correct the
474
inventorship to the patent in suit.
J.

Prosecution History Laches

In Symbol Technology, Inc. v. Lemelson Medical, Education & Research
475
Foundation, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s holding
that, as a matter of law, the defense of prosecution laches was not
476
available. The Federal Circuit held that “the equitable doctrine of
laches may be applied to bar enforcement of patent claims that are
issued after an unreasonable and unexplained delay in prosecution
even though the applicant complied with pertinent statutes and
477
rules.” In so doing, the Federal Circuit rejected the arguments that
(1) the doctrine was limited to interference actions under the Webster
478
479
Electric Co. v. Splitdorf Electrical Co., and its progeny; (2) that the
480
Patent Act of 1952 forecloses the application of prosecution laches;
and (3) that two of the Federal Circuit’s non-precedential opinions
rejecting prosecution laches defense should be binding on the Federal
481
Circuit.
482
In In re Bogese II, the Federal Circuit affirmed a decision by the
USPTO Board finding that Bogese surrendered his right to a patent
483
due to prosecution history laches. The Federal Circuit found that
the USPTO is authorized to reject a patent application when the
applicant fails to advance prosecution of his application for an
unreasonably long period of time, provided the USPTO gives notice of
484
the potential consequence of failure.
Here, the Federal Circuit
quoted approvingly the Board’s finding that the appellant’s conduct in

473. Id. at 1384, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661.
474. Id. at 1384, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661.
475. 277 F.3d 1361, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1515 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
476. Id. at 1363, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516.
477. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516.
478. 264 U.S. 463 (1924).
479. See Symbol Tech., 277 F.3d at 1365, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1518 (stating that in
Webster, the Court based their decision on the reasonableness of the prosecution’s
delay, not on whether there was interference).
480. See id. at 1365-66, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1518-19 (explaining that the
legislative history suggests that the drafters did not intend the Patent Act of 1952 to
preclude the defense of prosecution laches).
481. Id. at 1368, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520.
482. 303 F.3d 1362, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1448 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
483. Id. at 1363, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1449.
484. Id. at 1367-68, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452-53.
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delaying issuance of his patent, thereby extending its term, was “‘so
egregious in defeating the policy of the patent laws of promoting
485
science and the useful arts as to be presumed unreasonable.’”
Similarly, the Federal Circuit approved the Board’s holding that
forfeiture of a patent is appropriate when someone, “‘intentionally or
by reason of culpable neglect, is guilty of action which unduly
postpones the time the public would be entitled to the free use of the
486
invention.’” In fact, the Federal Circuit viewed the USPTO authority
to punish undue delay as “even broader than the authority of a district
487
court to hold a patent unenforceable.”
In dissent, consistent with her opinion in Symbol Technologies, Inc. v.
488
Lemelson Medical, Education & Research Foundation. Judge Newman
stated that the court has given patent examiners “a new power to deny
a patent on the ground that the applicant dawdled too long in
489
prosecution.” Judge Newman found this holding inconsistent with In
490
re Henriksen, where the Court of Customs and Patents Appeals said
that there is no statutory basis for fixing an arbitrary limit on the
number of prior applications in a chain of co-pending applications for
491
purposes of claiming priority.
Judge Newman saw the USPTO’s
492
equitable power as limited to relieving distress, not causing it.
Interestingly, she explained that fixing that limit to twenty years from
filing will make persistent filing rarer, but simultaneously contended
that the USPTO’s new power will increase the burden on all applicants
493
in order to punish a rare transgressor.
III. INFRINGEMENT
In 2002, the Federal Circuit considered numerous appeals
concerning patent infringement.
Central to its infringement
decisions was often construing a claim. For the most part, the court
followed the basic tenets of claim construction and relied on the

485. Id. at 1366, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1451 (quoting Ex parte Bogese II, slip op. at
33-34, No. 86-1699, 818 F.2d 877 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 16, 1987)).
486. Id. at 1366, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1451 (quoting Ex parte Bogese II, slip op. at
35-36, No. 86-1699, 818 F.2d 877 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 16, 1987)).
487. Id. at 1367-68 & n.5, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452-53 & n.5.
488. 277 F.3d 1361, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1515 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
489. In re Bogese II, 303 F.3d at 1370, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454 (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
490. 399 F.2d 253, 158 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 224 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
491. Id. at 254, 158 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 225.
492. In re Bogese II, 303 F.3d at 1371, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455 (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
493. Id. at 1372-73, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456.
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ordinary meaning of a claim term or intrinsic evidence to determine
the meaning of a claim.
Ironically, it was the Supreme Court, not the Federal Circuit, that
handed down the most important decision concerning infringement
494
this year, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.
In this
case, the Court considered the scope of the doctrine of equivalents as
limited by the prosecution history of a patent in suit. The Court
reversed the Federal Circuit and held that any amendment could
narrow the scope of equivalents, but that truly cosmetic amendments
would not create such a narrow scope.
In addition to claim construction and the doctrine of equivalents,
the Federal Circuit had occasion to address the issues of literal
infringement, inducement of infringement, and design patent
infringement.
What follows is an overview of some of the
infringement cases that the court decided in 2002.
A. Claim Construction
Construing the claims at issue is the first step in an infringement
495
analysis.
As a general rule, terms in a patent claim receive their
plain, ordinary, and accepted meaning within the community of
496
those of ordinary skill in the relevant art.
There is a “heavy
497
presumption” that favors the use of this accepted meaning.
However, if the patentee chooses to use terms in some other manner,
this presumption may be overcome and the Federal Circuit may
498
depart from this customary meaning. Accordingly, it is necessary to
review the specification to determine whether the patentee assigned
499
any special meaning to claim terms.
The specification is the best
500
source to determine the meaning of a disputed term. However, in
consulting the specification, the interpretative process may not
494. 535 U.S. 722, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (2002).
495. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996); Allen
Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1344, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769,
1772 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
496. Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 1299, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1065, 1067 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
497. Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1607, 1610 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
498. Ecolab, Inc. v. Envirochem, Inc., 264 F.3d 1358, 1366, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1173, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d
1575, 1578, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1126, 1129 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
499. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d
1313, 1325, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
500. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577; Teleflex, 299 F.3d at
1325, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1380.
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import limitations from the specification into the defining language
501
of the claims. Additionally, if in evidence, the Federal Circuit may
consider the prosecution history, which is often of critical importance
502
in determining the meaning of a claim.
1.

Interpreting the plain and ordinary meaning of claims
In two related cases, Inverness Medical Switzerland GmbH v. Warner
503
Lambert Co. (“Inverness I”) and Inverness Medical Switzerland GmbH v.
504
(“Inverness II”), the Federal Circuit
Princeton Biomeditech Corp.
vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment of non505
infringement on the grounds of an erroneous claim construction.
The patents-at-issue in both cases involved a pregnancy-testing
506
In Inverness I, the Federal Circuit indicated that the
device.
construction of the phrase “mobility . . . is facilitated” from Inverness
507
II also applied in this case. In Inverness II, the Federal Circuit noted
that the district court construed the phrase to mean that a “sugar, or
a material that includes sugar as an ingredient . . . must help or
508
improve the release of the labeled reagent from the test strip.” The
Federal Circuit, in Inverness II, disagreed with this interpretation and
concluded that the claim phrase must be given its ordinary meaning
509
of “capacity to make movement easier.” The Federal Circuit started
its construction with the use of dictionaries to determine the ordinary
510
meaning of the claim terms. The Federal Circuit relied on standard
English-language dictionaries rather than specialized, technical
dictionaries because the parties did not argue that the term had an
511
established specialized meaning.
Further, the Federal Circuit
indicated that it looked to dictionary definitions that were applicable

501. Intervet Am., Inc. v. Kee-Vet Labs., Inc., 887 F.2d 1050, 1053, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1474, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
502. Id. at 1053, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476; Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc),
aff’d, 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996); Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1577.
503. 309 F.3d 1373, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1933 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
504. 309 F.3d 1365, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1926 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
505. Inverness II, 309 F.3d at 1366, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1927; Inverness I, 309
F.3d at 1374-75, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1933.
506. Inverness II, 309 F.3d at 1366, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1927; Inverness I, 309
F.3d at 1375, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1934.
507. Inverness I, 309 F.3d at 1377, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935-36.
508. Inverness II, 309 F.3d at 1368, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1929 (emphasis
removed) (quoting Conopco, Inc. v. Princeton Biomeditech Corp., No. 97-6254 at 8
(D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2000).
509. Id. at 1370, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930.
510. Id. at 1369-70, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930.
511. Id. at 1369, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930.
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512

on the date the patents were issued in construing the claim.
In
choosing between multiple definitions, the Federal Circuit relied on
the patent disclosure to differentiate between proper and improper
513
meanings. The Federal Circuit further indicated that when a claim
term is used in more than one claim, it should be construed
514
In assessing the prosecution history, the Federal
consistently.
Circuit did not find “a clear and unambiguous disclaimer of a claim
scope” that required deviation from the ordinary meaning of the
515
claim term.
Additionally, in Inverness I, the Federal Circuit discussed the
516
construction of the words “on” and “onto.”
The district court
517
The
construed those words as requiring surface disposition.
Federal Circuit concluded that those words encompass both surface
and internal positioning and therefore vacated the district court’s
518
judgment. Applying the same process as used in Inverness II, the
Federal Circuit concluded that there are two pertinent definitions
519
and that the words may be interpreted to include both alternatives.
Interestingly, the Federal Circuit allowed the appellants to raise an
argument for the first time on appeal because it provided additional
support for the claim construction the appellants previously
520
argued.
Finally, the Federal Circuit determined that the
prosecution history did not preclude the use of more expansive
dictionary definitions encompassing surface and internal
521
positioning.
522
In Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., the Federal Circuit
affirmed-in-part, reversed-in-part, and remanded the district court’s
523
In doing so, the Federal Circuit
construction of various terms.
reinforced the propriety of courts using dictionaries, encyclopedias
and treatises to determine the ordinary and customary meaning of
524
claim terms. The Federal Circuit went on to say that:
512. Id. at 1370, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930.
513. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930 (quoting Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa
per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
514. Id. at 1371, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931.
515. Id. at 1372, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932.
516. Inverness I, 309 F.3d 1373, 1377-78, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1933, 1936-37 (Fed.
Cir. 2002).
517. Id. at 1377, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935.
518. Id. at 1382, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939.
519. Id. at 1378-79, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1936-37.
520. Id. at 1380-81, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938.
521. Id. at 1382, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939.
522. 308 F.3d 1193, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
523. Id. at 1197, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815.
524. Id. at 1202, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818.
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Dictionaries are always available to the court to aid in the task of
determining meanings that would have been attributed by those of
skill in the relevant art to any disputed terms used by the inventor
in the claims . . . . Indeed, these materials may be the most
meaningful sources of information to aid judges in better
understanding both the technology and the terminology used by
525
those skilled in the art to describe the technology.
526

In Electro Scientific Industries, Inc. v. Dynamic Details, Inc., the
Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment of non527
infringement based on claim construction. The patent at issue was
for an accurate method of high-speed drilling of small holes in circuit
528
boards. The district court construed the term “circuit boards” to
“‘require multiple, separated workpieces, [but] not a system for
529
processing a single workpiece.’”
Based on the language of the
claim, the specification, and the prosecution history, the Federal
Circuit determined that the term “circuit boards” does not require
530
separated workpieces. Despite a depiction in the specification of an
embodiment that processes physically separate pieces, the Federal
Circuit did not believe the specification restricted the claim language
531
to require separate circuit boards or workpieces. Interestingly, the
Federal Circuit relied on a dictionary to determine that the word
532
“multiple” does not require separateness.
In Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics Technology Corp. v. Shell Oil
533
the Federal Circuit affirmed-in-part, reversed-in-part, and
Co.,
remanded the District Court of Delaware’s finding of non534
infringement of Union Carbide’s patents. Union Carbide’s patents
535
contained efficiency equations for ethylene-oxide silver catalysts.
With respect to the claim construction of one patent, the district
court interpreted the claims as requiring the infringing party to
actually use the equation in creating its catalyst, rather than simply
536
requiring that the party’s catalyst be used to satisfy the equation.

525.
526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.
536.

Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818.
307 F.3d 1343, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1781 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1345, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781.
Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781.
Id. at 1348, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783 (citation omitted in original).
Id. at 1348-50, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783-85.
Id. at 1349, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1784.
Id. at 1350, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785.
308 F.3d 1167, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1171, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547.
Id. at 1171-73, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547-49.
Id. at 1174, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549.
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Consequently, the district court construed “characterizable by” to
537
mean “determined from.”
In its analysis, the Federal Circuit noted that the general rule
creates a presumption that claim terms mean what they say and
courts should construe them according to their ordinary and
538
accustomed meaning. However, the Federal Circuit explained that
the “heavy presumption” favoring ordinary meaning can be overcome
if a different meaning is clearly and deliberately put forth in intrinsic
539
evidence.
Relying on a dictionary, the Federal Circuit found that
the definition of “characterizable” is “capable of being characterized”
and “characterize” is defined as “to describe the essential character or
540
quality of . . . to be a distinguishing characteristic of.”
From this,
the Federal Circuit deduced that the ordinary meaning of
“characterizable by an efficiency equation” was “capable of being
541
described by an efficiency equation.”
This would be the accepted
meaning “unless the intrinsic evidence clearly redefines the claim
term to put one reasonably skilled in the relevant art on notice that
542
Union Carbide intended to assign the term a different meaning.”
After examining the prosecution history and specification, the
Federal Circuit held that there was no justification to depart from
543
“the ordinary meaning of the claim language.” With respect to the
claim term “an efficiency-enhancing amount . . . of a mixture of
[salts],” the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that this
meant that the “salts themselves must increase the efficiency of the
544
catalyst.”
Because the Federal Circuit interpreted some of the
claims differently from the district court, the Federal Circuit
remanded the cases to determine infringement according to the
545
proper claim construction.
546
In CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., the Federal Circuit vacated
the district court’s grant of summary judgment of non-infringement
537. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549.
538. Id. at 1177, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1551.
539. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1551.
540. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1552.
541. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552.
542. Id. at 1177-78, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552 (“We have previously held that,
in redefining the meaning of particular claim terms away from the ordinary
meaning, the intrinsic evidence must ‘clearly set forth’ or ‘clearly redefine’ a claim
term so as to put one reasonably skilled in the art on notice that the patentee
intended to so redefine the claim term.” (citing Bell Atl. Network Servs., 262 F.3d
1258, 1268, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
543. Id. at 1177-78, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552.
544. Id. at 1180, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554.
545. Id. at 1190, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1561-62.
546. 288 F.3d 1359, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1658 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

FINALPATENTSUMMARY.DOC

2003]

8/15/2003 1:41 PM

2002 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

945

based on the district court’s erroneous claim construction of the term
“reciprocating member” as limited to a single-component straight bar
547
In reaching its
in the plaintiff’s patent for an elliptical trainer.
decision, the Federal Circuit reiterated that there is a strong
presumption that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary
548
meaning. The Federal Circuit stated that generally it will interpret
a term to cover all known structural variation “‘if an apparatus claim
recites a general structure without limiting that structure to a specific
549
subset of structures.’” The Federal Circuit noted that its precedents
show that dictionary definitions may establish a claim term’s ordinary
550
meaning.
The Federal Circuit further held that a party accused of
infringement may overcome the presumption of ordinary meaning
551
and narrow a claim term.
However, it is not enough for the
accused party to simply indicate a preferred embodiment because a
patentee is not required to describe every possible embodiment of
552
the invention in the specification.
A narrowing of claims may be
achieved in several ways: (1) where the patentee acts as his own
lexicographer; (2) where the patentee distinguishes the term from
the prior art in the specification, drawings, or prosecution history;
(3) where the patentee’s chosen term “so deprives the claim of
clarity” that resorting to intrinsic evidence is necessary for a definite
meaning; and (4) where a claim term invokes a means-plus-function
553
analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
None of the narrowing
554
methods was applicable here.
Instead, the Federal Circuit looked
547. Id. at 1362, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
548. Id. at 1366, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662 (citations omitted).
549. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662 (quoting Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa
per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1234, 1250, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
550. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662 (citing Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp.,
274 F.3d 1336, 1344, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1851, 1855 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (defining the
ordinary meaning of “portion” as encompassing both a one-piece and a two-piece
structure using Random House Unabridged Dictionary)); see also Renishaw, 158 F.3d at
1250, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1122 (holding that a term’s meaning may come from a
“relevant dictionary” as long as the definition does not contradict the plain meaning
of the patent disclosure); Kegel Co. v. AMF Bowling, Inc., 127 F.3d 1420, 1427, 44
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1123, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary to define “assembly”); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576,
1584 n.6, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1580 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (explaining that
technical treatises and dictionaries, though extrinsic to integrated patent documents,
are legitimate resources which help judges to better understand underlying
technology and interpret claim terms, so long as such definitions do not contradict
definitions ascertained by reading patent documents).
551. CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662 (citations
omitted).
552. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662.
553. Id. at 1366-67, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662-63 (citations omitted).
554. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662-63.
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to the ordinary meaning of “reciprocating member” based on a
555
The
dictionary definition to determine the scope of the claims.
Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s decision because the
district court imported limitations from the specifications into the
556
claims in its claim construction.
557
Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa North America Corp. concerned a patent for
558
shift cable components used in motor vehicles.
At issue was the
559
The judge adopted a narrow
term “clip” as used in the claims.
560
construction of “clip” but the jury found the claims to be infringed.
Ficosa appealed the denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of
law on the non-infringement issue and the Federal Circuit affirmed
561
the district court’s decision. The Federal Circuit first stated that the
claim’s words are interpreted “in light of the intrinsic evidence from
the record, including the written description, the drawings, and the
562
prosecution history, if in evidence.”
Intrinsic evidence may offer
context and clarification regarding the meaning of claim terms and is
an important source for the legally operative meaning of language in
563
dispute.
However, in assessing claim construction, the Federal Circuit stated
that the number of embodiments disclosed in the specification
564
cannot be determined by the meaning of disputed terms. As the
Federal Circuit explained in CCS Fitness, the party accused of
infringement cannot overcome the presumptive deference to a
term’s ordinary meaning simply by referencing the preferred
embodiment, structures, or steps disclosed in the specification or
565
prosecution history.
As a result, the Federal Circuit determined
that the claim at issue was not limited to the preferred embodiment
566
disclosed in the specification. The Federal Circuit held that claim
terms assume “ordinary and accustomed” meanings unless the
claimant showed an intention to employ a modified definition in the
intrinsic record “using words or expressions of manifest exclusion or
567
restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope.”
555.
556.
557.
558.
559.
560.
561.
562.
563.
564.
565.
566.
567.

Id. at 1367, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663.
Id. at 1370, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665.
299 F.3d 1313, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1318, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376.
Id. at 1319, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376.
Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376.
Id. at 1318, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375.
Id. at 1324-25, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1380.
Id. at 1325, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1380.
Id. at 1327, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382.
Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382.
Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382.
Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382.
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Although the Federal Circuit determined that the district court erred
in its claim construction, it found the error harmless on the issue of
infringement because the claim included a broader scope of subject
568
matter than the jury construction.
Thus, if Ficosa infringed the
district court’s narrowly construed claim, it also infringed the Federal
569
Circuit’s broader claim.
570
In Neomagic Corp. v. Trident Microsystems, Inc., the Federal Circuit
affirmed-in-part, vacated-in-part, and remanded the district court’s
entry of summary judgment of non-infringement of Neomagic’s ‘955
571
and ‘806 patents.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the trial court’s
construction of the term “coupling” in the ‘955 patent to require that
the voltage applied to the substrate be different from that applied to
572
the logic circuit. The Federal Circuit used a technical dictionary
definition of “coupling” to demonstrate the ordinary meaning of the
573
term. Because the accused devices tap both the substrate and logic
circuit at the same voltage, the Federal Circuit found that they did
574
not infringe the ‘955 patent as a matter of law.
With regard to the ‘806 patent, the Federal Circuit vacated and
remanded the district court’s construction of “power supply” because
the district court improperly relied upon the accused device to arrive
575
at that definition. The Federal Circuit noted that “it is well-settled
that claims may not be construed by reference to the accused
576
device.”
Finally, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s
construction of “negative voltage with respect to” as referring to
577
absolute voltage. The Federal Circuit interpreted the term to refer
to relative voltage based on the plain meaning of the claim, which it
578
viewed as being consistent with the specification.
579
In Middleton, Inc. v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co., the
Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment of
non-infringement because the district court applied an erroneous

568. Id. at 1328-29, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1383.
569. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1383.
570. 287 F.3d 1062, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1482 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
571. Id. at 1075-76, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491.
572. Id. at 1072, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489.
573. Id. at 1071, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488.
574. Id. at 1072-73, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489.
575. Id. at 1073-74, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489-90.
576. Id. at 1074, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490 (quoting SRI Int’l v. Matsushita
Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118, 227 U.S.P.Q. 577, 583 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en
banc)).
577. Id. at 1075, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490-91.
578. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491.
579. 311 F.3d 1384, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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580

claim interpretation based on the meaning of “uniform.”
The
claimed invention was a floor finishing material including a
581
“uniform” film of clear plastic material. The Federal Circuit noted
that the term “uniform flexible film” apparently did carry any special
technical meanings and the accepted meaning of “uniform” is
582
“having always the same form.” The Federal Circuit looked to the
specification and found that it defines “flexible” as “bendability of the
583
sheet but [] not . . . stretchability.”
Furthermore, the Federal
Circuit stated that “film” obviously means the clear plastic material
584
referred to in the patent disclosure.
Finally, the Federal Circuit
acknowledged that usage and context within the claim itself were the
585
“Uniform”
most important indicators of the meaning of a term.
could thus mean “uniform in irregularity” as well as “uniform in
586
thickness.” As a result, a textured surface that was non-uniform in
thickness could infringe the patent provided that the irregularities
587
are uniform.
2.

The use of the specification and prosecution history in interpreting claims
In All Dental Prodx v. Advantage Dental Products, the Federal Circuit
affirmed-in-part and reversed-in-part a summary judgment decision of
588
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
The
589
All
claim language in dispute was “original unidentified mass.”
Dental sold tablets that were oval-shaped and flat and could be molded
590
onto a tooth to take an impression. The Federal Circuit stated that
while the disputed language “was not a model of clarity,” it was easily
591
understood when put in the context of the specification.
The
Federal Circuit noted that the specification did not need to describe
the subject matter in the exact terms used in the claims, but simply
needed to indicate to persons skilled in the art that, as of the filing
592
date, the applicant invented what was now being claimed.

580. Id. at 1385-86, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 113839.
581. Id. at 1385, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139.
582. Id. at 1387, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140 (citing WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1290 (1985)).
583. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140.
584. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140.
585. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140.
586. Id. at 1389, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142.
587. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142.
588. 309 F.3d 774, 776, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1945, 1946 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
589. Id. at 778-79, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948-49.
590. Id. at 777, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1947.
591. Id. at 779, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948.
592. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948 (quoting Eiselstein v. Frank, 52 F.3d 1035,
1038, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1467, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
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593

In Jack Guttman, Inc. v. Kopykake Enterprises, Inc., the Federal
Circuit vacated and remanded the decision by the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio denying Guttman’s motion for a
preliminary injunction because the district court based its decision on
594
an erroneous claim construction. The patent at issue involved the
use of a inkjet copy machine to make edible copies of photographs to
595
put on cakes.
Guttman claimed that the novelty of the patent
stemmed from the conventional wisdom that edible sheets were too
delicate to go through hot and tortuous path of an inkjet copier and
that the inventor fashioned the idea to adhere the edible sheet to a
carrier sheet, and then send it through the manual feed path of a
596
conventional inkjet copier with the heaters removed or disabled.
The Federal Circuit construed “photocopy machine,” finding that
insofar as the specification explicitly contemplated that a “photocopy
machine” could have scanning and reproduction components in
separate housings, the district court erred in limiting the claims to
597
“conventional” photocopy machines.
As a result, a scanner
combined with an inkjet printer could be a “photocopy machine”
598
under the Federal Circuit’s interpretation.
Because the intrinsic
evidence made the claims unambiguous, the district court erred by
failing to construe the terms in dispute in accordance with that
599
evidence.
The Federal Circuit remanded the case to the district
court for further proceedings based upon the proper claim
600
construction.
601
In Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., the Federal Circuit reversed
the district court’s patent infringement award, holding that no
reasonable jury could find that Baystate infringed a properly
602
construed claim of Bowers’ patent.
Here, Bowers developed and
received a patent for a template that works in conjunction with a
computer aided design program named CADKEY, made by Cadkey,
603
Inc. Subsequently, Bowers took a license for a copyrighted product
called Geodraft and packaged the two products in a “Designer’s

593.
594.
595.
596.
597.
598.
599.
600.
601.
602.
603.

302 F.3d 1352, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1354, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303.
Id. at 1354-55, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303.
Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303.
Id. at 1359-61, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307-09.
Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307-08.
Id. at 1362, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308-09.
Id. at 1363, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310.
302 F.3d 1334, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1338, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1065-66.
Id. at 1338-39, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066-67.
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Toolkit” that was released in 1990 with a shrink wrap license.
Bowers presented the product to Baystate and offered to establish a
business relationship, but Baystate rejected Bowers’ offer and
developed a product with similar features as Bowers’ Designer’s
605
Toolkit.
Baystate subsequently purchased Cadkey, Inc., effectively
606
eliminating the market for Bowers’ Designer’s Toolkit.
The Federal Circuit held, inter alia, that the district court erred in
its claim construction and reversed the jury verdict of patent
607
infringement.
Relying on the specification and reexamination
history, the Federal Circuit construed the limitation to mean securing
said templates in a fixed orientation to said tablet whereby said
pointing device can select a working function in a single movement
608
of the said button” to mean that “each of the indicia associated with
the sub-menu of a main-menu group must represent a working
function accessible with a single movement of the pointer button
(e.g., as opposed to access through a further selection via a drop609
down menu).”
Applying this construction to the “undisputed”
evidence that the accused product utilized drop-down menus, the
Federal Circuit held that the record showed that the patent in suit
610
was not literally infringed. The Federal Circuit noted that, because
the patentee did not assert infringement under the doctrine of
611
equivalents, it would not consider it on appeal.
612
In Bionx Implants, Inc. v. Linvatec Corp., the Federal Circuit
affirmed the claim construction decision by the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York, but vacated that court’s order
entering summary judgment and remanded the case for further
613
proceedings. The patent-at-issue related to a surgical fastener that
is particularly adapted to repairing tears in the meniscus of the
614
knee. On appeal, Bionx argued that the district court adopted too
restrictive a construction of the term “rigid,” which is used in each of
615
the asserted claims. The district court’s construction required that
the claimed suture be “sufficiently rigid to push through meniscus

604.
605.
606.
607.
608.
609.
610.
611.
612.
613.
614.
615.

Id. at 1339, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066.
Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066.
Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
Id. at 1338, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066.
Id. at 1347, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
Id. at 1349, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073.
Id. at 1351, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075.
Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075.
299 F.3d 1378, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1145 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1379, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145-46.
Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146.
Id. at 1380, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146.
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616

tissue without a pre-cut channel for the suture to follow.” Bionx
disagreed, arguing that “rigid” should apply to “any shaft that is
capable of being pushed through tissue, regardless of whether the
617
tissue is pre-channeled.” The Federal Circuit construed “rigid,” in
the context of a surgical fastener designed to repair tears in the knee,
to mean “rigid enough to be pushed directly through the semi-hard
cartilage of a meniscus [a part of the knee] without any precutting
618
[i.e. a precut channel through the tissue].”
The Federal Circuit
based its interpretation on the prosecution history in which the
patentee distinguished a flexible suture on the basis that it could not
619
be “‘pushed into body tissue without the use of a needle.’”
With respect to the issue of infringement, the Federal Circuit
found that videotaped evidence showing use of the device with a
cannula (where a cannula is not normally used with the accused
infringer’s device, but where use of a cannula was within the context
of use contemplated by the patent) could constitute evidence
620
relevant to the question of whether the accused device was rigid.
Therefore, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment and remanded the case for further
621
proceedings.
622
In Honeywell Inc. v. Victor Co. of Japan, Ltd., the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court’s summary judgment ruling that the
623
accused products did not infringe the patent claims. However, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that some of the
624
accused products were the subjects of a license agreement.
In
deciding the infringement issue, the Federal Circuit relied heavily on
the definition of the claim term “contiguous” that the inventor
625
offered during prosecution of the case before the USPTO.
The
Federal Circuit determined that the district court erred by not
according enough weight to the inventor’s own definition, stating
that “[i]t is well settled that a patentee may define a claim term either
in the written description of the patent, or, as in the present case, in
626
A definition is often offered during
the prosecution history.”
616.
617.
618.
619.
620.
621.
622.
623.
624.
625.
626.

Id. at 1381, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146-47.
Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147.
Id. at 1380-82, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146-48.
Id. at 1381-82, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148 (citation omitted in original).
Id. at 1382-83, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148-49.
Id. at 1383, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149.
298 F.3d 1317, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1904 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1328, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912.
Id. at 1329, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913.
Id. at 1323-24, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908-09.
Id. at 1323, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908 (citing Mycogen Plant Sci. v.
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prosecution as a response to a rejection and is entered along with a
627
Such a definition limits the claim’s scope
narrowing amendment.
and prevents a patentee from subsequently recapturing what had
628
been surrendered. While an inventor’s definition has no narrowing
629
effect, it is relevant to the inventor’s interpretation of a term.
However, the Federal Circuit rejected the broadest implication of
Honeywell’s claim construction arguments as contrary to the most
630
expansive dictionary definition of the term “contiguous.”
The
Federal Circuit also reviewed the specification and prosecution
history to assist in determining the meaning of the claim
631
limitations.
It concluded that nothing in the specification or
prosecution history warranted a narrow reading of the claims-at632
issue.
633
In Fantasy Sports Properties, Inc. v. Sportsline.com, Inc., the Federal
Circuit affirmed-in-part and vacated-in-part the summary judgment of
non-infringement decision by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
634
District of Virginia. The claims on appeal involve a method and
635
The
apparatus for playing a “fantasy” football computer game.
claim limitation in dispute was “wherein said players in said first and
636
second groups receive bonus points.”
The Federal Circuit
construed the term “bonus points” to mean “additional points
awarded beyond those given in an actual football game for unusual
scoring plays, such as when a player scores in a manner not typically
637
associated with his position.”
The Federal Circuit noted that in
conjunction with the ordinary meaning of the claim term, the

Monsanto Co., 243 F.3d 1316, 1327, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1030, 1039 (Fed. Cir.
2001)).
627. Id. at 1323-24, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908 (citing as an example, Southwall
Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1576, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1677
(Fed. Cir. 1995)).
628. Id. at 1324, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908.
629. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908 (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic,
Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(indicating that the record is often critical to determining a claim’s meaning); E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1438, 7
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that the prosecution history
“must be examined to ascertain the true meaning of what the inventor intended to
convey in the claims”)).
630. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908.
631. Id. at 1325-26, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909-10.
632. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909-10.
633. 287 F.3d 1108, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1564 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
634. Id. at 1111, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566.
635. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566.
636. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567.
637. Id. at 1114, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
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638

specification also supported the district court’s definition.
The
specification stated that “[c]omputerized football points are awarded
for touchdowns, field goals, and points after touchdowns. Bonus
639
points were also awarded based upon the difficulty of the play.” As a
result, “bonus points” was interpreted as points awarded for a scoring
play above the points such a scoring play would earn in an actual
640
football game.
In its infringement analysis, the Federal Circuit concluded that
Yahoo! did not infringe the patent because the term “miscellaneous
points” indicated only an unusual play, with no additional points
641
awarded beyond those given for such a play in a real football game.
The Federal Circuit also concluded that ESPN did not infringe the
patent because their game awarded no additional points beyond
642
those awarded in a real football game. Furthermore, the Federal
Circuit acknowledged that ESPN’s fantasy football game awarded a
points depending on the type of scoring play, the game did not award
643
poins based upon the position of the scoring player.
With respect to SportsLine’s game, the Federal Circuit concluded
that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because
under the proper infringement analysis, there existed a genuine issue
644
of material fact. The Federal Circuit held that in order to infringe
Fantasy’s patent, the software code underlying the accused game
must be written in such a way as to allow a user to utilize the function
of awarding bonus points for unusual plays without having to modify
645
the code.
The SportsLine game allowed for position-specific
scoring by creating different scoring configurations for each
646
As a result, the Federal Circuit determined that the
position.
SportsLine game directly infringed the “computer playing football”
647
limitation of Fantasy’s patent. The Federal Circuit also determined
that it was unclear whether kickers could be awarded points for an
648
out-of-position score. Thus, the Federal Circuit remanded the case

638.
639.
640.
641.
642.
643.
644.
645.
646.
647.
648.

Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
Id. at 1116, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570.
Id. at 1116-17, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570.
Id. at 1117, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570.
Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1571.
Id. at 1118, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1572.
Id. at 1119, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1572.
Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1572.
Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573.
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to the district court to determine whether the SportsLine product
649
supports awarding bonus points to kickers in a second group.
650
In Pickholtz v. Rainbow Technologies, Inc., the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement, but affirmed the district court’s denial of Pickholtz’s
651
motion for infringement. In so doing, the Federal Circuit held that
the district court erred when it construed the term “computer” to
652
exclude peripherals.
The Federal Circuit determined that
Pickholtz used the terms “computer” and “computer system” in the
specification synonymously and that nothing in the patent itself
explained their relationship or indicated any difference in
653
meaning.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit found that the lower
court in error in concluding that the “intrinsic evidence
654
unambiguously imparted different meanings to the terms.”
Since
“computer” can be defined through intrinsic evidence alone, the
655
Federal Circuit found no need to rely on extrinsic evidence, which,
656
Interestingly, the
would not have been conclusive in any event.
Federal Circuit determined that nothing in the prosecution history
indicated that the terms have different meanings, although a prior
657
art patent used the terms differently.
The Federal Circuit did not
discuss whether the prior art patent should be treated according to
658
how a person of ordinary skill would understand the terms.
659
In Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Resources, Inc., the
Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s preliminary injunction
against Interface to prevent Interface from infringing Tate’s patent
660
claims to raised access flooring panels. Interface appealed only the
lower court’s conclusion regarding the likelihood of success based on
661
the merits of Tate’s infringement claim.
The Federal Circuit
rejected Interface’s argument that the lower court’s interpretation of
the term “border,” which “encompass[es] the simple beveled edges in
662
the accused floor panels” was an erroneous construction. In doing
649.
650.
651.
652.
653.
654.
655.
656.
657.
658.
659.
660.
661.
662.

Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573.
284 F.3d 1365, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1367-68, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341.
Id. at 1373-74, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345-46.
Id. at 1373, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345.
Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345.
Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345.
Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345.
Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345.
Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345.
279 F.3d 1357, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1360, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648.
Id. at 1364, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
Id. at 1370-72, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1656-58.
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so, the Federal Circuit found that a person possessing ordinary skill
in the art of raised access floor panels would know that the term
“border” referred to “the area or zone forming an edge or trim
663
framing the decorative surface of the panel.”
Moreover, in
reviewing the patent, the Federal Circuit found that the specification
664
or claims did not require that the“border” be or single layered.
The Federal Circuit reiterated that it would not read in limitations
from elsewhere in the specification when the original claim terms
665
were clear, as in the case at issue.
Thus, the Federal Circuit held
that Interface’s panels infringed Tate’s patent and Tate therefore met
the likelihood of success on the merits portion of the preliminary
666
injunction test.
3.

The role of the preamble in interpreting claims
The claims at issue in Epcon Gas Systems, Inc. v. Bauer Compressors,
667
Inc. related to a method and apparatus for providing gas assistance
668
to an injection molding process. The Federal Circuit first rejected
669
Bauer’s argument that the preamble limits the scope of the claims.
The Federal Circuit found that Epcon’s claims were in Jepson form,
which allows a patentee to use the preamble to recite “‘elements or
670
steps of the claimed invention which are conventional or known.’”
671
In Rowe v. Dror, the Federal Circuit found that “[w]hen this form is
employed, the claim preamble defines not only the context of the
672
claimed invention, but also its scope.”
Following Rowe a patentee
choosing the Jepson form of the claim supports an intention “to use
the preamble to define, in part, the structural elements of his claimed
673
invention.” Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded that the preamble
674
served as a limitation since the patentee used a Jepson-type claim.
663. Id. at 1370, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656.
664. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657.
665. Id. at 1371, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657 (citations omitted).
666. Id. at 1372, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658.
667. 279 F.3d 1022, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1470 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
668. Id. at 1025, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472.
669. Id. at 1029, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475 (citing Applied Materials, Inc. v.
Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 98 F.3d 1563, 1572-73, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1481, 1488 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Kropa v. Robie, 187 F.2d 150, 152, 88 U.S.P.Q.
478, 481 (C.C.P.A. 1951)).
670. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475 (quoting Kegel Co. v. AMF Bowling, Inc.,
127 F.3d 1420, 1426, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1123, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1997)) (quotation
omitted).
671. 112 F.3d 473, 479, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1550, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
672. Epcon, 279 F.3d at 1029, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475 (citing Rowe, 112 F.3d
at 479, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1553).
673. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475 (quoting Kegel Co., 127 F.3d at 1426, 44
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127.
674. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475 (citation omitted).
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The Federal Circuit also used a technical dictionary to help formulate
the proper construction of the terms “supply of stored gas,”
675
“substantially,” and “venting.” The Federal Circuit garnered further
support for its construction by reviewing the specification and finding
676
it to be consistent with its interpretation.
The Federal Circuit stated that the term “substantially” was used in
two of Epcon’s patent claims in slightly different contexts, i.e.,
677
“substantially below,” and “substantially constant.”
The Federal
Circuit noted that “the same term or phrase should be interpreted
678
consistently where it appears in claims of common ancestry.”
However, it found that Epcon’s claims implicated a more precise
statement of the axiom—“[a] word or phrase used consistently
679
throughout a claim should be interpreted consistently.”
The
Federal Circuit concluded that there was a “subtle but significnt
680
The phrase
difference” in the two uses of the term“substantially”.
“substantially constant” denoted language of approximation, while
681
the phrase “substantially below” signified language of magnitude.
Due to the differing uses of the term , the Federal Circuit held that
“substantially” might have differing constructions in the two
682
phrases.
683
In Allen Engineering Corp. v. Bartell Industries, Inc., the Federal
Circuit remanded the district court decision for failure to construe
684
the claim limitations and make adequate findings on infringement.
The Federal Circuit provided the district court with guidance on
685
claim construction on remand.
In particular, the Federal Circuit
686
focused on the preamble of the claims-in-suit. It noted that each of
the claims began with the same preamble, namely “[a] self-propelled,
fast steering motorized riding trowel for finishing a concrete
675. Id. at 1029-32, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475-77.
676. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475-77.
677. Id. at 1030-31, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476.
678. Id. at 1030, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476 (citing Elkay Mfg. Co. v. Ebco Mfg.
Co., 192 F.3d 973, 980, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1109, 1114 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Abtox, Inc.
v. Exitron Corp., 131 F.3d 1009, 1010, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1735, 1735-36 (Fed.
Cir. 1997); Fonar Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 821 F.2d 627, 632, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1109, 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
679. Id. at 1030-31, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476 (citing Phonometrics, Inc. v. N.
Telecom Inc., 133 F.3d 1459, 1465, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1421, 1426 (Fed. Cir.
1998)).
680. Id. at 1031, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476.
681. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476.
682. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1476.
683. 299 F.3d 1336, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
684. Id. at 1346, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773.
685. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773.
686. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774.
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687

surface.”
The Federal Circuit noted that claims are not normally
688
limited by the preamble, but may be “‘when the claim drafter
chooses to use both the preamble and the body to define the subject
689
matter of the claimed invention.’” The claim preamble should be
construed as limiting if it is “‘necessary to give life, meaning and
690
The Federal Circuit instructed that this
vitality’” to the claim.
construction be made on a case-by-case basis, in light of the overall
691
claim.
Allen Engineering interpreted the term “fast steering” to be a claim
692
limitation.
Bartell Industries asserted that the term was laudatory
693
The
and only set forth the purpose of the claimed invention.
Federal Circuit held that “fast steering” was a relative term
unaccompanied by any interpretive reference in either the claims or
694
the specification. Lacking a frame of reference, the indicated that a
person of skill in the relevant art would not understand “fast steering”
695
meant in this context. The Court held that “fast steering” “failed to
give life, meaning and vitality to the claimed structure” and could not
696
The Federal Circuit held that the
be construed as a claim limit.
expression should be used only to construe the intended purpose of
the claimed combination without creating a limitation of the
697
meaning.
698
In Catalina Marketing International v. Coolsavings.com, the Federal
Circuit affirmed-in-part, reversed-in-part, vacated-in-part, and
remanded the district court’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement of Catalina’s patent directed to a system for dispensing
687. Id. at 1346, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774.
688. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774 (citing DeGeorge v. Bernier, 768 F.2d 1318,
1322 n.3, 226 U.S.P.Q. 758, 764 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
689. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774 (quoting Bell Communications Research,
Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 620, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1816,
1820 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
690. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774 (quoting Kropa v. Robie, 187 F.2d 150, 152,
88 U.S.P.Q. 478, 480-81 (C.C.P.A. 1951)).
691. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774 (quoting In re Stencel, 828 F.2d 751, 754, 4
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1071, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 1987)); see also Applied Materials, Inc. v.
Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 98 F.3d 1563, 1572-73, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1481, 1488 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Whether a preamble stating the purpose and
context of the invention constitutes a limitation . . . is determined on the facts of
each case in light of the overall form of the claim, and the invention as described in
the specification and illuminated in the prosecution history.”).
692. Allen Eng’g, 299 F.3d at 1346, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774.
693. Id. at 1347, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774.
694. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774.
695. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774.
696. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774 (quoting Kropa, 187 F.2d at 152, 88
U.S.P.Q. at 480-81).
697. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774.
698. 289 F.3d 801, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1781 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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coupons to consumers at remote terminals connected to a host
699
computer system. The Federal Circuit held that the district court
improperly treated the preamble as a limitation to the asserted
700
claim.
In so doing, the Court held that the phrase “‘located at
predesignated sites such as consumer stores’” is not a limitation
because the patentee did not rely on the phrase in defining the
invention or understanding terms or limitations in body of the
701
claim.
The Federal Circuit further held that the applicant’s
statements during prosecution that its invention involved terminals
“located in stores” for the distribution of coupons “on site,” did not
suggest a clear reliance on the preamble to distinguish the prior art
702
and, therefore, did not constitute a limitation.
In addition, the
phrase merely suggested the use of the apparatus without affecting
703
the structure or operation of the claim itself.
In contrast, the
inclusion of the same phrase in the body of another claim necessarily
704
limited that claim.
4.

Miscellaneous claim interpretation issues
705
In Beckson Marine, Inc. v. NFM, Inc., the Federal Circuit vacated
and remanded a summary judgment decision by the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Washington based on the Federal
Circuit’s finding that the district court’s claim interpretation was not
706
supported by the record.
Beckson’s patent was directed to a
707
portlight window for a boat. The district court’s non-infringement
holding was based on its construction of the term “sloping drain
groove,” as “a highly specific U-shaped drain channel of constant
708
diameter/width.”
The Federal Circuit held that the district court
improperly narrowed the scope of claim on one of the patents in suit
by importing limitations from the specification and from dependent
709
claims.
The Federal Circuit held that the term “sloping drain
groove” only required a sloping artificial channel to carry water,
710
which is not limited to long, narrow U-shaped entities.
Because

699.
700.
701.
702.
703.
704.
705.
706.
707.
708.
709.
710.

Id. at 804-05, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1782.
Id. at 810, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786-87.
Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786.
Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786.
Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786.
Id. at 810-11, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1787.
292 F.3d 718, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1031 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 720, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031-32.
Id. at 720-21, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1032.
Id. at 723, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034.
Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034.
Id. at 723-24, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034.
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infringement is a question of fact, the Federal Circuit stated that an
appellate court cannot generally determine infringement and must
instead remand the case to the district court, with the new claim
711
construction, for such an infringement determination.
712
In Ecolab Inc. v. Paraclipse, Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed the
trial court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law regarding the jury
713
verdict of non-infringement of one claim. The Federal Circuit also
vacated the trial court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law with
respect to the verdict of non-infringement of a second claim, thus
714
remanding that claim for a new trial. The patent at issue covered a
715
The Federal Circuit noted that an erroneous
type of insect trap.
jury instruction regarding claim interpretation that impacts a jury’s
716
infringement decision is grounds for a new trial, but a party must
717
show that the erroneous jury instruction was prejudicial. When an
error in a jury instruction could not have altered the outcome, the
718
error is harmless.
Here, the Federal Circuit determined that the
instruction with respect to the meaning of the word “contain” was
prejudicial because there was sufficient evidence adduced at trial
such that a correct instruction could have supported a finding of
719
infringement.
B. Means-Plus-Function Claims
A claim limitation may be expressed in means-plus-function format
in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, which reads as follows:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a
means or step for performing a specified function without the
recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such
claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure,
711. Id. at 724-25, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1035.
712. 285 F.3d 1362, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
713. Id. at 1365, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1350.
714. Id. at 1365, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1350-51.
715. Id. at 1365-66, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1351.
716. Id. at 1373, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1356 (citing Advanced Display Sys., Inc.
v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1281, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1679 (Fed. Cir.
2000)).
717. Id. at 1374, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1357.
718. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1357 (citing Environ Prods., Inc. v. Furon Co.,
215 F.3d 1261, 1266-67, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1038, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Weinar v.
Rollform Inc., 744 F.2d 797, 808, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 369, 376 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[A]
reversal . . . is not available to an appellant who merely establishes error in
instructions. . . . Where the procedural error was ‘harmless,’ i.e., where the evidence
in support of the verdict was so overwhelming that the same verdict would necessarily
be reached absent the error, or the error was cured by an instruction, a new trial
would be mere waste and affirmance of the judgment is required.”), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1084 (1985)).
719. Id. at 1374-75, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1357-58.
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material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents
720
thereof.

The use of the term “means” creates a presumption that the
721
inventor intentionally invoked § 112, ¶ 6. This presumption may be
overcome where a claim element uses “means” and does not recite a
722
corresponding function. Section 112, ¶ 6 also can be avoided even
where a claim element uses “means” and describes a function, so long
as it also includes “sufficient structure or material for performing that
723
function.”
A claim term recites sufficient structure if it has a
724
However, the
“reasonably well understood” meaning in the field.
mere use of the word “means” after a limitation does not make that
725
limitation a means-plus-function limitation.
726
In BBA Nonwovens Simpsonville, Inc. v. Superior Nonwovens, L.L.C.,
where the technology at issue related to the manufacture of
spunbond nonwoven fabric, the Federal Circuit found that the claims
727
were properly interpreted to be means-plus-function claims.
The
Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s interpretation of “corona
means” as subject to § 112, ¶ 6, and rejected the defendant’s
argument that the “means” was limited to a specific location on the
728
claimed device.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
identification of the recited function, finding that the function
corresponding to the “means” in claim one stemmed from the word
“corona,” and that proper reading of the claim was “means for
729
forming a corona.”
The district court had observed that Superior
Nonwoven’s proposed construction ignored the word “positioned” in
claim one, and the Federal Circuit here stated that the expression
following the word “positioned” described where the corona means
was located, constituting a separate limitation not subject to § 112,

720. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (2000).
721. York Prods., Inc. v. Cent. Tractor Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1574, 40
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1619, 1623 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
722. Rodime P.L.C. v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 174 F.3d 1294, 1302, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1429, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
723. Id., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434. But see Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102
F.3d 524, 531, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“To invoke [§ 112,
¶ 6], the alleged means-plus-function claim element must not recite a definite
structure which performs the described function.”).
724. Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 880-81, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836, 1838
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580,
1583, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1783, 1786 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
725. Cole, 102 F.3d at 531, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
726. 303 F.3d 1332, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
727. Id. at 1335, 1343, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260, 1266.
728. Id. at 1343-44, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1266.
729. Id. at 1344, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1266.
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730

¶ 6. The Federal Circuit noted the difference between the “corona
means” itself and its location, and ultimately found Superior
Interwoven’s argument—that the “corona means” must be “within”
731
the slot draw attenuator—was misplaced.
The Federal Circuit held that § 112, ¶ 6 was inapplicable in Epcon
732
Gas Systems, Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., finding that the district
733
court erred in construing a process claim to be subject to § 112, ¶ 6.
In so doing, the Federal Circuit pointed out that the claim included
no language indicating a “step plus function” form, and that the
claim should not be interpreted as subject to § 112, ¶ 6 simply
734
because a similar apparatus claim was subject to § 112, ¶ 6.
In
determining that § 112, ¶ 6 was not applicable, the Federal Circuit
noted that the claim recited a series of steps without reciting a
735
function.
After finding the district court’s use of the claim
736
preamble as a source for a function to be misplaced, the Federal
Circuit determined that a preamble statement of purpose does not
737
necessarily supply a function for a “step plus function” form. Thus,
the Federal Circuit held that the claim was merely a “garden-variety
738
process claim.”
By construing the claim outside of § 112, ¶ 6, the
Federal Circuit found that there was a genuine issue of material fact
regarding the direct infringement of the claimed method, thereby
739
reversing the district court’s summary judgment.
740
In Allen Engineering Corp. v. Bartell Industries, Inc., the Federal
Circuit found that the district court improperly applied § 112, ¶ 6,
vacating the district court’s judgment holding that Bartell Industries
741
infringed Allen Engineering’s patent related to riding trowels. The
Federal Circuit found that the district court failed to construe the
claim limitations at issue and conduct a limitation-by-limitation
742
comparison.
In doing so, the Federal Circuit distinguished when
743
§ 112, ¶ 6 is applicable by relying on Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., and
730. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1266.
731. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1266.
732. 279 F.3d 1022, 1028, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1470, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
733. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475.
734. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475.
735. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475.
736. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475.
737. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475 (citing O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d
1576, 1583, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1777, 1782 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
738. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475.
739. Id. at 1034, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1479.
740. 299 F.3d 1336, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
741. Id. at 1342, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770.
742. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770.
743. Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 531, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
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noting that when a claim describes elements with detailed recitations
of structure, as opposed to function, it cannot be construed as a
744
In contrast, the Federal Circuit found
means-plus-function claim.
that where a claim recites merely a function such as “closure
means . . . for controlling access,” it is properly construed as a means745
plus-function limitation.
Using this analysis, the Federal Circuit
concluded that although the patent at issue used “means” in its
claims, the detailed recitation of structure clearly removed the claims
746
from the ambit of § 112, ¶ 6.
C. Literal Infringement
Literal infringement of a claim occurs when a claim limitation
747
reads on (is found in) the device at issue.
748
In Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Resources, Inc., the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting Tate’s
motion to enjoin Interface from infringing claims of Tate’s patent for
749
raised access flooring panels. On appeal, Interface challenged only
the district court’s determination regarding likelihood of success on
750
First, the Federal Circuit
the merits of Tate’s infringement claim.
held that there was no “practicing the prior art” defense to literal
751
infringement.
The Federal Circuit also found that Interface’s
asserted defense—that its accused device was an adoption of the
teachings of the prior art—was an improper interpretation of the
752
law. Under the proper test, literal infringement is not determined
by comparing the alleged infringement device to the prior art, but by
753
construing the claims and comparing them to the accused device.
744. Allen Eng’g, 299 F.3d at 1347, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775 (quoting Cole, 102
F.3d at 531, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006).
745. Id. at 1347-48, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775 (quoting Sage Prods., Inc. v.
Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1428, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1103, 1110 (Fed. Cir.
1997)). This is because “a function was recited for the means and the claim did not
‘explicitly recite[] the structure, material, or acts needed to perform [the
function].’” Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775 ((quoting Sage Prods., Inc. 126 F.3d at
1428, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1110).
746. Id. at 1348, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775.
747. Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Spectramed, Inc., 49 F.3d 1575, 1583, 34
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1120, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Amhil Enters., Ltd. v. Wawa, Inc., 81
F.3d 1554, 1562, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1471, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
748. 279 F.3d 1357, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
749. Id. at 1360, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648.
750. Id. at 1364, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
751. Id. at 1365, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653 (citing Baxter, 49 F.3d at 1583, 34
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126).
752. Id. at 1365-66, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653 (stating that the holding in
Baxter expressly forecloses any such defense).
753. Id. at 1366, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653 (citing Baxter, 49 F.3d at 1583, 34
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126 (“There is no requirement that the accused device be
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The Federal Circuit asserted that, just as the doctrine of equivalents
could not extend so widely as to encompass prior art, claim language
754
must be construed in a manner that preserves validity. Prior art is
relevant to literal infringement when it affects the construction of
ambiguous claims, except where the interpretation is clear in light of
the specification and is properly supported by the patent’s
755
disclosure. The Federal Circuit also rejected Interface’s attempt to
756
prove non-infringement by the reverse doctrine of equivalents.
757
In Riles v. Shell Exploration & Production Co., the Federal Circuit
required the patentee to show that the accused device contained
every limitation in the asserted claims; if even one limitation was
missing from the accused device, or not met as claimed, there would
758
be no literal infringement.
The U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Texas had affirmed as a matter of law a jury
759
Shell
verdict of infringement, which included damages.
Exploration appealed that decision and Riles cross-appealed because
760
the district court vacated the jury’s finding of literal infringement.
The Federal Circuit held that the evidence was insufficient to support
761
the jury’s finding of literal infringement.
The Federal Circuit noted that there were three limitations of
Riles’s patent claim in dispute and that only the “Depending Support
762
Leg” limitation was literally met by Shell’s oil drilling platform. The
district court construed “stabbing connection” to mean an end-to-end
joining of two metal tubes by the insertion of an extension attached
763
to the end of one of the tubes into the end of the other.
The
nonobvious in light of the prior art, or otherwise be itself patentable.”)).
754. Id. at 1367, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654 (citing Whittaker Corp. v. UNR
Indus., Inc., 911 F.2d 709, 712, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742, 1744 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
755. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654. The courts generally give patentees the
full benefit of clear claim language and so bind the patentees in accordance with the
principles of fairness and the public-notice function of patent law. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1654.
756. Id. at 1368, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655 (noting that the Federal Circuit has
never affirmed a finding of non-infringement based on the reverse doctrine of
equivalents). The reverse doctrine of equivalents is “where a device is so far changed
in principle from a patent article that it performs the same or similar function in a
substantially different way, but nevertheless falls within the literal words of the
claim.” Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609, 85
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 328, 330 (1950).
757. 298 F.3d 1302, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1819 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
758. Id. at 1308, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823 (quoting Mas-Hamilton Group v.
LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206, 1211, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1010, 1014-15 (Fed. Cir.
1998)).
759. Id. at 1305, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821.
760. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821.
761. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821.
762. Id. at 1308-09, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823-24.
763. Id. at 1308, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823.
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district court also found that neither Shell’s leveling porch nor its
leveling piling had an extension, and that the Shell process did not
764
insert either one into the other. The Federal Circuit held that the
district court did not err in finding insufficient evidence in the
record to support the jury’s finding—that Shell’s process literally met
765
the “stabbing connection” limitation.
In examining another limitation, the district court construed
“metal-to-metal bearing contact” to mean “‘a weight bearing contact
766
between two metal surfaces.’” The Shell process guided the piling
through the sleeve, resting it on the layer of wooden timbers, rather
767
than directly on the metal plate of the leveling porch. Ultimately,
the Federal Circuit found that the district court did not err with
respect to the jury’s finding that Shell’s process met the “metal-to768
metal bearing contact” limitation literally, and found that the
district court properly granted a judgment as a matter of law with
769
regard to literal infringement.
D. Infringement under the Doctrine of Equivalents
If one or more of the claim limitations are not literally present in
the accused device, thus precluding a finding of literal infringement,
the claim may still be considered infringed if equivalents of those
770
limitations are present.
These equivalents are assessed on a
limitation-by-limitation basis; this focus on individual limitations,
rather than on the accused device as a whole, enhances a court’s
vigilance against allowing the concept of equivalence to eliminate any
771
claim limitations completely.
Equivalence may be established by
showing, by preponderant evidence, that an element of an accused
device “does substantially the same thing in substantially the same way
772
to get substantially the same result” as the claim limitation.
The

764. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823. Moreover, the district court held that
Shell’s process merely “guides the leveling piling through the guide sleeve to rest on
the leveling porch.” Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823.
765. Id. at 1308-09. 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823.
766. Id. at 1309, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823 (citation omitted in original).
767. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823.
768. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823.
769. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823.
770. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 25, 41
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1869 (1997).
771. Id. at 40, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875.
772. Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 266 F.3d 1367, 1370, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1437, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec.
U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1260, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1962, 1969 (Fed. Cir. 1989));
see also Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608, 85
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 328, 330 (1950).
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courts also consider claim elements as equivalently present if only
773
“insubstantial differences” distinguish the two elements.
In 2002, the Supreme Court heard the case of Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
774
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., which addressed infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents. This decision, on the permissible scope
of equivalents, seriously departed from the Federal Circuit’s previous
775
practice, and thus became a seminal decision in this area of law.
The Festo Corporation owned two patents for an industrial
776
After the patent examiner rejected the initial application
device.
for the first patent, due to defects in its description, the application
777
was amended to add the new limitations.
The defendant, the
alleged infringer, marketed a device that contained a structure
substantially the same as Festo’s, but different with regard to the
778
structure of the amended limitation. The district court determined
that Festo’s patents covered the defendant’s device under the
doctrine of equivalents, but the Federal Circuit disagreed by
determining that a limitation amendment that narrowed the claim
was an absolute bar to arguing equivalence under the doctrine of
779
equivalents.
Thus, the Supreme Court was faced with two issues:
(1) can prosecution history estoppel arise from any narrowing
amendment that occurs during prosecution?; and (2) when
prosecution history estoppel arises, does it bar suit against every
780
equivalent to the amended claim element?
The Supreme Court held primarily that any amendment could
narrow the scope of possible equivalents, but if the amendment was
truly insignificant, then it would not narrow the scope of the patent
781
or prevent its enforcement.
Thus, any amendment made in
response to a statutory rejection (for example, a rejection under 35
U.S.C. § 112)—and not only those amendments made in response to
rejections based on prior art—may give rise to prosecution history
782
estoppel.
In this regard, the Court fully adopted the view of the
Federal Circuit majority. The Court also found that the “absolute

773. Leggett & Platt, Inc. v. Hickory Springs Mfg. Co., 285 F.3d 1353, 1359, 62
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1266, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon
Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1423, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1103, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
774. 535 U.S. 722, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (2002).
775. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705.
776. Id. at 728, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708.
777. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708.
778. Id. at 729, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708-09.
779. Id. at 729-30, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709.
780. Id. at 726-27, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708.
781. Id. at 734, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712.
782. Id. at 735, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712.
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783

bar” rule adopted by the Federal Circuit was erroneous.
Instead,
the Court articulated a presumption, created by the act of an
784
The
amendment, that an alleged equivalent has been disclaimed.
burden of the presumption falls on the patent holder to demonstrate
that the embodiment in question is an infringing equivalent that was
785
not disclaimed.
786
Citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., the Court
criticized the Federal Circuit for not following its previous cautions to
courts adopting changes that upset the “settled expectations of the
787
inventing community.”
The Court held, much as it did in WarnerJenkinson, that a patentee bears the burden of proving that an
amendment was not made for a reason that would give rise to
estoppel and does not surrender the particular equivalent in
788
question.
According to the Court, although prosecution history
estoppel can bar challenges to many equivalents, this action requires
an inquiry into the subject matter surrendered by the narrowing
789
amendment.
While a complete bar was simpler, the Court found
that it was inconsistent with the initial purpose of applying the
estoppel—to tie the inventor to the contentions made during the
790
application process and any resulting reasonable inferences. Thus,
the Court required a more thorough and searching inquiry than the
791
Federal Circuit’s position.
Moreover, the Supreme Court pointed out that a narrowing
amendment need not: (1) “relinquish equivalents unforeseeable at
the time of the amendment”; (2) “relinquish equivalents beyond a
fair interpretation of what was surrendered”; or (3) “foreclose claims
of equivalence for aspects of the invention that have only a peripheral
792
relation to the reason the amendment was submitted.”
Finally, in
requiring the patentee to bear the burden of showing that an
783. Id. at 737, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712.
784. Id. at 737-38, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713.
785. Id. at 741, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713-14.
786. 520 U.S. 17, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (1997).
787. Festo, 535 U.S. at 739, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713.
788. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713. The standard announced by the Court was
that:
Th[e] presumption [that prosecution history bars an equivalence] is not,
then, just the complete bar by another name . . . . The patentee must show
that at the time of the amendment one skilled in the art could not
reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally
encompassed the alleged equivalent.
Id. at 741, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713.
789. Id. at 737, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712.
790. Id. at 737-38, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712.
791. Id. at 738, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712.
792. Id. at 738, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712.
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amendment does not surrender the particular equivalent in question,
the Court demanded a factual inquiry, which suggests that summary
793
judgment on this issue might be difficult.
Before Festo was decided, the Federal Circuit sat en banc in Johnson
794
& Johnston Associates Inc. v. R.E. Service Co. to determine whether
Johnson & Johnston was entitled to a finding of infringement under
795
the doctrine of equivalents. A severely split Federal Circuit reversed
the district court’s finding of infringement on the issues of the
doctrine of equivalents, willfulness, damages, attorneys’ fees, and
796
expenses.
In reversing the trial court’s finding of infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents, the Federal Circuit, as a matter of
law, held that when a patent drafter discloses but does not claim
subject matter, the drafter effectively releases the unclaimed subject
797
matter into the world for public consumption. The Federal Circuit
reasoned that otherwise, the primacy of the claims in defining the
798
scope of the patentee’s exclusive rights would be undermined.
Further, the Federal Circuit reasoned that if the patentee were
allowed undefined and unrecaptured subject matter, then patentees
would narrow claims as a means of avoiding USPTO prosecution, and
would use the doctrine of equivalents as a basis for post-issue
799
Finally,
infringement, citing the specification’s broad disclosure.
the Federal Circuit noted that there are two remedies for patentees to
recapture subject matter that was disclosed and inadvertently left
800
unclaimed.
First, within two years of an original patent grant,
under 35 U.S.C. § 251, a patentee may file a reissue application to
801
enlarge the scope of the original claims.
Second, a patentee can
file a separate continuation application under § 120 to claim
802
disclosed but previously unclaimed subject matter.
In another pre-Festo case, Leggett & Platt, Inc. v. Hickory Springs
803
Manufacturing Co., the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s
grant of summary judgment of non-infringement under the doctrine
793. Id. at 740, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713.
794. 285 F.3d 1046, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc).
795. Id. at 1048, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1226.
796. Id. at 1055-72, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231-43. Judges Clevenger, Rader,
Dyk, and Lourie filed separate concurring opinions, while Judge Newman filed a
dissenting opinion.
797. Id. at 1054, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
798. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
799. Id. at 1054-55, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
800. Id. at 1055, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231.
801. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231; see 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
802. Johnson & Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1055, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231; see 35
U.S.C. § 120 (2000).
803. 285 F.3d 1353, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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of equivalents, because the Federal Circuit found that genuine issues
804
Here, infringement pivoted on one
of material fact existed.
805
In this
limitation, “support wires,” in the claims for a box spring.
instance the prosecution history was unhelpful in assessing
equivalency because the patent had issued without any
806
amendments.
Although the alleged infringer contended that its
product met the function and result prongs of the function-way-result
807
test, the accused admitted that its product differed in its result. The
Federal Circuit noted that whether the support cups served a
substantially identical function to that of the “support wires”
808
described in the patent at issue was primarily a matter of fact. The
Federal Circuit found that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment because the evidence was not such that no
reasonable jury could determine whether the two elements were
equivalent, and that the competing affidavits in the case created a
809
genuine issue of material fact. The Federal Circuit thus remanded
810
the case to the district court.
811
which was
In Schwing GmbH v. Putzmeister Aktiengesellschaft,
decided after Festo, the Federal Circuit affirmed-in-part and vacatedin-part the district court’s grant of summary judgment of non812
infringement of two accused devices.
The district court granted
summary judgment—that Putzmeister’s Bastardring II concrete
pump did not infringe Schwing’s patent under the doctrine of
equivalents—because the prosecution history of the patent in suit
813
barred the application of the doctrine.
The Federal Circuit
disagreed with the district court’s application of the doctrine of
equivalents, determining that the applicant’s remarks to the USPTO
did not preclude the application of the doctrine of equivalents to the
accused concrete pumps—the Bastardring II and the modified
814
The Federal Circuit explained how Festo modified
Bastardring II.
the doctrine of equivalents application from its application in the
district court’s decision, stating that the Supreme Court had rejected
a “complete bar,” instead requiring “an examination of subject
804.
805.
806.
807.
808.
809.
810.
811.
812.
813.
814.

Id. at 1355, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267.
Id. at 1357, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1269.
Id. at 1358, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1270.
Id. at 1359, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1270.
Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1270.
Id. at 1360, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1271.
Id. at 1362, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1272.
305 F.3d 1318, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1641.
Id. at 1326, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647.
Id. at 1327, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647.

FINALPATENTSUMMARY.DOC

2003]

8/15/2003 1:41 PM

2002 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

969
815

matter surrendered by the narrowing amendment.”
The Federal
Circuit cited the Supreme Court finding that it was possible for the
patentee to overcome the rebuttable presumption that a narrowing
816
amendment surrendered the equivalent at issue.
Specifically, the
The Federal Circuit noted the Supreme Court holding that a
patentee could “overcome the presumption that prosecution history
estoppel bars a finding of equivalence” by illustrating:
the
unforeseeability of the equivalent; the tangential relationship
between the rationale of the amendment and the equivalent; or that
it was unreasonable to expect the patentee to describe the substitute
817
at issue.
Given the change in the law of equivalency, the Federal
Circuit agreed that the case should be remanded to the district court
to determine whether Schwing could rebut the Festo presumption
that the applicant’s narrowing amendment precluded the application
818
of the doctrine of equivalents to the modified Bastardring II.
Finally, the Federal Circuit determined that statements in Schwing’s
specification precluded the application of the doctrine of equivalents
819
to the Bastardring II pump.
In another post-Festo case, Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Arrow
820
Communication Laboratories, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit vacated a
summary judgment decision by the district court that there was no
821
infringement, and remanded the case for trial. The Federal Circuit
noted that there are two limits to the application of the doctrine of
822
First, prosecution history estoppel can prevent use of
equivalents.
the doctrine when patentees relinquish subject matter, by
823
amendment or argument, while prosecuting the patent.
Second,
824
which renders the question of
the all-limitations rule,
insubstantiality of the differences inapplicable if a claim limitation is
missing from an accused device, also limits the application of the

815. Id. at 1329, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648-49 (citing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (2002)).
816. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648.
817. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649.
818. Id. at 1329, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649.
819. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649.
820. 305 F.3d 1303, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
821. Id. at 1306, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482.
822. Id. at 1315, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488-89.
823. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488 (citing Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan
Pharm., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1376-77, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033, 1036 (Fed. Cir.
1999)).
824. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489 (“No claimed [limitation], or an equivalent
thereof, can be absent if the doctrine of equivalents is invoked.”) (quoting Kustom
Signals Inc. v. Applied Concepts, Inc., 264 F.3d 1326, 1333, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1135 (Fed. Cir. 2001))).
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825

doctrine of equivalents. In light of these limits, the Federal Circuit
reviewed the prosecution history and determined that nothing in the
826
The Federal
history gave rise to prosecution history estoppel.
Circuit concluded that although the all-limitations rule states that a
claim limitation cannot be missing from the accused device for a
finding of equivalents, that rule can be satisfied if one element in the
827
device corresponds to several claim limitations.
Similarly, the Federal Circuit found no prosecution history
estoppel bar to the doctrine of equivalents in Riles v. Shell Exploration
828
& Production Co., where Shell attempted to evade a finding of
infringement by arguing that the “metal-to-metal bearing contact”
limitation was not entitled to a scope of equivalents encompassing its
829
offshore oil platform.
Here, the Federal Circuit found that the
district court correctly did not interpret this claim term to require
direct metal on metal contact, instead requiring “a weight bearing
830
contact.” Accordingly, the Federal Circuit noted that even without
a direct metal-to-metal contact, a reasonable jury could have found
Shell’s platform used the equivalent of “metal-to-metal bearing
831
contact.”
Further, the Federal Circuit stated that the doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel did not preclude Riles employment of
832
During
the doctrine of equivalents on this claim element.
prosecution of his patent, Riles attempted to distinguish the patent by
stating “‘Graham does not describe a metal-to-metal bearing contact
833
for transferring loads to the legs of the platforms.’” In context, the
Federal Circuit found this statement was not an unmistakable
surrender of subject matter of the claim coverage beyond the direct
834
metal-on-metal contact. The Federal Circuit also noted that Riles’s
prosecution statement neither suggested a preference for weight
bearing contacts, such as metal-on-metal, metal-on-wood, or metal-onconcrete, nor mentioned the directness of the contact for the weight
835
transfer.
Instead, the Federal Circuit found that the core of the
825. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488-89 (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton
Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33-34 (1997); Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc.,
833 F.2d 931, 934-35, 939 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1739-40 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en
banc)).
826. Id. at 1316, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489.
827. Id. at 1317, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490.
828. 298 F.3d 1302, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1819 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
829. Id. at 1310, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1824-25.
830. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1824.
831. Id. at 1310, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1824-25.
832. Id. at 1310, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825.
833. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825 (citation omitted in original).
834. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825.
835. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825.
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836

statement expressed the transfer of compressive load.
Graham
involved a semi-submersible platform tied to a structure attached to
the sea floor by tension tie rods, and did not transfer compressive
837
load to the anchored structure.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
held that Riles only explained that his invention transfers load onto
an anchored structure, and that Riles’s statements did not equal a
838
surrender of claimed subject matter, or an unmistakable surrender.
E. Prosecution History Estoppel
Prosecution history estoppel can restrict the availability of the
839
doctrine of equivalents.
This doctrine bars a patentee from
asserting, as an equivalent, subject matter surrendered during
840
The arguments and
prosecution of the patent application.
amendments contained in the prosecution history must be examined
841
to determine the meaning of terms in the claims, thus excluding
interpretations that were disclaimed during prosecution of the
842
patent.
In addition, arguments attempting to overcome prior art
may lead to narrow claim interpretations because the public can rely
843
on these statements.
For example, estoppel may result from amendments that narrow
844
the scope of a claim to satisfy requirements of the Patent Act.
In
Festo, the Supreme Court found that narrowing amendments create a
845
rebuttable presumption of estoppel, with its scope dependent on

836. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825.
837. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825.
838. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825.
839. See Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1376, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that a patentee may not use
the doctrine of equivalents if that patentee had surrendered the subject matter at
issue in a prior prosecution).
840. Am. Permahedge, Inc. v. Barcana, Inc., 105 F.3d 1441, 1445-46, 41
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1614, 1618 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
841. Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1576, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1673, 1676 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
842. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676-77 (citations omitted); see also Spectrum
Int’l, Inc. v. Sterilite Corp., 164 F.3d 1372, 1378, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1068-69
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that a patentee’s explicit arguments to overcome prior art
during application prosecution may narrow the scope of a claim); Standard Oil Co. v.
Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 293, 296 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(noting that prosecution history prevents a court from permitting an interpretation
of a claim that the patentee surrendered during the patent application prosecution).
843. Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc., 149 F.3d 1335, 1347, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1418, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
844. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736, 62
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1711-12 (2002).
845. Id. at 740, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713 (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1873 (1997)).
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846

reasonable inferences from the amendment. However, a patentee
is not barred from asserting “equivalents unforeseeable at the time of
the amendment and beyond a fair interpretation of what was
surrendered,” or those that “have only a peripheral relation to the
847
reason the amendment was submitted.”
Nor is recourse to the
doctrine of equivalents foreclosed where there is a reason that
suggests that the patentee could not reasonably have been expected
848
to have explained the alternative in question.
The patentee bears
the burden of overcoming this presumption by illustrating that the
849
amendment does not surrender the equivalent at issue.
An
estoppel also may be found on the basis of arguments made during
850
prosecution of the application to secure the allowance of claims.
In Abbott Laboratories v. Dey, L.P., the Federal Circuit outlined the
851
standards of prosecution history estoppel.
First, a court must
identify which claim limitations are allegedly met by equivalents, then
it must determine if such limitations were amended during patent
852
prosecution.
If there are no such amendments, then the doctrine
853
of equivalents will not be barred by amendment-based estoppel, but
the doctrine may be barred by argument-based estoppel depending
854
on the statements made by the applicant during prosecution.
In Abbott Laboratories, a “phospholipid” limitation in the patent in
855
suit was at issue. The Federal Circuit found that the limitation was
not amended during prosecution, and therefore, no amendment
856
estoppel and no argument-based estoppel existed. In the decision
below, the district court found prosecution history estoppel based on
857
the prosecution of a related application.
The Federal Circuit
846. Id. at 737-38, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712.
847. Id. at 738, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712.
848. Id. at 740-41, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713-14.
849. Id. at 739, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713.
850. See Elkay Mfg. Co. v. Ebco Mfg. Co., 192 F.3d 973, 979, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1109, 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that the scope of coverage of the claims may
change if a patentee has relinquished a possible claim construction in an
amendment or argument to overcome or distinguish a reference); Southwall Techs.,
Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1583-84, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1683 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (holding that once a term is interpreted in one claim, the patentee is
estopped from using the doctrine of equivalents to allow the claim if that term is
included in a later claim).
851. 287 F.3d 1097, 1103, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
852. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549.
853. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549.
854. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549 (citing Elkay Mfg., 192 F.3d at 979, 52
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1113; Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 170 F.3d
1373, 1376-77, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
855. Id. at 1103-04, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549-50.
856. Id. at 1104-05, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549-50.
857. Id. at 1104, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549-50.
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vacated the district court’s finding of non-infringement under the
858
doctrine of equivalents, holding that there was no basis for the
conclusion that statements made about the characteristics of one
patent should be attributed to another because the two patents have
859
a common assignee and inventor, as well as a similar subject matter.
Therefore, statements made during the prosecution of the first
860
patent did not create an estoppel with respect to the second patent.
The Federal Circuit further held that the prior art first patent did not
limit the scope of equivalence in the second patent’s claims because
the first patent disclosed a limitation argued to be equivalent to the
861
second patent’s claimed subject matter. The Federal Circuit based
its holding on the fact that the claims of the second patent contained
limitations not found in the prior art and, on that basis, an examiner
could have found such differences to be non-obvious during a
862
hypothetical examination of such a claim.
The Federal Circuit addressed the issue of whether the prosecution
history of a related application can be used in limiting the scope of
the claims of the patent in suit in Middleton, Inc. v. Minnesota Mining
863
& Manufacturing Co.
The Federal Circuit reversed the district
court’s summary judgment of non-infringement based on the district
court’s erroneous claim interpretation based on meaning of
864
“uniform.” The district court relied on the prosecution history of a
865
In
related application to determine the meaning of uniform.
reviewing the use of the disputed term in a related application, the
Federal Circuit found that the prosecution history of a parent
application that included claims directed to bowling alley surfaces did
866
not limit the definition of “uniform” for the CIP application. Thus,
the Federal Circuit remanded the case for proper application of the
doctrine of equivalents based on its new claim construction and the
867
intervening Festo case.
858. Id. at 1108, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1553.
859. Id. at 1105, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550.
860. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550.
861. Id. at 1106, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1551.
862. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1551.
863. 311 F.3d 1384, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
864. Id. at 1387-89, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140-42.
865. Id. at 1388, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141.
866. Id. at 1388-89, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141 (“The broader continuation
applications claimed floor surfaces in general, not just smooth sporting surfaces.
Therefore, the prosecution history in the context of varnishes for smooth bowling
alleys does not limit the broader claims to other flooring surfaces.”).
867. Id. at 1389-90, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142. The district court previously
applied the Federal Circuit’s Festo holding and found a complete bar based on the
addition of the term “uniform” during prosecution, and which the district court had
erroneously construed. Id. at 1386, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139-40.
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In Schwing GmbH v. Putzmeister Aktiengesellschaft, the Federal
Circuit affirmed-in-part and vacated-in-part the district court grant of
summary judgment of non-infringement of two accused devices:
Putzmeister’s Bastardring II concrete pump, which was held not to
infringe Schwing’s patent under the doctrine of equivalents, and the
modified Bastardring II pump, which did not infringe either literally
869
or under the doctrine of equivalents.
In assessing claim
construction, the Federal Circuit determined that the district court
erred in interpreting the claims to include a functional requirement
870
that was not found in the language of the claim itself. The Federal
Circuit noted that the prosecution history cannot limit a claim’s
scope unless the patentee’s remarks before the USPTO would cause a
competitor to believe that the patentee had disavowed the concerned
871
subject matter. In addition, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court’s finding that Schwing had not demonstrated a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the modified Bastardring II pump literally
infringed, despite the Federal Circuit’s disagreement with the district
872
court’s claim construction.
With respect to infringement under the doctrine of equivalents,
the Federal Circuit determined that the applicant’s remarks to the
USPTO were “equivocal at best” and did not preclude the doctrine’s
application to either the Bastardring II or the modified Bastardring
873
II.
However, the Federal Circuit agreed that the case should be
remanded to the district court to determine whether Schwing can
rebut the Festo presumption that the applicant’s narrowing
amendment precluded the application of the doctrine of equivalents
874
to the modified Bastardring II.
Prosecution history estoppel precluded the patentee in Rheox, Inc.
875
v. Entact, Inc. from claiming that Entact infringed its patent under
the doctrine of equivalents. Rheox owned a patent to a method of
remediating lead from contaminated soil by applying calcium
876
orthophosphate.
The district court limited the term “calcium
orthophosphate” to “tricalcium orthophosphate” and found that
Rheox disclaimed monocalcium orthophosphate and triple super

868.
869.
870.
871.
872.
873.
874.
875.
876.

305 F.3d 1318, 1319, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1642 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1323, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644.
Id. at 1323-24, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644-45.
Id. at 1324, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645.
Id. at 1325-26, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646-47.
Id. at 1327, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647.
Id. at 1329, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649.
276 F.3d 1319, 1320, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1369.
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877

phosphate (“TSP”). On appeal the Federal Circuit noted that when
assessing whether a patentee relinquishes a claim, it considers the
totality of the prosecution history, including arguments or
878
amendments.
In affirming the non-infringement holding of the
district court, the Federal Circuit found that the patentee had
disclaimed claims to TSP—a necessary element to any finding of
879
infringement.
880
In Talbert Fuel Systems Patents Co. v. Unocal Corp., the Federal
Circuit applied prosecution history estoppel, thus eliminating the
possibility of the application of the doctrine of equivalents as a basis
for infringement. The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court’s
claim construction, where the prosecution history reflected that the
patentee, in attempting to distinguish his invention from the prior
881
art, disclaimed the plaintiff’s asserted claim construction.
The
882
limitation at issue was a boiling point range limitation of 121-345°F.
The district court construed the claim as limited to gasoline with a
final boiling point of 345°F, and excluded gasoline with a higher final
883
boiling point. The Federal Circuit reviewed the prosecution history
and found that Talbert relied on 345°F as the final boiling point in
884
overcoming § 112 rejections and in distinguishing the prior art. In
affirming a finding of non-infringement based on prosecution history
estoppel, the Federal Circuit rejected Talbert’s argument that the
narrow claim construction excluded the preferred embodiment
because the nature of the subject matter and the arguments made in
the prosecution history warranted the narrow claim construction, and
precluded the application of the doctrine of equivalents such that
885
Unocal’s product would be found to be infringing.
F.

Inducement of Infringement

Inducement of infringement is defined by 35 U.S.C. § 271(b),
which provides that “whosoever actively induces infringement of a
886
patent shall be liable as an infringer.”
In order to succeed on a
claim of inducement, the patentee must show; first, that there has

877.
878.
879.
880.
881.
882.
883.
884.
885.
886.

Id. at 1324, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371-72.
Id. at 1326, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1373.
Id. at 1326-27, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1373-74.
275 F.3d 1371, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1376, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367.
Id. at 1374, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1365.
Id. at 1375, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1365.
Id. at 1375-76, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1365-66.
Id. at 1376-77, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367.
35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2000).
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887

been direct infringement, and second, that the alleged infringer
knowingly induced infringement and possessed specific intent to
888
In other words, the plaintiff
encourage another’s infringement.
must show that the infringer’s actions caused the infringing acts, and
that the infringer knew, or should have known, these actions would
889
induce infringements.
890
In Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. v. Chemque, Inc., the
Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s holding that Chemque
891
On appeal, Chemque alleged that
did not induce infringement.
892
there was no inducement because there was no literal infringement.
The Federal Circuit disagreed, determining that there was indeed
893
literal infringement, and therefore, the Federal Circuit held that
substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict of infringement by
894
inducement.
According to the Federal Circuit, Chemque knew
about the 3M patents and even gave customers instructions on how to
895
be use the infringing product.
The fact that this would lead to
896
infringement was evidence of inducement.
G. Infringement Under the Hatch-Waxman Act
The Hatch-Waxman Act provided a new means by which a patentee
897
can sue for infringement.
With the enactment of the HatchWaxman Act, Congress sought to strike a balance between two
898
competing policy interests.
The first interest was encouraging the
research and development of new drugs, and the second interest was
to allow competition in the form of low-cost, generic pharmaceutical
899
alternatives.
Under the Act, pharmaceutical manufacturers may
887. Epcon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., 279 F.3d 1022, 1033, 61
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1470, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
888. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1587, 1594 (Fed. Cir. 1990). But see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb
Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1525, 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(“[P]roof of actual intent to cause the acts which constitute the infringement is a
necessary prerequisite to finding active inducement.”) (footnote omitted).
889. Manville, 917 F.2d at 553, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1594.
890. 303 F.3d 1294, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
891. Id. at 1298, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1271.
892. Id. at 1305, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277.
893. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277.
894. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277.
895. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277.
896. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277.
897. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360cc & 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271
(2000).
898. Andryx Pharm. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1370, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1414, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
899. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1415.
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submit an ANDA to seek expedited approval from the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) of a generic version of a previously approved
900
In the course of submitting an ANDA, the generic drug
drug.
manufacturer must certify, inter alia, that the previously approved
drug’s patent is no longer valid, or will not be infringed by the
manufacture, use, or sale of the generic drug disclosed in the
901
ANDA. Congress has deemed that this paragraph IV certification is
itself an act of infringement, and thus, upon receiving notice of the
902
ANDA, the patent holder may sue the ANDA filer for infringement.
903
In Abbott Laboratories v. TorPharm, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit
examined whether the generic drug product was covered by Abbott
Laboratories’ patent. Specifically, the Federal Circuit reviewed
TorPharm’s attempt to introduce a generic version of Depakok, an
anticonvulsant medication approved for the treatment of epilepsy
904
Abbott Laboratories
and manufactured by Abbott Laboratories.
listed two patents in the “Orange Book” as corresponding to the
epilepsy medication, and sued TorPharm after TorPharm filed an
905
ANDA with the FDA. The district court granted summary judgment
of infringement against TorPharm based on TorPharm’s product
description in its package insert and based on Abbott Laboratories’
test data indicating that TorPharm’s biobatch material had a high
molecular weight—similar to material prepared according the two
906
Abbott Laboratories patents. On appeal, the Federal Circuit found
907
However, the
no error with the lower court’s claim construction.
Federal Circuit held that the lower court erred in finding no issue of
material fact with respect to the oligomeric structure of TorPharm’s
908
product. In particular, TorPharm’s expert provided an alternative
analysis of the identification of the mass spectrum of TorPharm’s
product corresponding to species with molecular weights claimed by
909
the Abbott Laboratories patents.
Therefore, the Federal Circuit
910
remanded the case for consideration of the alternative analysis.

900. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j).
901. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
902. Andrx Pharm., 276 F.3d at 1371, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1415; 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(2)(A) (2000).
903. 300 F.3d 1367, 1370, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1929, 1930 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
904. Id. at 1370, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930.
905. Id. at 1370-71, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930-31.
906. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930-31.
907. Id. at 1372, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931.
908. Id. at 1380-81, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937-38.
909. Id. at 1376-77, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1934-36.
910. Id. at 1381, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1938.
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In Bayer AG v. Biovail Corp., Bayer brought two infringement
actions: (1) asserting that the defendant infringed its high blood
pressure drug (Adalat) patent by seeking ANDA approval of a 60mg
generic version of the drug; and (2) by marketing a 30mg generic
912
version.
The district court granted summary judgment to Biovail
holding that Bayer was collaterally estopped on both claims based on
a previous finding of non-infringement by the Federal Circuit in a
913
similar 30mg Adalat ANDA infringement case. The Federal Circuit
vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment of collateral
estoppel because the district court’s prior construction of the claims
of the patent in suit did not address all of the issues contained in the
914
present suits. In the prior cases, the district court construed claims
915
in light of an ANDA specification.
In the present actions,
information regarding actual products manufactured in accordance
916
As such, the Federal Circuit held
with the ANDA was submitted.
that the district court was required to construe the claim with respect
917
to measurement of the manufactured products.
Further, with
respect to manufactured products made in accordance with the
ANDA specification of the prior action, the Federal Circuit held that
918
“infringement under § 271(e)(2)(A), by submission of an ANDA, is
not synonymous with infringement under § 271(a) by a commercial
product” and, therefore, the patentee should have “a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue of infringement by the commercial
tablets”
despite
a
finding
of
non-infringement
under
919
§ 271(e)(2)(A).
920
In Andrx Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Biovail Corp., the Federal Circuit
again considered infringement in the context of the filing of an
ANDA. Andrx, a generic drug manufacturer, had previously been
awarded a judgment of non-infringement of Biovail’s diltiazem
921
patent.
Prior to the final resolution of the first suit, Biovail had
acquired an exclusive license for a patent on an extended release
version of diltiazem, and was successful at getting this drug listed in

911.
912.
913.
914.
915.
916.
917.
918.
919.
920.
921.

279 F.3d 1340, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1675 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1342, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676.
Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676.
Id. at 1349-50, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682-83.
Id. at 1344, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678.
Id. at 1346-47, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679-80.
Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679-80.
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2000).
Bayer, 279 F.3d at 1350, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683.
276 F.3d 1368, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1414 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1372, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1416.
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922

the Orange Book.
Andrx protested the listing of this new patent,
923
but was unsuccessful in its request to have the drug delisted. Andrx
sued Biovail in a second infringement action seeking an adjudication
924
of non-infringement of the extended release patent.
Andrx also
sued the FDA for improper handling of its ANDA and refusal to delist
925
the extended release patent. In the second suit at the district court,
Andrx received a judgment shortening the statutory stay from ANDA
926
approval from thirty months to five months. Biovail appealed, and
the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s order, finding that the
lower court exceeded its authority in: (1) shortening the statutory
thirty-month delay of approval of Andrx’s pending ANDA by the
FDA, and (2) ordering that the ANDA be granted approval by the
927
FDA. The Federal Circuit held that the district court exceeded its
authority in shortening the thirty-month stay because there was little
evidence that the parties were not complying with statutory
928
requirements to cooperate in expediting the case.
Further, the
Federal Circuit noted that although claims may be brought under the
APA to compel the FDA to act in accordance with the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments, the complaint in this instance, failed to assert
929
jurisdiction under the APA.
H. Design Patent Infringement
Under 35 U.S.C. § 171, design patents may be obtained by the
inventor of any “new, original and ornamental design for an article of
930
manufacture.”
The determination of design patent infringement
requires a court to engage in: (1) construction of the patent claim,
and (2) a comparison of the construed claim to the accused
931
product.
In construing a design patent claim, the scope of the
claimed design encompasses the patent’s visual appearance as a
932
whole and the visual impression it creates.
Design patent
infringement may be found even where the accused design and the

922. Id. at 1372-73, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1416-17.
923. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1417.
924. Id. at 1373, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1417.
925. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1417.
926. Id. at 1374, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1418.
927. Id. at 1375, 1380, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1418, 1422.
928. Id. at 1376, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1419.
929. Id. at 1380, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1422.
930. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2000).
931. Elmer v. ICC Fabricating, Inc., 67 F.3d 1571, 1577, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1417, 1420 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
932. Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 104-05, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1788, 1791 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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933

patented design are not identical. In fact, the courts more heavily
weigh the appearance of the design as a whole as compared to the
934
accused product.
935
At issue in Hoop v. Hoop was a motorcycle windshield design
consisting of a pair of eagle-shaped motorcycle fairing guards, which
936
The Hoops
were created by brothers Jeffrey and Stephen Hoop.
hired Lisa and Mark Hoop to create drawings and models of the
937
designs.
Both sets of parties applied for, and received, a design
938
In subsequent litigation, the district court found that the
patent.
Hoop brothers were the true inventors and granted them a
939
preliminary injunction.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court’s preliminary injunction enjoining the plaintiffs
940
from acts constituting infringement of the Hoop brother’s patent.
The Federal Circuit stated that design patents and utility patents must
meet the same standard of inventorship, i.e. the person who
941
conceived the patented invention is the true inventor. The Federal
Circuit noted that the inventor retains his or her rights to the patent
even where the patentee uses the services, ideas, and aid of others in
942
the process of realizing the invention.
Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit found that, in addition to the undisputed facts that the Hoop
brothers conceived of the eagle-shaped fairing guards and enlisted
the assistance of Mark and Lisa Hoop, the accused patent lacked the
requisite inventive quality and the Hoop brothers therefore remained
943
the true inventors. Upon review of the accused patent, the Federal
Circuit agreed with the lower court’s determination that the design
was only a refined variation of the first design, thus rejecting the
contention that the accused patentees were the true inventors
because of additional detailed three-dimensional molds outlined in
933. Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 820, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1121, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
934. OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1405, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1641, 1647 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
935. 279 F.3d 1004, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1442 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
936. Id. at 1005, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1443.
937. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1443.
938. Id. at 1006, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1443.
939. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1443.
940. Id. at 1008, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1444.
941. Id. at 1007, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1443-44 (citing In re Rousso, 222 F.2d
729, 731, 106 U.S.P.Q. 99, 101 (CCPA 1955) (rejecting the assertion that a lesser
standard of invention applies to design patents than to mechanical patents); C.R.
Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., 157 F.3d 1340, 1352, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1232 (Fed.
Cir. 1998)).
942. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1444 (quoting Ethicon, Inc. v. United States
Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1548 (Fed. Cir.
1998)).
943. Id. at 1008, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1444.
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944

the accused patent.
Finally, the Federal Circuit held that the
creators of the original design, the Hoop brothers, were the true
inventors because they conceived of the invention and the accused
945
design lacked the requisite inventive quality.
In another design patent case, Contessa Food Products, Inc. v.
946
Conagra, Inc., the district court found, on summary judgment, that
Conagra infringed Contessa’s design patent on a serving tray for
947
shrimp party platters.
The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded
the district court’s decision, finding that the district court erred in
limiting its infringement analysis to “features visible at the point of
sale,” during which the underside of the tray—illustrated in the
948
patent drawings—was not visible. The Federal Circuit stated that in
determining design patent infringement, the “ordinary observer”
analysis must consider features beyond just one phase or part of the
949
useful life of the accused design. The Federal Circuit held that the
features of the accused products must be examined individually and
compared overall with the patented design as a whole, as depicted in
950
all figures, to determine design patent infringement.
Thus, all of
the ornamental features illustrated in the figures must be considered
951
in evaluating design patent infringement. On remand, the Federal
Circuit directed the district court to apply the “ordinary observer” test
where the hypothetical purchasing decision made by such an
observer included all ornamental features visible at any time during
952
the normal use of the product.
I.

Willful Infringement
953

In Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Services, Inc., Transclean sued
Bridgewood for patent infringement and a jury found that
Bridgewood willfully infringed the patent and engaged in false
954
advertising.
The district court granted Transclean’s motion for
summary judgment and held that Bridgewood infringed Transclean’s
patent as a sanction for Bridgewood’s failure to answer an
944. Id. at 1007-08, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1444.
945. Id. at 1007, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1444.
946. 282 F.3d 1370, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
947. Id. at 1375-76, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066-67.
948. Id. at 1378-79, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
949. Id. at 1380, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070 (citing KeyStone Retaining Wall
Sys., Inc. v. Westrock, Inc., 997 F.2d 1444, 1450-51, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1297, 1302
(Fed. Cir. 1993)).
950. Id. at 1381, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
951. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
952. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
953. 290 F.3d 1364, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
954. Id. at 1369, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868.
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interrogatory about Bridgewood’s ground for its defense of non955
infringement. However, the district court overturned a portion of
the jury’s damages award and denied Transclean’s motion for
956
enhanced damages based on the principle of willful infringement.
Applying regional circuit law, the Federal Circuit held that the
957
district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the sanction.
The Federal Circuit found that Transclean was entitled to a reply to
its interrogatory concerning grounds for its defense of non958
infringement. The district court was within its discretion to impose
a sanction because Transclean was clearly prejudiced by its inability to
959
conduct discovery on the infringement issues. The Federal Circuit
concluded by refusing to find that the district court abused its
discretion because this would impair the district court’s ability to
police its own proceedings, which ensures transparency and
predictability, and would impair the court’s ability to discourage
960
mischievous conduct by parties.
J.

Repair and Reconstruction

The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have through the years
grappled with the distinction between repair of a patented item and
961
reconstruction. In Husky Injection Molding Systems Ltd. v. R&D Tool
962
& Engineering Co., the Federal Circuit determined that there are at
least three types of repair and reconstruction circumstances. First,
there is the instance where the patented item is spent, or expired,
and the accused infringer reconstructs the item, thus making the
patented item usable again but also infringing on the original
963
patent.
A second, and non-infringing scenario, is where only part
964
A third permissible
of the spent patented item is replaced.
situation is where part of the patented item, although not spent, is

955. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868.
956. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868.
957. Id. at 1373, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
958. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
959. Id. at 1373-74, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
960. Id. at 1374, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
961. Husky Injection Molding Sys. Ltd. v. R&D Tool & Eng’g Co., 291 F.3d 780,
784-85, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1834, 1837 (Fed. Cir. 2002); DONALD S. CHISUM, 5
CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.03[3], at 16-159 (1997).
962. 291 F.3d 780, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1834 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
963. Id. at 785, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837 (citing Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons,
106 U.S. 89 (1882)).
964. Id. at 785-86, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837-38 (citing Aro Mfg. Co. v.
Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961)).
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replaced, thus enabling the object of the patent to perform a
965
different function.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment of non-infringement, holding that R&D’s replacement of
parts in the patented system were appropriately considered
permissible repair, rather than reconstruction, of the patented
966
system.
Husky asserted its patent against R&D for contributory
infringement; Husky’s patent covered a device for producing hollow
injection-molded plastic articles used in conjunction with a “carrier
967
plate.”
Neither the molds nor the carrier plates were separately
968
patented. Customers who used Husky’s patented machine regularly
switched molds and carrier plates when their manufacturing needs
changed, and R&D manufactured and replaced molds and carrier
969
plates which could be used in Husky’s machine.
The Federal
Circuit considered the parts in question to be readily replaceable,
primarily because Husky’s machine design allowed the carrier plates
970
and molds to be replaced.
In accordance with substantial
precedent, the Federal Circuit held that there was no infringement
because the parts were readily replaceable, and that marketing
replacement parts did not support Husky’s claim of contributory
971
infringement.
Further, the Federal Circuit rejected Husky’s
argument that the replaceable parts were essential to the invention,
972
finding such argument irrelevant.
Finally, the Federal Circuit
stated that the purchasers of the machines were within their rights to
replace the carrier plates and molds, thus precluding claims of
contributory infringement, which is itself based on direct
973
infringement.
K. Bona Fide Purchaser Doctrine
In an unusual case, Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics
974
Corp., the Federal Circuit granted a petition for rehearing en banc
975
to decide whether its decision in Heidelberg Harris, Inc. v. Loebach was
965. Id. at 786, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838 (citing Surfco Haw. v. Fin Control
Sys. Pty. Ltd., 264 F.3d 1062, 1065, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir.
2001)).
966. Id. at 782, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834.
967. Id. at 782-83, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1835.
968. Id. at 782, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1835.
969. Id. at 783, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1835.
970. Id. at 788, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840.
971. Id. at 789, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840.
972. Id. at 788, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839.
973. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839.
974. 284 F.3d 1323, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1187 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
975. 145 F.3d 1454, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1948 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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binding authority on the issue of whether the bona fide purchaser
976
In Rhone-Poulenc, the Federal
doctrine applies to patent licenses.
Circuit decided that Heidelberg was not binding and vacated the
977
previous panel decision, while issuing a new decision.
Previously,
Rhone-Poulenc Agro (RPA) and DeKalb jointly developed
978
During that
biotechnology related to specific genetic materials.
period, an RPA scientist developed, and patented, an optimized
979
transit peptide that helps herbicide-resistant corn grow.
DeKalb
was given a license to use the patented technology with the right to
980
sublicense, which it did to Monsanto.
RPA sued DeKalb and
Monsanto alleging that DeKalb procured the license by fraud, and
Monsanto defended on the grounds that it held a valid (sub)license
981
from DeKalb.
The district court found that Monsanto, as a
sublicensee, “‘could be considered a bona fide purchaser because it
had paid value for the right to use the technology without knowledge
982
of any wrongdoing by DeKalb.’” The Federal Circuit defines “bona
fide purchaser” as one who in good faith obtains legal title to
property in exchange for valuable consideration, free from notice of
983
any other claim of interest in the property.
The Federal Circuit
here relied on 35 U.S.C. § 271 to determine the meaning of “without
984
authority” to make, use, offer to sell, or sell the patented invention.
In examining the statute, the Federal Circuit departed from
precedent and determined that § 261 reflects a Congressional finding
that as a matter of law, only an assignee of all substantial rights can
985
benefit from protection of the statute for a bona fide purchaser.
Finally, the Federal Circuit held that there was no available bona fide
purchaser defense because Monsanto’s license was not exclusive, and
976. Rhone-Poulenc, 284 F.3d at 1325, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1188. The Federal
Circuit has noted that “a bona fide purchaser is one who purchases legal title to
property in good faith for valuable consideration without notice of any other claim of
the interest in the property.” Id. at 1329, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191 (citing Realty
Portfolio, Inc. v. Hamilton, 125 F.3d 292, 298 (5th Cir. 1997)); see also RESTATEMENT
OF RESTITUTION § 172 (1937).
977. Rhone-Poulenc, 284 F.3d at 1325, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1188-89.
978. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189.
979. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189.
980. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189.
981. Id. at 1326, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189.
982. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189 (quoting Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v.
Monsanto Co. and DeKalb Genetics Corp., No. 1:97CV1138, slip op. At 56 (M.D.N.C.
Feb. 8, 2000)).
983. Id. at 1329, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191 (citing Realty Portfolio, Inc. v.
Hamilton, 125 F.3d 292 (5th Cir. 1997)); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note
976, § 172.
984. Rhone-Poulenc, 284 F.3d at 1327, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1190; 35 U.S.C.
§ 271 (2000).
985. Id. at 1333, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1195; 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000)
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there was no argument from the parties that the license agreement
986
transferred all substantial rights.
IV. INEQUITABLE CONDUCT AND OTHER DEFENSES
A. Prosecution Laches
Prosecution laches is a defense to an infringement action involving
new claims stemming from ongoing applications that might prejudice
987
intervening adverse public rights. If an intervening patent is issued
more than two years before the filing of a divisional application, the
burden is imposed upon the divisional applicant or patentees to show
circumstances justifying the delay. This rule is applicable to any
988
statutory bar; for example, a public use or sale.
In the absence of
intervening rights, no excuse must be shown for a lapse of more than
989
two years in presenting the divisional application.
In Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson Medical, Education & Research
990
Foundation LP, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s
991
holding that prosecution laches was unavailable as a matter of law.
The Federal Circuit held that “the equitable doctrine of laches could
be applied to bar the enforcement of patent claims that issued after
an unreasonable and unexplained delay in prosecution, despite the
992
applicant’s statutory and regulatory compliance.” In so doing, the
Federal Circuit rejected the argument that (1) the doctrine was
limited to interference actions under Webster Electric Co. v. Splitdorf
993
Electrical Co., and its progeny; (2) the Patent Act of 1952 foreclosed
the application of prosecution laches; and (3) two of the Federal
Circuit’s non-precedential opinions rejecting prosecution laches
994
defenses should, in fact, bind the court.
Beyond affirming the
viability of this defense, the Federal Circuit did not elaborate
995
regarding how it should be applied.
986. Id. at 1334, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1195.
987. Symbol Tech., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found., 277 F.3d
1361, 1364, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1515, 1517 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
988. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Jeffrey-DeWitt Insulator Co., 22 F.2d 277,
279 (2d Cir. 1927).
989. Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Ferdinand Gutmann Co., 304 U.S. 159, 167-68
(1938).
990. 277 F.3d 1361, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1515 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
991. Id. at 1363, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516. See also supra notes 475-81
(discussing the concept of prosecution laches).
992. Symbol Technologies, 277 F.3d at 1368, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520.
993. 264 U.S. 463 (1924) (holding that an unreasonable eight-year delay rendered
the claims unenforceable).
994. Symbol Technologies, 277 F.3d at 1365-68, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1518-20.
995. Id. at 1363-68, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517-20.
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996

In In re Bogese II, the Federal Circuit applied the prosecution
laches doctrine in the context of delayed patent prosecution. The
court affirmed a decision by the USPTO Board finding that Bogese
forfeited his right to a patent. In doing so, the Federal Circuit held
that the USPTO could reject a patent application where the applicant
failed to advance prosecution for an unreasonably long period,
997
provided the USPTO gave notice of this consequence.
In
approving the Board’s findings, the Federal Circuit found that the
patentee’s intentional or negligent conduct of delaying the patent’s
issuance, hereby extending its term, was presumptively unreasonable
because it eroded patent law policy of promoting science and the
998
useful arts. The Federal Circuit also affirmed the Board’s holding
that forfeiture of a patent was appropriate when a patentee either
intentionally or negligently acted in a manner that unnecessarily
postponed the date that the public could rightfully and freely use the
999
invention. This holding effectively made USPTO power to punish
undue delay even broader than district court power to hold a patent
1000
unenforceable.
In her dissent, Judge Newman stated that the majority had
effectively given patent examiners additional powers to deny patents
1001
on the basis that the applicant was not timely in prosecution.
The
1002
Judge found this reason inconsistent with In re Henriksen, where the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals stated that “there was no
statutory basis for fixing an arbitrary limit to the number of prior
1003
applications [in] a chain of co-pending applications.”
Judge
Newman noted the USPTO’s equitable power was limited to relieving
1004
Although the GATT change to a twenty
distress, not causing it.
years from filing standard would make these situations more rare,
Judge Newman added that USPTO’s new power would impose a great
burden on all applicants while only occasionally punishing a
1005
transgressor.

996. 303 F.3d 1362, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
997. Id. at 1367-68, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452-53.
998. Id. at 1366, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1451.
999. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1451 (citing Ex parte Bogese II, slip op. at 35-36,
No. 86-1699, 818 F.2d 877 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 16, 1987)).
1000. Id. at 1367, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452.
1001. Id. at 1370, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454 (Newman, J., dissenting).
1002. 399 F.2d 253 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
1003. Bogese II, 303 F.3d at 1370, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454 (quoting In re
Henriksen, 399 F.2d at 254).
1004. Id. at 1370-71, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454-55.
1005. Id. at 1373, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456.
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B. Inequitable Conduct
1006

In Frank’s Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc. v. Vincent, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the patent in suit was
unenforceable because of the patentee’s inequitable conduct before
the USPTO. In affirming the conduct ruling, the Federal Circuit
rejected the argument that the patent should be enforced on behalf
of the innocent inventor because the inequitable conduct was not by
1007
the true inventor.
The Federal Circuit reiterated the long held
rule that “one bad apple spoils the entire barrel,” even as to otherwise
innocent individuals, confirming that the patent in suit “may not be
1008
enforced by innocent co-inventors.”
Moreover, the Federal Circuit
noted that the wrongdoers (as opposed to the innocent inventor)
prosecuted the patent in suit, thereby making the patent
1009
unenforceable.
1010
In Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit
reversed and remanded the district court’s ruling, in favor of Orange
Bang, that the patent at issue was invalid on the basis of prior use and
was unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. The Federal Circuit
held that the record was devoid of substantial evidence to support the
jury’s verdict because there was no evidence showing that the prior
1011
use device satisfied every limitation of the claimed invention.
The
Federal Circuit also held that the uncorroborated oral testimony
presented to show prior public use failed to constitute the “clear and
convincing evidence necessary to invalidate the patent for prior
1012
public knowledge.”
With respect to the first of two declarations of
misconduct submitted to the USPTO, the Federal Circuit stated that
every statement of the declaration relating to the invention was true
1013
and therefore did not constitute inequitable conduct.
With respect
to the second declaration, the Federal Circuit stated that the accused
infringer did not identify specific statements that Juicy Whip knew
1014
were false.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit determined that the
1015
evidence of materiality and intent to deceive was lacking.

1006.
1007.
1008.
1009.
1010.
1011.
1012.
1013.
1014.
1015.

292 F.3d 1363, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1377, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075.
Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075.
Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075.
292 F.3d 728, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 738, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1257-58.
Id. at 743, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
Id. at 744, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
Id. at 745, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263.
Id. at 744-45, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262-63.
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C. Use of the Invention by the United States Government
1016

In Madey v. Duke University,
the Federal Circuit reversed the
district court’s partial dismissal, reversed the district court’s summary
judgment which applied the experimental use defense to Duke
University’s use of Madey’s patented technology, and affirmed the
district court’s summary judgment that Duke University did not
infringe the patents because it did not own or control the accused
1017
infringing equipment.
Previously, the district court dismissed
several of Madey’s claims on the grounds that Duke University’s use
of the patents was under the authority of a government research
grant and that the case should be brought in the Court of Federal
1018
Claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).
Thus, the district court
1019
In
determined that it did not have jurisdiction over those claims.
reversing this partial dismissal, the Federal Circuit determined that
the district court erred by failing to apply Federal Circuit law and by
providing no findings or analysis upon which to base a review of the
1020
decision.
In granting summary judgment to Duke University, the district
court determined that Madey failed to create a genuine issue of
material fact that Duke University was engaged in a commercial
1021
enterprise.
Upon reversal, the Federal Circuit concluded that the
district court had used an overly broad formulation of the
experimental use doctrine, which is typically “very narrow and strictly
1022
limited.”
The Federal Circuit indicated that the correct focus of
the experimental use defense should be on whether Duke
University’s use was for legitimate non-commercial purposes, rather
1023
than examining Duke University’s non-profit status.
Further, the
Federal Circuit noted that Duke University aggressively pursued a
patent licensing program, from which it derived a substantial revenue
1024
stream.
1025
the Federal Circuit vacated and
In Toxgon Corp. v. BNFL, Inc.,
remanded the district court’s determination that it lacked subject
1026
matter jurisdiction in an infringement action.
The patentee filed
1016.
1017.
1018.
1019.
1020.
1021.
1022.
1023.
1024.
1025.
1026.

307 F.3d 1351, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737 (BNA) 1737 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1352, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1737-38.
Id. at 1358-60, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744; 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000).
Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
Id. at 1359-60, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744.
Id. at 1355-57, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740-42.
Id. at 1361-62, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746.
Id. at 1362-63, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747.
Id. at 1363 n.7, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747 n.7.
312 F.3d 1379, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1380, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1147.
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suit, alleging infringement by BNFL’s process for treating and
removing radioactive material using a pilot melter, described as a
single-chamber vitrification system that converts nuclear waste into
1027
glass.
In response, the accused infringer asserted, under Rule
12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that the
infringement occurred under the authority of and for the sole
benefit of the United States, thus requiring the claims to be heard in
1028
the Court of Federal Claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).
Section
1498(a) restricts suits against the United States to monetary
compensation for infringement and also relieves federal contractors
of liability where the contractor uses or manufactures an infringing
1029
invention for the United States.
Consistent with Supreme Court
precedent, the Federal Circuit long has held that § 1498(a) is not a
jurisdictional bar but can be used as an affirmative defense in a suit
1030
between private litigants.
As such, the Federal Circuit found that
the district court inappropriately dismissed the infringement suit
1031
under Rule 12(b)(1).
According to the Federal Circuit, a more
appropriate remedy for defenses arising under § 1498(a) should be
1032
addressed by summary judgment under Rule 56.
D. Estoppel
1033

In University of West Virginia v. VanVoorhies,
the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment of the
University’s claim that a co-inventor of a patent breached his duty to
assign inventions developed during the course of the co-inventor’s
1034
graduate studies at the University.
First, the Federal Circuit
acknowledged that while questions of contract law are matters of state
law, the question of whether a patent application was a continuationin-part of an earlier filed patent application, and thus covered by a
previously executed assignment, was a question of patent law as
1035
Moreover, the Federal Circuit held
interpreted under federal law.
that under the University’s patent policy, the defendant was obligated
to assign patent applications to the University even without a signed
1036
contract requiring such an assignment.
1027.
1028.
1029.
1030.
1031.
1032.
1033.
1034.
1035.
1036.

Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147.
Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147-48; 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000).
28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).
Toxgon, 312 F.3d at 1381, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148.
Id. at 1382, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149.
Id. at 1382-83, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149.
278 F.3d 1288, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1299, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455.
Id. at 1296-97, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
Id. at 1298, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455.
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In affirming the district court’s rejection of the defendant’s
argument that a previously executed assignment was invalid, the
Federal Circuit clarified that “while the doctrine of assignor estoppel
precluded challenges to the validity of a patent itself, it did not
preclude challenges to the validity of a contract assigning the
1037
Finally, the Federal Circuit held that an inventor’s act of
patent.”
providing technical information to the University’s patent counsel
and executing the necessary documents for prosecuting a patent
application did not give rise to an attorney-client relationship
between the University’s counsel and the defendant inventor, nor did
these circumstances require disqualification when the University and
1038
the inventor’s interests became adverse.
V. REMEDIES
A. Preliminary Injunction
1039

In Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Resources, Inc., the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction
enjoining Interface from infringing claims of its patent for raised
1040
access flooring panels.
Interface appealed only the lower court’s
conclusion regarding the likelihood of success based on the merits of
1041
The Federal Circuit first held that
Tate’s infringement claim.
1042
there was no practicing prior art defense to literal infringement.
Next, the Federal Circuit rejected Interface’s argument that the lower
court’s interpretation of the term “border,” which “encompass[es]
the simple beveled edges in the accused floor panels” was an
1043
erroneous construction.
The Federal Circuit found that a person
of ordinary skill in the art of raised access floor panels would know

1037. Id. at 1301-02, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457-58; see also Diamond Sci. Co. v.
Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2028 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The court
in Diamond Scientific held:
Assignor estoppel is an equitable doctrine that prevents one who has
assigned the rights to a patent (or patent application) from later contending
that what was assigned is a nullity. The estoppel also operates to bar other
parties in privity with the assignor, such as a corporation founded by the
assignor. The estoppel historically has applied to invalidity challenges based
on “novelty, utility, patentable invention, anticipatory matter, and the state
of the art.
Id. at 1224, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2031 (citation omitted).
1038. VanVoorhies, 278 F.3d at 1303-04, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459.
1039. 279 F.3d 1357, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
1040. Id. at 1360, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648.
1041. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648.
1042. Id. at 1369, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656.
1043. Id. at 1370, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656.
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that the term “border” referred to “the area or zone forming an edge
1044
In reviewing
or trim framing the decorative surface of the panel.”
the patent, the Federal Circuit found no requirements in the
specification or claims that “the ‘border’ be horizontal or formed of a
1045
single layer.”
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit held that the
accused’s panels infringed the patentee’s panels and that Tate met
the “likelihood of success on the merits” prong of the preliminary
1046
injunction test.
B. Damages
1.

Other than reasonable royalty
1047
In Vulcan Engineering Co. v. FATA Aluminum, Inc.,
the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of patent validity,
infringement, and a damages award of lost profits, but remanded to
determine whether the patentee was entitled to additional price
1048
erosion damages.
The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district
court’s denial of damages as to other infringing processes, attorney
1049
fees, enhanced damages, and a new trial.
In denying damages for
other infringing processes, the Federal Circuit held that the
patentee’s grant of an express license to a third party user of the
patented process was inconsistent with an assertion of damages for
1050
infringement against the defendant.
After determining that the
patentee reserved only the right to damages for failing to obtain the
business of providing the infringing process, the district court did not
award damages because the patentee failed to prove the amount of
1051
the relevant damages with certainty.
1052
the Federal Circuit
In Fiskars, Inc. v. Hunt Manufacturing Co.,
affirmed the district court’s determination that a defendant’s motion
to reopen and vacate a damages judgment, two years after entry of
1053
that judgment, should be denied.
Hunt filed a motion for relief of
judgment based on Rules 60(b)(5) or 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, seeking vacatur of the damages award based on
new evidence allegedly showing that Fiskars was not entitled to lost
1044.
1045.
1046.
1047.
1048.
1049.
1050.
1051.
1052.
1053.

Id. at 1370, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656.
Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657.
Id. at 1372, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658.
278 F.3d 1366, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1380, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554.
Id. at 1378-80, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552-54.
Id. at 1378, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552.
Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552.
279 F.3d 1378, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1851 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1379, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1852.
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1054

profits.
The Federal Circuit first found that Federal Circuit law
applied in this case, and that Rule 60(b)(6) was available only in
1055
The
extraordinary circumstances, which were not present here.
Federal Circuit also rejected Hunt’s contention argument that
damages for lost profits should be reexamined post-trial where
probative market data about acceptability becomes available—after “a
non-infringing alternative replaces the infringing product in the
1056
marketplace.”
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit also agreed with the
district court’s finding that the evidence, which arose nearly two years
after trial, did not create such extraordinary circumstances as to
1057
invoke Rule 60(b)(6).
2.

Reasonable royalty
1058
the district court
In Riles v. Shell Exploration & Production Co.,
refused to grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law which
would overturn a jury verdict of infringement and award of damages.
The Federal Circuit agreed that “substantial evidence supported the
jury’s finding of infringement,” but that the damages were “excessive
1059
With respect to damages, Riles’s
and unsupported by evidence.”
damages theory was that if Shell had a patented method of
construction on the platform, it could result in an injunction on the
1060
use of the entire platform.
Such an injunction would force Shell to
either abandon its $84 million platform or to pay Riles a percentage
1061
royalty.
The Federal Circuit found this theory to be legally
incorrect, because Shell could lawfully use its platform without
infringing Riles’s patent, and the Federal Circuit therefore found that
the record did not support a percentage royalty based on the cost of
1062
the entire platform.
Moreover, the Federal Circuit found that Riles’s damages model
was incorrect because it did not pair the proposed royalty with the
value of the patented method—but rather with the unrelated cost of
the entire Shell platform—which included costs outside of the costs
1063
of anchoring without mud mats.
In remanding the case for a re1054. Id. at 1380, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853.
1055. Id. at 1382, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854 (citing Marquip, Inc. v. Fosber Am.
Inc., 198 F.3d 1363, 1370, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1015, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
1056. Id. at 1383, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855.
1057. Id. at 1381-83, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855.
1058. 298 F.3d 1302, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1819 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
1059. Id. at 1305, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821.
1060. Id. at 1311, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825.
1061. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825.
1062. Id. at 1311-12, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826.
1063. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826.
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determination of damages, the Federal Circuit held that the market
would not award Riles a royalty for his method that was separated
1064
from relations to potential non-infringing alternative methods.
1065
In Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Services, Inc.,
a jury found that
Bridgewood willfully infringed the patent and engaged in false
advertising. Transclean subsequently appealed the district court’s
reversal of part of the jury’s damages award and its denial of
Transclean’s motion for enhanced damages based on willful
infringement; in turn, Bridgewood cross-appealed the findings of
1066
validity and infringement.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the lower
1067
With regard to damages, the
court’s finding of patent validity.
district court disallowed the allocation of a percentage of the sale of
1068
Bridgewood’s business to Transclean as a reasonable royalty.
The
Federal Circuit affirmed this decision, stating that for purposes of
calculating a base from which to determine reasonable royalties,
there was no concrete relation between the value of a business’s
1069
goodwill at sale and the sales from infringing goods.
Further, with
regard to the denial of enhanced damages, the Federal Circuit found
1070
that the district court did not abuse its discretion.
3.

Attorney fees and costs
1071
the Federal Circuit
In Pickholtz v. Rainbow Technologies, Inc.,
reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement, but affirmed the district court’s denial of Pickholtz’s
1072
motion for infringement.
In so ruling, the Federal Circuit vacated
the district court’s refusal to award attorney fees to Pickholtz, finding
that the language of Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
1073
did not allow pro se lawyers to receive fees for their own time.
Upon remanding the case, the Federal Circuit noted, however, that
the court’s inherent power could be invoked, even where a
procedural rule exists that sanctions the same conduct, to determine

1064. Id. at 1312, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826.
1065. 290 F.3d 1364, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
1066. Id. at 1367, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866-67.
1067. Id. at 1373, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
1068. Id. at 1375, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873 (citing Transclean Corp. v.
Bridgewood Serv., Inc., No. 97-2298, slip op. at 3 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2001)).
1069. Id. at 1376-77, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874.
1070. Id. at 1377, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875.
1071. 284 F.3d 1365, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
1072. Id. at 1367-68, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341.
1073. Id. at 1376-78, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1347-49; FED. R. CIV. P. 37.
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whether Pickholtz was entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to this
1074
power.
1075
Kohus’s patent infringement suit had
In Kohus v. Cosco, Inc.,
1076
failed and Cosco sought to recover litigation costs from Kohus.
The district court awarded Cosco $975.90 for deposition costs and
1077
The Federal Circuit reversed
$12,950.00 for exhibit expenses.
these awards, finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1920 provided the only remedy
1078
for awarding costs.
The Federal Circuit held that the video was
neither an exemplification nor a copy of a paper, and the district
court had no statutory authority to award costs to the defendants for
1079
the video.
In doing so, the Federal Circuit considered a Sixth
1080
Circuit decision, Swan Carburetor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., to determine
whether the video could be considered “drawings, charts, or physical
models.” The court in Swan allowed costs to be awarded for drawings
1081
and charts, but not for physical models.
In applying Swan and
denying cost recovery of the video, the Federal Circuit held that the
defendant’s video was a physical model, because it was a substitute for
a physical model and was created to assist counsel’s arguments and
1082
expert witness’ explanations.
Judge Dyk dissented, stating that, in
fact, a video should be included in the costs covered by 28 U.S.C.
1083
Judge Dyk also stated that the language of the statute
§ 1920(4).
1084
could be construed to include “after-invented technology.”
C. Attorney Conduct
1.

Contempt
1085
In Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Arrow Communication Laboratories, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit reversed the decision of the district court, which
held that there was no violation of a protective order. The Federal
Circuit also vacated a summary judgment decision by the district
court that there was no infringement and remanded the case for
1074. Pickholtz, 284 F.3d at 1376-78, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348-49.
1075. 282 F.3d 1355, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1145 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
1076. Id. at 1356, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146 (citing Kohus v. Cosco, Inc., 250
F.3d 758 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curium)).
1077. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146.
1078. Id. at 1359, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148-49; 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2000).
1079. Kohus, 282 F.3d at 1359, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1148-49.
1080. 149 F.2d 476, 65 U.S.P.Q. 386 (6th Cir. 1945).
1081. Id. at 477, 65 U.S.P.Q. at 387.
1082. Kohus, 282 F.3d at 1360-61, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149-50.
1083. Id. at 1361, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150 (Dyk, J., dissenting); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1920(4).
1084. Kohus, 282 F.3d at 1361, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150.
1085. 305 F.3d 1303, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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1086

trial.
During discovery and under a protective order, Arrow
(Arcom) produced a confidential and pending patent application to
1087
Under the belief that Eagle had rights to the subject matter
Eagle.
in the application, Eagle’s attorney made copies of the patent
application and filed the copies as two separate applications with the
1088
USPTO.
In a letter to Arcom nine days later, Eagle’s attorney
1089
explained that he was seeking to preserve Eagle’s rights.
When
Arcom petitioned the district court to hold Eagle’s attorney in
contempt, Eagle argued, and the district court agreed, that the
attorney’s actions did not violate the protective order because the
disclosure was to the USPTO, which already possessed the pending
1090
patent application.
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, finding
that the conduct of Eagle’s attorney was “egregious” and that the
district court’s failure to find a violation of the protective order was
1091
most certainly an abuse of discretion.”
2.

Pre-filing investigation under Rule 11
1092
the Federal
In Antonious v. Spalding & Evenflo Companies, Inc.
Circuit vacated and remanded the district court decision to
determine whether counsel for Antonious failed to conduct
1093
reasonable pre-filing factual investigations.
The Federal Circuit
held that plaintiff’s attorneys could be sanctioned under Rule
11(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if a reasonable
1094
attorney would have found the claim construction frivolous.
In
finding the claim construction was not frivolous, the Federal Circuit
remanded for a determination as to whether plaintiff’s counsel’s
investigation was thorough enough to satisfy the Rule 11(b)(3) pre1095
filing investigation requirement.

1086. Id. at 1306, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482.
1087. Id. at 1311, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485.
1088. Id. at 1311-12, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486. One patent application
identified only an Eagle employee as inventor; the other identified Eagle and Arcom
employees as joint inventors. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486.
1089. Id. at 1312, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486.
1090. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486.
1091. Id. at 1314, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487-88 (“[C]opying a competitor’s
patent application obtained through discovery and submitting it as your own—for
whatever reason—is not using the material for purposes of litigation.”).
1092. 275 F.3d 1066, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
1093. Id. at 1068-69, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246.
1094. Id. at 1072, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249.
1095. Id. at 1077, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1252.

FINALPATENTSUMMARY.DOC

996

8/15/2003 1:41 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:891
1096

In Fantasy Sports Properties, Inc. v. Sportsline.com, Inc., the Federal
Circuit affirmed-in-part and vacated-in-part the summary judgment of
1097
The claims on appeal
non-infringement of the district court.
related to a method and apparatus for playing a “fantasy” football
1098
computer game.
Following an infringement analysis, the Federal
Circuit denied Yahoo!’s motion for attorney fees and costs because
Fantasy had conducted a proper pre-filing investigation, which
included setting forth a reasonable claim construction under which
1099
the defendants literally infringed.
3.

Attorney statements
In Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics Technology Corp. v. Shell Oil
1100
Co.,
the Federal Circuit affirmed-in-part, reversed-in-part, and
remanded a decision of the district court finding non-infringement
1101
of Union Carbide’s patents.
Union Carbide patents covered
ethylene oxide silver catalysts with improved efficiency, and the
1102
claims contained an “efficiency equation.”
Among other things,
Union Carbide argued that it was entitled to a new trial because of
improper statements made by Shell’s counsel about Union Carbide’s
past copying of Shell patents, which allegedly tainted the jury, thus
1103
precluding a fair verdict.
The district court found the statements
“improper,” but concluded that they had not influenced the jury
1104
verdict.
In noting the lower court’s need to monitor attorneys
appearing before it, the Federal Circuit found the statements
“unacceptable,” but ruled that the district court did not abuse its
discretion; the statements went more to invalidity—which was
1105
ultimately not a jury question—than to infringement.
CONCLUSION
In 2002, the Federal Circuit continued to play a major role in the
field of patent law, securing its position as one of the most important
courts in the United States. It was an unusual year for the court as it
saw two of its cases taken up by the Supreme Court, Holmes Group, Inc.

1096.
1097.
1098.
1099.
1100.
1101.
1102.
1103.
1104.
1105.

287 F.3d 1108, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1564 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1111, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566.
Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566.
Id. at 1120, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573.
308 F.3d 1167, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1171, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547.
Id. at 1171-72, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547-48.
Id. at 1180, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555.
Id. at 1183, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1556.
Id. at 1183-84, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1556.
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v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.
and Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
1107
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushki Co., Ltd., both resulting in reversals.
The Federal Circuit also issued two en banc decisions. In Johnson
1108
& Johnston Associates Inc. v. R.E. Service Co., Inc., the court clarified
the law on the doctrine of equivalents post-Festo. And, in Rhone1109
Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., the court decided that the
1110
previous decision in Heidelberg Harris, Inc. v. Loebach
was not
binding authority on the issue of whether the bona fide purchaser
doctrine applies to patent licenses.
Nevertheless, for the most part, the Federal Circuit continued to
play its important role of ensuring that the patent laws are applied in
a uniform manner.

1106.
1107.
1108.
1109.
1110.

535 U.S. 826, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (2002).
535 U.S. 722, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (2002).
285 F.3d 1046, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
284 F.3d 1323, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1187 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
145 F.3d 1454, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1948 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

